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U.S. V. PARKER: WILL THOSE WITH STANDING PLEASE
STAND UP
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the United States Congress passed a law that required all
state senates to be comprised of 25 members. This would obviously be
an invasion of the state sovereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amend-
ment. However, who could maintain a suit to fight this law? Could the
state? Could a displaced senator? Could a citizen claiming vote dilu-
tion? Would it make a difference if the state agreed? Each of these
questions involves the issue of standing.
In the case of United States v. Parker,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a circuit split on whether a pri-
vate individual had standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment claim.2 The
preliminary issue in such a claim is whether a private individual may
allege that a federal action has infringed a state's rights in violation of
the Tenth Amendment, or whether the state is the only entity with stand-
ing to pursue such a claim.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to private stand-
ing in suits challenging federal action under the Tenth Amendment, as
demonstrated by United States v. Parker. Part II provides a general
background on the Tenth Amendment and the issue of standing. Part III
considers the precedential backdrop, including past Tenth Circuit deci-
sions and holdings from other circuits. Part IV will examine the Parker
case, including the facts and the holding. Finally, Part V will analyze the
holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment reserves for the states any power "not dele-
gated to the United States ' 3 nor "prohibited ... to the states. ''4 Courts
have interpreted this amendment as the manifestation of the framers'
intent to maintain the dual sovereignty of federal and state governments.
5
The powers granted to these sovereigns are only over people, not over
each other.6 In general, the federal government cannot "commandeer"
1. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284-85.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4. Id.
5. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
6. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.
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state legislatures.7  When such commandeering occurs, a state will usu-
ally bring a challenge to the federal action, claiming that it improperly
infringed upon an issue of local concern.8 Other times, however, private
plaintiffs have sought to vindicate these rights.9
In furtherance of the dual sovereignty principle, neither sovereign
can agree to the relinquishment of any sovereign power.10 In the hypo-
thetical presented in the introduction, the law mandating the structure of
the state senate is unconstitutional, even if the state agreed to its terms.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government gen-
erally lacked the power to regulate individuals. In fact, the Confederate
government only had "greatly restricted" power over the states. 1 In con-
trast, the Constitution created a federal government that acted directly
upon its citizens. 12 Also in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the
new Constitution did not retain for the states any power not "expressly"
delegated to the federal government.1 3  This left room under the new
constitution for incidental and implied powers.
The framers of the Constitution, in particular James Madison, cre-
ated the Tenth Amendment to alleviate the anti-federalists' fears that the
federal government may encroach on the sovereignty of the states in an
exercise of legitimate power. 14  In fact, the Tenth Amendment was
probably necessary to convince the states to ratify the Constitution.
15
Before the Constitution, the people vested power in the states. 16  The
Constitution, with the states' consent as evidenced by the ratifications,
granted some of these powers to the new federal government.' 7 Since the
federal government is one of "enumerated powers," it is necessarily re-
stricted to those powers "delegated to the United States."' 8 The states
retained, and continue to retain, all other powers.
7. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
8. Ara B. Gershengom, Note: Private Party Standing To Raise Tenth Amendment Comman-
deering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1066 [hereinafter, Gershengorn].
9. Id.
10. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
11. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).
12. Oregon, 74 U.S. at 76.
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819).
14. Gershengom, supra note 8, at 1083-84; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
15. Justice Powell stated:
[Elight States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. All eight of these included among their recommendations some version
of what later became the Tenth Amendment. So strong was the concern that the proposed
Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provi-
sion reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the
Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 569 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
16. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
17. Id. at 403-04.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Until the twentieth century, courts treated the Tenth Amendment as
a "truism" that did not perform any "substantive independent work." 19
This is illustrated by United States v. Darby,2 ° where the Court stated:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments ... or that its purpose was other
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to
exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers.21
The Tenth Amendment made a brief jurisprudential appearance in
1976 with the National League of Cities v. Usery22 decision. In Usery,
the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set minimum
wage standards, would violate the Tenth Amendment if applied to the
states. The Usery Court held that the Tenth Amendment was a limitation
on the Article I powers of Congress, which in this case was the Com-
merce Power.23 This was the first substantive use of the Tenth Amend-
ment. Subsequent cases followed the Usery reasoning until 1985.24
In 1985, Justice Blackmun, having concurred in Usery, wrote the
majority opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.25 In Garcia, Blackmun rejected the substantive role of
the Tenth Amendment. Garcia again involved the Fair Labor Standards
Act, this time applied to a municipal transit authority. Rejecting the
Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal power, the Court held that
"procedural safeguards," such as the political process was the only pro-
tection of state sovereignty.26 Thus, the Tenth Amendment was again
relegated as a "truism" with no substantive power.
The Tenth Amendment reappeared again in 1992, in New York v.
United States.27 In the New York decision, the Court held that the Tenth
Amendment prevented the federal government from "commandeering"
19. Gershengom, supra note 8, at 1068.
20. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
21. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1068 (quoting United States v. Darby 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941)).
22. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
23. Id. at 845. Article I, § 8 lists the powers of the legislative branch, such as the power to lay
taxes, regulate commerce, and declare war. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
24. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)
(analyzing whether the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act was a Tenth Amendment
violation); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 (1982) (analyzing whether the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act was a Tenth Amendment violation); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
(1983) (analyzing whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was a Tenth Amendment
violation).
25. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
26. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 182-83 (15th ed.
2004).
27. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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state legislatures. 28 Although the commerce power authorized the chal-
lenged act in New York, it interfered with the state's exercise of its sover-
eignty. While the facts of the case are inconsequential for purposes of
this paper, New York is interesting because it marks the re-emergence of
the Tenth Amendment as a substantive limitation on federal action. The
Court has reaffirmed the reasoning set forth in New York in several sub-
29sequent decisions.
Essentially, the Court's most recent interpretations of the Tenth
Amendment hold that it is a substantive right protecting the sovereignty
of the states. It does so by limiting the federal government to only those
powers enumerated by the United States Constitution. Further, it limits
the federal government's legitimate exercise of power when that exercise
would interfere with a state's sovereignty.
B. Standing
Generally, the question of standing is simply, "Do we have the cor-
rect plaintiff for this case?" Traditionally, courts analyze a plaintiffs
standing to bring his claim independent of the merits of the plaintiffs
claim. 30 The United States Constitution imposes the requirement of
standing through the "cases" and "controversies" clauses. 31  These
clauses require that parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy ' 32 that they present the "concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
To insure this personal stake, Article III courts (the only courts affected
by the "cases" and "controversies" requirements) have, in addition, im-
posed a prudential requirement that will not allow a party to "rest his
claim to relief on the rights of another who does not press those rights. 34
In other words, if A suffers an injury, B cannot bring a lawsuit on A's
behalf.35 Furthermore, when determining whether a party has standing,
the court will apply the summary judgment standard and accept as true
all material allegations of the complaint, and construe the complaint in
favor of the complaining party.36
28. New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
29. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I[I § 2.
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
34. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
35. This ignores some jus tertii assertions that allow this in a few specific situations, such as a
parent representing a child's interest. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 277 (1984).
36. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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Prudential requirements are generally attributed to Justices Brandeis
and Frankfurter.37 Both of these justices advocated judicial deference to
the democratic process by invoking justiciability doctrines such as ripe-
ness,38 reviewability39 and standing4° to avoid reviewing legislative ac-
tions.
In 1992, the Court offered a succinct statement of the standing re-
quirement in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
41
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible consti-
tutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a le-
gally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
42
Justice Scalia stated that these requirements are imposed by the
"case and controversy" requirement of Article III. However, he also
admits, "some of its elements express merely prudential considera-
tions. ' '43 One of the prudential considerations is the third-party standing
bar, as articulated by the "injury" requirement. The Constitution does
not require that the plaintiff be the injured party. The case and contro-
versy requirement would be satisfied simply if there were an injury, re-
gardless of who the plaintiff is. Therefore, the third-party standing bar is
a prudential requirement.
As a side note, because the third-party standing bar is a prudential
requirement, Congress can bypass that requirement statutorily, such as in
qui tam statutes" and "citizen suit statutes."45 However, such Congres-
37. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article
111, 91 MICH. L REV. 163, 179 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein].
38. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (case dismissed
for, among other reasons, failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
39. See FCC v. CBS of Cal., 311 U.S. 132, 136 (1940) (case dismissed for lack of reviewabil-
ity).
40. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-45 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
41. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 560.
44. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 175 (discussing the history of qui tam suits in American
jurisprudence). See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
388 n.1 [hereinafter Caminker] (The phrase "qui tam" is shorthand for "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se imposo sequitur," interpreted as "who brings the action as well for the king as for
himself"). Usually, a qui tam statute grants an individual the right to file suit for enforcement of that
statute, even when the individual has no personal interest or injury, beyond the "bounty" offered by
2005]
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sional waiver to the third-party standing bar is outside the scope of this
survey, and will not be addressed here.
III. PRECEDENT
A. Supreme Court
One of the early decisions on the issue of "private attorneys gen-
eral '4 6 litigating Tenth Amendment violations was Tenn. Elec. Power
Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth.47 In 1933, the United States Congress passed
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act.48 Under this Act, the Tennessee
Valley Authority ("Tennessee") was to erect a series of dams on the Ten-
nessee River to control flooding and produce power.49 Several power
companies, including the Tennessee Electric Power Company, filed suit
seeking to have Tennessee enjoined from producing power and thereby
competing with them.50 One of the plaintiffs' contentions was that the
Act violated the Tenth Amendment because it "result[ed] in federal regu-
lation of the internal affairs of the states' 5 ' and was outside of the enu-
merated powers of the federal government. The Court rejected this con-
tention by holding that "[t]he sale of government property [power] in
competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment."
52
The Court further stated that "there is no objection to the Authority's
operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent
the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any ques-
tion under the amendment.,
53
Several taxpayer cases have also suggested that rights under the
Tenth Amendment belonged only to the states. In Frothingham v. Mel-
lon,54 the plaintiff alleged that the Maternity Act of 1921 5 exceeded
the suit. Id. at 345. See also Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers And The Public Fisc: Paradigms
Of Government Harm Under The Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121, 125 (2001) (discuss-
ing contemporary qui tam actions under the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
(1994)).
45. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 223-25 (discussing the viability of citizen suits after Lujan). A
"citizen suit" statute grants an individual the right to file suit for enforcement of that statute when the
individual's injury or interest is representative of the public injury. Caminker, supra note 44, at 345.
Compare this with the qui tam statutes. Id.
46. Caminker, supra note 44, at 343 ("Individuals bringing suits of either [qui tam or citizen]
type are often called 'private attorneys general'.....
47. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
48. 73 Cong. Ch. 32,48 Stat. 58 (1933).
49. Id.
50. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1073.
51. Tennessee, 306 U.S. at 136.
52. Id. at 144.
53. Id.
54. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This case was decided together with a companion case Massachu-
setts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), so some references refer to this case name. The Frothingham
case involved an individual's standing, whereas the Mellon case, based on the same controversy,
involved the State's standing on the exact same issue. Id. at 478-79. Since this article is concerned
with individual standing, I will ignore the Mellon companion case.
55. 67 Cong. Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
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Congress' "enumerated powers" under Article I, §8. The Maternity Act
authorized appropriations to reduce infant and maternal mortality. 5 The
plaintiff contended that the Act "invades the local concerns of the State,
and is a usurpation of power."57 The Court held that the plaintiff did not
have standing because she was seeking to enforce the legislative power
of the state.
58
Later, in Flast v. Cohen,59 the Supreme Court again implied that
only a state had standing to assert a Tenth Amendment violation.60 In
Flast, the plaintiff sought review of the trial court's dismissal of his case
for lack of standing. 61 In the trial court, the plaintiff had alleged that the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196562 violated the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment63 because it
provided federal funds for religious schools. 64 The Court held that unlike
Ms. Frothingham, Mr. Flast had standing. The Court held that while Ms.
Frothingham was asserting the state's rights, Mr. Flast was, in fact, as-
serting personal rights.65 Therefore, Mr. Flast was not asserting "third
party" rights.
Given the holdings in Flast and Frothingham, one might conclude
that a private individual would only have standing to pursue a case as-
serting private rights, not state's rights. In essence, a private individual
can only pursue a Tenth Amendment claim when the contested federal
action violates a personal right, not the rights conferred merely by the
individual's status as a taxpayer or a citizen of his or her state.
However, several cases imply that an individual's right to pursue a
Tenth Amendment claim does exist.66 The Court, in deciding some of
the New Deal era cases on the merits, must have granted the parties
standing by implication,67 because a lack of standing would have resulted
in the Court's dismissal of the case sua sponte.68 For example, in
Helvering v. Davis,69 the plaintiff claimed that the Social Security pro-
gram was an invasion of the state's Tenth Amendment rights.70 In reject-
56. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
57. Id. at 480.
58. Id.
59. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
60. Flast, 392 U.S. at 126.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
63. Flast, 392 U.S. at 86-87.
64. Id. at 85-86.
65. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1073-74.
66. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 646 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
67. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1982).
68. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
69. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619.
70. Id. at 637.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ing this contention, the Court granted standing by implication by decid-
ing the case on the merits.7'
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,72 the Court
noted that there is a prudential limitation whereby "the plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties., 73 In Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife,74 the Supreme Court stated that this prudential limita-
tion, while not a bar per se, is a severe obstruction for a plaintiff." The
Court noted that when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the gov-
ernment action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it
is ordinarily "substantially more difficult" to establish.76
The Court dealt with an individual's right to act as a private attor-
ney general in two recent cases. The first was Lujan.77 In 1978, the Fish
& Wildlife Service ("FWS") issued an interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act.78 In 1983, the FWS reversed its interpretation.79 The De-
fenders of Wildlife then filed suit seeking the court to enjoin the FWS to
reinstate the earlier interpretation. 80 The Supreme Court first noted that
when the plaintiff is the subject of the legislation, there is "ordinarily
little question that the action or inaction has [affected him]," and that he
would therefore have standing. 8' After noting that the subject of the leg-
islation was the protection of the endangered species and not the protec-
tion of the plaintiffs, the Court therefore stated that the plaintiffs must
present evidence that one of the members of the Defenders of Wildlife
would "be 'directly' affected. 82  In other words, the plaintiffs would
have to show that they had a personal injury or interest in the case. Find-
ing that none of the plaintiffs had a sufficient injury or interest in the
case, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. In a
curiously worded opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that "[t]he
[plaintiff's] profession of an 'intent' to return to the places they had vis-
ited before-where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the
opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species-is simply not
enough [to qualify as an injury]."
83
71. See id. at 640.
72. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
73. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80.
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
75. Id. at 562; Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1074.
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
77. Id. at 555.
78. Id. at 558.
79. Id. at 558-59.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 561-62.
82. Id. at 563.
83. Id. at 564; Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, offered a foreshadowing of the
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), case by stating that a
[Vol. 82:3
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Compare Lujan with Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services.8 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs sought a Court order compelling
Laidlaw to comply with the Clean Water Act.85 The plaintiffs submitted
affidavits stating that the river was currently unusable for recreation be-
cause Laidlaw was polluting it. 86 The Court held that, unlike the plain-
tiffs in Lujan, the violation of the legislation created a sufficient nexus
and "directly affected [the plaintiffs'] recreational, aesthetic, and eco-
nomic interests" which could not be "equated with the speculative 'some
day' intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the world that
we held insufficient to show injury in [Lujan]." 87 These cases seem to
imply that only a "sufficient nexus" between the legislation and the al-
leged injury could overcome the third-party prudential bar. Although
Lujan and Laidlaw deal with non-Tenth Amendment standing, they are
the most recent cases decided by the Supreme Court on the general issue
of standing.
B. Circuit Split
The federal courts in several circuits are split on the issue of
whether a private individual has standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment
violation claim.88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this
precise point in Pierce County v. Guillen.89 However, the Court decided
the case on other grounds and left the standing question for another
day. 90
Several courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,91 the United States District Court for the District of Ver-
mont,92 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana 3 have all rejected "private attorney general" standing. Gener-
ally, these courts have interpreted the Tenth Amendment as protecting a
state's rights, not an individual's rights, as declared in Tennessee. 4
nexus theory in different circumstance would be enough to grant standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. 528 U.S. 167 (2000),
85. Laidlaw, 582 U.S. at 177.
86. JA. at 184.
87. Id.
88. Compare Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a private individual does not have standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims), with
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a private indi-
vidual does have standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims).
89. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
90. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n.10.
91. Costle, 630F2d at 761.
92. Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d 355, 371
(D. Vt. 1998).
93. Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 U.S. Dist. LBXIS 8207 (E.D, La. May 28, 1999), affd, 210 F.3d
368 (5th Cir. 2000).
94. Tennessee, 306 U.S. at 144 ('the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no
standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment").
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These courts have also heavily relied on the prudential third-party bar set
forth in Duke Power.
95
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle,96 a plaintiff chal-
lenged a provision of the Clean Air Act 97 under which the Environmental
Protection Agency had the authority to approve or disapprove Colorado's
clean air policies.98 In dismissing the case for lack of standing, the Tenth
Circuit cited Duke Power and held that "[o]nly the State has standing to
press claims aimed at protecting its sovereign powers under the Tenth
Amendment." 99 The Court also noted that the Colorado Supreme Court
had previously held that "[u]nless a statute provides otherwise, the attor-
ney general has the exclusive right to represent the state in actions to
enforce its interests."' l In this case, not only did the Attorney General
of Colorado not wish to enforce Colorado's interests, he, to the contrary,
intervened and held a position that was at odds to the plaintiffs' posi-
tion.1°1
In reaching a similar conclusion in Vermont Assembly of Home
Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala,'2 the Vermont District Court relied on
Tennessee and found that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
had only extended the right to maintain a Tenth Amendment suit to mu-
nicipalities, but not to individuals.10 3 The plaintiff contended that the
Balanced Budget Act of 19971°4 was unconstitutional because the Medi-
care reimbursement scheme interfered with the Vermont's health care
policy. 10 5 In dismissing the case for lack of standing, the court noted that
although the State of Vermont filed an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiff's position, the state did not join the lawsuit.
Finally, in Gaubert v. Denton,10 6 the Eastern Louisiana District
court relied on both Shalala and Costle in finding that a plaintiff could
not pursue a Tenth Amendment claim. 10 7 When Mr. Gaubert was in-
volved in a traffic accident, he filed suit against the State of Louisiana in
state court, claiming that the state had negligently maintained the road.'08
Mr. Gaubert requested road safety data compiled by the State of Louisi-
ana as required by the Federal Highway Safety Act ("FHSA"). °9 The
95. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
96. Costle, 630 F.2d at 754.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2004).
98. Costle, 630 F.2d at 759.
99. Id. at 761.
100. ld. at 763.
101. ld. at 761.
102. Shalala, 18 F Supp. 2d at 371.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1997).
105. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
106. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 1999).
107. Gauben, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *2.
108. Id.
109. 23 U.S.C. § 401 (2004).
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state refused to release the data based on sections of the FHSA" that
specifically prohibited usage of the safety data as evidence. Since Mr.
Gaubert challenged the constitutionality of a portion of the FHSA, the
state court stayed the case and referred the constitutionality question to
the federal court."'
Mr. Gaubert filed suit in federal court claiming that since the FHSA
exceeded the government's enumerated powers, it was an invasion of
state sovereignty and a violation of the Tenth Amendment." 2 The fed-
eral court, relying on Shalala and Tennessee, stated that Mr. Gaubert
could not maintain the suit against the federal government. 13 The court
also noted that, similar to Costle, the state assumed a position contrary to
the plaintiff's.
The courts in each of these holdings have impliedly adopted the
Tennessee position that the Tenth Amendment only protects the rights of
states, not the rights of individuals. 114 These cases stand for the proposi-
tion that a private plaintiff cannot represent the state's interest in a Tenth
Amendment claim, even when there is an "identity of interest" between
the plaintiff and the state.
However, the holdings of these courts are at odds with decisions
made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,"
15
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit," 6 and the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.17
As opposed to the previously mentioned cases, these courts allowed the
"private attorney general" standing by allowing any "injury or threatened
injury' ' 1 to overcome the third-party standing bar. These courts also
rely on the assertion of individual rights in pursuing the Tenth Amend-
ment claim,119 in keeping with the Flast 2° and Frothingharn'21 line of
cases. It is also noteworthy that these courts have allowed any "injury or
threatened injury" to create the nexus advocated by Justice Kennedy in
his concurring Lujan opinion and in the Laidlaw decision.1
22
In the Seventh Circuit case of Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
the plaintiff contended that Gun Control Act of 1968124 unconstitution-
110. 23 U.S.C. §§ 402(k), 409 (2004).
111. Gaubert, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *2.
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id. at * 13-14.
114. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
115. Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
116. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
117. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1549 (W.D.N.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
118. Kemp, 965 F.2d at 1034.
119. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
120. See supra note 59.
121. See supra note 54.
122. See supra note 83.
123. 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
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ally prevented him from carrying a gun. 125 Since he had been convicted
of domestic violence, Gillespie could not carry a gun, which caused him
to lose his job as a police officer. 126 Gillespie contended that the statute
dictated to states as to how it can select members of its militia.'2 7 In do-
ing so, Gillespie claims that the federal government was "compelling
state officers to implement a federal statute and by intruding upon areas
of traditional state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment."
' 128
Holding that Gillespie had standing to pursue the Tenth Amendment
claim, the Seventh Circuit stated that "as New York explains, the Tenth
Amendment, although nominally protecting state sovereignty, ultimately
secures the rights of individuals."' 29 Therefore, Gillespie could assert
that the federal government violated his personal rights when it violated
the Tenth Amendment. 130  Although Gillespie lost on the merits, the
Court did grant him standing.'131
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, reached the same conclu-
sion in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Energy,132 but reached it
through different reasoning. In Atlanta Gas, the Court tried to modernize
the Supreme Court Tenth Amendment standing precedent by discerning
modern trends. The court held that "under Duke Power, the petitioners
may make constitutional objections based on any of [a federal Act's]
provisions so long as they show the requisite injury in fact and its causal
relation to the action in question."'133 Although this approach seems in-
compatible with cases such as Frothingham and Tennessee, the Court
interpreted the New Deal era "standing by implication" cases discussed
above as a modem trend, which suggest how the Supreme Court would
rule should it face the issue.
34
Finally, the District Court case of Gilliard also allowed a private
plaintiff standing; however, this court's reasoning follows Flast and
Frothingham. 135 Gilliard was filed on behalf of children affected by an
amendment to Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").
This amendment required child support payments to be included as fam-
ily income, which reduced the AFDC entitlement. The suit alleged that
the AFDC amendments invaded state's domestic relations law, which the
124. 18 U.S.C.S. § 922 (1968).
125. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 697.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 700.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 703.
130. Id. Some of the cases on Second Amendment make an assumption that the Second
Amendment guarantees personal rights. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Second
Amendment grants the right to "keep and bear arms" only when connected with the state's need to
maintain a "well regulated militia." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
131. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
132. 666 F.2d 1359 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
133. Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 54, 59.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as a state matter.' 36 The court
held that although the Tenth Amendment, as a "constitutional norm,"
regulates relations between governments rather than the relations be-
tween governments and individuals, individuals should have standing to
assert constitutional protections derived from them. 137 Since the children
were, in fact, asserting personal rights, not the state's right, the court held
that the private plaintiffs did have standing. 
138
While the above discussed cases have granted a private individual
standing, the courts in these decisions have not specifically contradicted
Tennessee; rather, they have found reasons why Tennessee should not
apply. In general, these cases have actually accepted the Tennessee posi-
tion that a private plaintiff cannot assert a state's rights. However, if the
plaintiff is asserting private rights, he may pursue a Tenth Amendment
claim against a federal statute.
IV. UNITED STATES V. PARKER
139
A. Facts
On October 3, 2002, Dale Parker drove his truck onto a military in-
stallation in Utah to do some civilian contract work.' 4 Because of a ran-
dom, authorized search, a military policeman located a loaded weapon in
Mr. Parker's truck.14' The military police detained Mr. Parker 142 and
charged him with violation of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act
("ACA"). 143 Specifically, Mr. Parker violated a Utah law 144 against car-
rying a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on a public street. Since this
violation was on federal land, the ACA required the court to apply the
relevant Utah law.
Mr. Parker filed a motion to dismiss under the Second and Tenth
Amendments. 46 Specifically, Mr. Parker contended that the prosecution,
pursuant to the ACA, violated his right to bear arms. 147 Further, Mr.
Parker claimed that the authority to regulate Second Amendment rights is
a sovereign right of the state under the Tenth Amendment; therefore, the
136. Gilliard, 633 F. Supp. at 1549.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 362 F. 3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
140. Parker, 362 F. 3d at 1280.
141. Id. at 1281.
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2003); The purpose of the ACA is to borrow state law to fill gaps in the
federal criminal law that applies on federal enclaves. United States v. Adams, 140 F.3d 895, 896
(10th Cir. 1998). The ACA thus provides "a method of punishing a crime committed on government
reservations in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if committed within the
surrounding jurisdiction." Id.
144. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (2003).
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ACA was unconstitutional because it allowed the United States to im-
pede state sovereignty by prosecuting him under the Second Amend-
ment.148 At trial, a magistrate judge found Mr. Parker guilty and fined
him $100.14 9 Mr. Parker appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Since Mr. Parker was contesting the constitutionality of the ACA statute,
the Court of Appeals applied de novo review.
150
B. Decision
After denying Parker's Second Amendment claim, the court consid-
ered his Tenth Amendment claim sua sponte,15' i.e., whether Mr. Parker
had standing to pursue the Tenth Amendment claim. 52 In dismissing the
Tenth Amendment claim for lack of standing, the Court relied heavily on
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle.'53 In Costle, the Court
found that because the interests of the state did not coincide with the
interests of the plaintiff, 54 the plaintiff could not pursue the Tenth
Amendment claim. In Parker, the court stated "[s]imply put, we would
be hard pressed to conclude that Parker is representing Utah's inter-
ests.' 55 The court also did not believe "that the Tenth Amendment is
violated when the federal government acts to enforce a Utah law which is
violated on a federal enclave."'
56
Ultimately, the court affirmed Mr. Parker's conviction and dis-
missed the Tenth Amendment claim for lack of standing. Part V of this
paper will examine the reasoning behind this decision and will advocate
that the court should have allowed Mr. Parker standing to pursue his
Tenth Amendment claim.
V. ANALYSIS
Although the court dismissed Parker's case as essentially a frivolous
claim, the issue of constitutional standing must be decided without re-
gard to the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. The United States
v. Parker157 decision does not follow the cited precedent, nor is it recon-
cilable with recent decisions from other circuits. In this case, the Tenth
Circuit applied precedent that was too factually specific to apply properly
to this case. Further, the court cited other precedent that was neither




151. Although beyond the scope of this survey, the "right to bear arms" discussion provides an
interesting review of pertinent Second Amendment caselaw. See id. at 1282-84.
152. Id. at 1284.
153. Id. at 1285; Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980).
154. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285; Costle, 630 F.2d at 754.
155. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
156. Id.
157. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
[Vol. 82:3
PLEASE STAND UP
Parker standing and, subsequently, dismissed the Tenth Amendment
claim on its merits.
The Parker court placed great emphasis on its earlier decision of
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle.158 From Costle, the court
first re-affirmed the "identity of interest" argument. 59 The essence of
this argument is that if a "private attorney general" does not have an
identical interest as that of the state in opposing the federal action, the
private plaintiff cannot represent the state's interest through a Tenth
Amendment action. In Costle, the state intervened and assumed a posi-
tion contrary to the plaintiff, therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff
did not have standing. 60 The reasoning employed by the court in Costle
in 1980 is no longer appropriate because of the 1992 Supreme Court de-
cision of New York v. United States.'61 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state could not surrender its sovereign power,
even by agreement. 62 Therefore, in a "private attorney general" cause of
action, under the precedent of New York, the state's position becomes
irrelevant. The proper question is whether the federal government in-
truded upon a state's sovereignty, not whether the plaintiff was advocat-
ing the same position that the state would have advocated.
It is also unlikely that following its decision in New York, the Su-
preme Court would hold that a state could both agree to surrender its
sovereign power, and also deny the sole avenue through which a citizen
might contest such a surrender of power. If a court denies individuals
standing when their interests do not coincide with the state's interests, at
least in the situation where the state agrees to the surrender, there is very
little possibility of objecting to the Tenth Amendment violation without
allowing individual, "private" objections.
However, even if we assume that New York did not apply, the
court's finding that "we would be hard pressed to conclude that Parker is
representing Utah's interests"1 63 seems incorrect on its face. There
seems to be an identity of interest in this case, because both Mr. Parker
and Utah have an interest in preventing the federal government from
violating Utah's sovereign rights. The motivation behind the interest is
irrelevant. It does not matter why Mr. Parker wants to prevent the fed-
eral government from violating the Tenth Amendment; it only matters
that he is representing and advancing Utah's sovereign rights. Although
the court did not examine Utah's interests, it seems likely that those in-
terests would include protection of its sovereign rights.
158. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
159. Id.
160. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
161. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
162. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
163. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
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The second holding from Costle identified by the Parker court was
the "sole protector" argument. 164 This argument, as delineated in Parker,
is that "only the State has standing to press claims aimed at protecting its
sovereign powers under the Tenth Amendment."' 65 This notion was de-
rived from the Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-3 1-101 (1)(a), which grants the Attorney General the exclusive right,
in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, to represent the state in
actions to protect its interests. 166 Even ignoring for a moment the possi-
ble invalidity of this holding after New York, this finding was too factu-
ally specific to Costle to apply in Mr. Parker's case. Costle involved
Colorado statutes, 167 whereas Parker involves Utah law. 68 Therefore, a
holding derived from Colorado law is inapplicable to a case decided un-
der Utah law.
Another case relied on by the court in Parker is the Tennessee
case. 169 As discussed previously, it is unlikely that the dictum from Ten-
nessee is still applicable. In light of the New York decision, a blanket
statement that a private citizen would not have standing in a Tenth
Amendment claim is probably incorrect because the only way to prevent
a state from surrendering its sovereignty is for a private citizen to file
suit. Therefore, there must be some circumstances in which a private
citizen could maintain a Tenth Amendment claim.
If we assume for a moment that the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had decided Parker, it is likely that it would have granted Mr.
Parker Tenth Amendment standing. Following the reasoning in Gillespie
v. City of Indianapolis,170 the Court would probably find that Mr. Parker
was asserting personal rights, similar to the assertions of Mr. Gillespie.1
71
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Gillespie was that under New York,
all rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment are, in fact, rights of the
individual. 172
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit would probably also have held that
Mr. Parker had standing, given the "modem trend" followed by that
court. 173 Although there seemed to be some hesitancy in the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, 74 it is likely that given the recent Supreme Court de-
164. Id.; Costle, 630 F.2d at 761.
165. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285; Costle, 630 F.2d at 761.
166. State Board of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540, 541 (1931) (discussing the
statutory predecessor of C.R.S. § 24-31-101).
167. Costle, 630 F.2d at 771.
168. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1280.
169. Id. at 1285.
170. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
171. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
172. Id.
173. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1982).
174. The court stated, "we must initially express our uncertainty about whether the petitioners
have standing to raise the Tenth Amendment question." Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368; see also
Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1079.
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cisions, as discussed below, regarding the Tenth Amendment and the
power of states in general, the Eleventh Circuit would probably more
readily grant Mr. Parker standing.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Parker, it is likely that it
would grant standing to Mr. Parker. The "nexus" requirement of both
Justice Kennedy's concurring Lujan opinion and the Laidlaw decision is
probably satisfied. 75 That is, there is likely a sufficient nexus between
the alleged Tenth Amendment violation and Mr. Parker's injury. Mr.
Parker's arrest-because of the federal prosecution of a state-regulated
area-presents a sufficient nexus to warrant a finding that Mr. Parker has
standing. Further, this nexus is even stronger than the Laidlaw plaintiff's
inability to use the river. However, some commentators have attributed
the relaxation of the standing requirement by Laidlaw as attributable to
the unique nature of environmental issues, 176 and, therefore, it might not
be appropriate in this context. However, even disregarding the environ-
mental standing analysis, the Court would likely find that Mr. Parker did
have standing based on the New York rationale.
Overall, the modem trend in the Rehnquist Supreme Court is to be
very conscious of state sovereignty. 77 With modem cases such as New
York v. United States, 178 Printz v. United States, 79 and Reno v. Con-
don,'8 0 there can be little question that the Rehnquist court has estab-
lished a trend of promoting state sovereignty by limiting federal
power.18t In each of these cases, the Supreme Court has stressed the
sovereignty of the state. Furthermore, with the reelection of President
George W. Bush, it is likely that the "conservative" camp of the Supreme
Court will expand with new appointments. 18
2
In Printz, the Supreme Court considered a federal statute that at-
tempted to direct state officers to enforce federal legislation.' 83 In hold-
175. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
176. See Emily Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A New
Look at Environmental Standing, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 3, 14 (2000); See also Richard
J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47
UCLA L. REV. 703, 744-745 (2000).
177. Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 451 (2003) (describing the Rehnquist court's use of
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment to promote state rights).
178. New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (finding unconstitutional a statute that tried to direct a state
legislature to follow federal legislation).
179. 521 U.S. 898, 944-45 (1997) (finding unconstitutional a statute that tried to direct a state
official to follow federal legislation).
180. 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (rejecting a claim of an unconstitutional statute because the
statute did not regulate the sovereignty of the state). The opinion includes an extensive discussion of
the substantive role of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 149-51.
181. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1070.
182. See Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separa-
tion of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 1064 (2002) (analyzing then-Governor Bush's
conservative appointments to the Texas Supreme Court).
183. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 935.
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ing the statute unconstitutional, the Court made clear its desire to main-
tain the "[p]reservation of the States as independent and autonomous
entities.' 84 Even in Reno, where the Supreme Court found that a statute
regulating the state's sale of driver's license information was valid, 185 the
Court stressed that the statute regulated state activities;' 86 it was not
"seeking to control or influence" state activities. 87 The extensive dis-
cussion on the limitations of federal power by the Tenth Amendment in
Reno'88 highlights the deference that the Rehnquist Supreme Court has
given to state sovereignty. Even in the Reno case where the Supreme
Court denied the unconstitutionality claim of a statute that imposed a
burden on a state, it was careful to explain why this statute was not an
imposition on the state sovereignty. 189 Given this "empowering" of the
state, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would deny Mr. Parker stand-
ing in the instant case.
If we adopt the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in the instant case, the
conclusion is that the Tenth Amendment only protects a state's rights.' 90
By declaring that only a state has standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment
claim, the Tenth Circuit's interpretation would necessarily preclude an
individual from pursing a Tenth Amendment claim. However, we should
consider the actual text of the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 9' If we
accept the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, then the clause "or to the peo-
ple" from the Tenth Amendment becomes meaningless. As far back as
1803, the Supreme Court has advocated interpretations that do not nullify
portions of the Constitution. 92 In fact, Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible,
unless the words require it."'193 However, with the Parker holding, the
Tenth Circuit has stated that the clause "or to the people" is meaning-
less.' 94 If, as the Tenth Circuit holds, a private individual cannot pursue
a Tenth Amendment Claim, 95 then the phrase is without effect. Com-
pare this interpretation with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation: "Gilles-
pie, in making Tenth Amendment claims, actually is asserting his own
184. Id. at 928.
185. Reno, 528 U.S. at 143.
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 148-51.
189. Id. at 150.
190. Costle, 630 F.2d at 771.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
192. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
193. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174 (emphasis added).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
195. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
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rights." 96 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation gives the clause "or to the
people" effect and meaning. Therefore, this interpretation is in keeping
with the notion of giving effect to every clause of the Constitution,
whereas the Tenth Circuit's interpretation does not.
Finally, if we look at the purpose of the structure of the Constitu-
tion, it is to protect the rights of individuals. The "dual sovereignty"
principles of federalism protect the rights of citizens. It does this by
avoiding the creation of a "tyranny" by preventing the accumulation of
too much power in one place. 197 Since the framers specifically designed
the Constitution to protect individuals, it would seem prudent to allow
those individuals to object to actions that cause consolidate power where
it should not be. The separation of powers protects the individual. Any
violation of that separation would therefore harm the individual. There-
fore, the individual should be able to advocate his own interest by being
able to pursue a Tenth Amendment claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Parker was not the correct plaintiff
to pursue the Tenth Amendment claim. What would have been a better
conclusion is that Mr. Parker did have standing but that his Tenth
Amendment claim was without merit. As the Court stated, the Tenth
Amendment is not violated when the federal government merely seeks to
"enforce a Utah law which is violated on a federal enclave."' 98 This rea-
soning is appropriate for a decision on the merits, not for a dismissal for
lack of standing.
Given the modem "trend" of respecting state sovereignty, the Su-
preme Court would likely grant standing to an individual who wished to
promote state sovereignty. However, even a court that did not champion
state sovereignty would probably overturn such a restrictive finding that
only a state can pursue a Tenth Amendment claim, since it nullifies a
clause of the constitution.
In general, it would probably be better in line with the constitutional
guarantees of the Tenth Amendment, and the principles of federalism to
grant private individuals standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims
individually. This is especially true where, as in Parker, there may be a
Tenth Amendment violation, but either the state consented to it or the
state is not interested in objecting to it. The ultimate inquiry should lie in
whether the federal actions are constitutional, not in whether the best
plaintiff is present to challenge them. Although the standing requirement
is obviously a prerequisite for the "cases and controversies" requirement,
196. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
197. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James Madison).
198. United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004).
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courts should broadly grant individual standing in Tenth Amendment
cases by eliminating the third-party standing bar.
Douglas G. Bechtel*
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank my
wife, Jennifer, for her love, patience and support.
SECTION 1983 AND THE TORT OF MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION: A TENTH CIRCUIT HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The malicious prosecution doctrine of 42 U.S.C. § 1983' (hereinaf-
ter § 1983) has been the source of much confusion and the cause of a
long term split in the circuit courts. 2 With regards to this particular con-
stitutional tort doctrine, the courts have experienced two separate contro-
versial splits.3 The first split occurred over whether a federal claim for
malicious prosecution even existed under § 1983. 4 The Supreme Court
has, in recent history, resolved this issue by validating § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims in cases such as Heck v. Humphrey5 and Albright v.
Oliver.6
The modem split concerning § 1983 malicious prosecution claims
lies not in whether the claim exists, but rather in how a successful claim
of this nature must be pleaded.7 Specifically, the circuits are split over
whether a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a showing of only
constitutional deprivation, or of both a constitutional deprivation, as well
as the common law tort elements. 8
In an attempt to clarify exactly where the Tenth Circuit stands in
this chaotic doctrine, this Article focuses on the Tenth Circuit's historical
implementation of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, as well as the
Court's current stance on this issue. Part I of this Article explains the
historical context through which malicious prosecution crept into § 1983
litigation. This section looks at how the circuits split over the malicious
prosecution issue, and how the Tenth Circuit has sided in that split. Part
II provides an analysis of the modem circuit split over how to properly
frame a constitutional malicious prosecution claim. This section looks at
the split both generally, and more specifically in light of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's most recent decision of Pierce v. Gilchrist.9 Part In offers an
analysis of why the circuits continue to disagree over the application of
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
2. See generally Jacques L. Schillaci, Comment, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal
Purity in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 439,452-62 (2002).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 452.
5. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
6. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
7. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
8. Id. at 459-62.
9. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
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§ 1983 malicious prosecution actions, and, specifically, why the Tenth
Circuit's approach is most suitable.'
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims
Section 1983 developed from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, an en-
actment aimed at protecting the rights of former slaves.
11 After the adop-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment, the southern states proceeded to enact
codes requiring former slaves to work for their previous owners.
12 In an
attempt to put an end to this underhanded method of maintaining slavery,
the federal government enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 via the
Fourteenth Amendment's authority. 13 The first section of this Act is now
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.14
While the Act did effectively deter state enactments of "black
codes,"' 5 the statute sat "virtually dormant" until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury when courts began interpreting the statute's scope.
16 In the land-
mark decision of Monroe v. Pape,17 the Supreme Court "broaden[ed] the
scope of § 1983 liability to encompass wrongdoing by state officials
even when [the wrongdoing] was not officially sanctioned by state
law."' 8 The Monroe decision set into motion the broadening evolution of
§ 1983 claims. Specifically, the decision provided for greater interpreta-
tion of the statute's "under the color of state law" language.
19
Malicious prosecution is a suit brought by a victim of a maliciously
instituted prosecution. 20 The claimant in a malicious prosecution action
brings suit only after the termination of the allegedly malicious proceed-
ings.21 The doctrine of constitutional malicious prosecution developed
as a result of a broadened understanding of § 1983's scope.
22 In the be-
ginning, claimants brought federal constitutional claims under § 1983 in
conjunction with a state malicious prosecution tort action.
23 As a result
of these joint claims some federal courts began to recognize a conjoined
10. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1290.
11. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 446.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 447.
14. id.
15. Id. at 446 (describing codes that, despite the emancipation of slaves, forced African
Americans to maintain working for their former masters).
16. Esther M. Schonfeld, Article, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued
Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1681, 1689 (1999).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. Schiilaci, supra note 2, at 451 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187).
19. Id. at 450.
20. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for
Malicious Prosecution, 50 A.L.R. 4th 843, § 2(a) (2004).
21. Id.
22. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 451-52.
23. Id.
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federal malicious prosecution action under § 1983.24 However, this new
claim did not develop without criticism. In reality, the recognition by
some circuits of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim developed into the
first of two circuit splits.
2 5
The circuits divided nearly down the middle with the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits recognizing a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983, and the First, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits re-
jecting such a claim. 26 The courts that allowed the new § 1983 action
reasoned that since a malicious prosecution claim required a showing of
malice in prosecution, it was inherently also a constitutional violation.27
Alternatively, those circuits opposing § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims rejected the notion that criminal prosecutions lacking probable
cause were per se constitutional violations. 28 Because there existed nei-
ther a constitutional nor a federal statute that expressly mentioned mali-
cious prosecution, these circuits further argued that the common law tort
elements alone were not sufficient to base a constitutional claim. 29
B. The Tenth Circuit's Approach to Early § 1983 Malicious Prosecution
Claims
The Tenth Circuit joined the other circuits who embraced the new
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim. The Tenth Circuit first showed its
inclination to allow a federal malicious prosecution claim in the case of
Taylor v. Nichols.30 This case involved a § 1983 claim brought by a po-
lice officer in federal district court.3' The officer was accused of crimi-
nal assault and battery stemming from a routine traffic stop.32 The offi-
cer was investigated, arrested, detained, and, eventually, acquitted of the
33allegations. After being acquitted, the officer brought suit against the
person alleging criminal assault, as well as the prosecuting attorney in
the case.34 The federal district court granted defendants' motion to dis-
miss holding that the alleged injury was not actionable under the Civil
Rights Act because the alleged defendant in the case was not acting un-
der the color of state law.35 The officer appealed the case to the Tenth




26. Id. at 452-53.
27. Id. at 452.
28. Id. at 453-54.
29. Id. at 454.
30. 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977).
31. Taylor, 558 F.2d at 563-64.
32. Id. at 563.
33. Id. at 563-64.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 565.
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the officer's claim on the same basis as
the lower court decision-the person alleging criminal assault was not a
state actor.37 While the court ultimately dismissed the claim, the decision
was important because the court acknowledged the viability of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim.3 s The court reasoned that:
The tort case of malicious prosecution is not coterminous in its ele-
ments with a civil rights suit based upon misuse of the process. True,
the same facts could give rise to violations under both federal and
state law, but color of state law would have to be present in order to
have a civil rights case.
39
While this case did not embrace entirely the idea of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim, it certainly opened the Tenth Circuit's door to the
possibility of hearing such a claim.
In 1984, the Tenth Circuit permanently accepted the idea of a fed-
eral malicious prosecution action.
40 In Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc.,41
the Tenth Circuit acknowledged and upheld a § 1983 malicious prosecu-
tion claim. In allowing the claim, the court particularized the level of
deprivation necessary to comprise a constitutional violation.
42 The court
reasoned that "not every tort amounts to a deprivation of constitutional
rights"; however, "when private parties or public officials use criminal
complaints to coerce a release of civil liability from injured persons, this
action, as a malicious prosecution, is egregious and qualifies as a depri-
vation of due process that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 3 Hav-
ing finally recognized a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the Tenth
Circuit proceeded to further define the claim in its subsequent decisions.
In 1990 the Tenth Circuit decided the malicious prosecution case of
Robinson v. Muraffi.44 Robinson alleged that defendant police officers
knowingly permitted the use of false testimony in his prosecution.
45
Robinson had allegedly killed one of the defendants' fellow police offi-
cers. 46 The defendant police officers argued that because the chain of
causation between the police misconduct and the actual grand jury in-
dictment was broken by subsequent independent acts of the prosecutor,
the officers were not liable.47 The court rejected this reasoning, stating
that "[i]f police officers have been instrumental in the plaintiffs contin-
37. Id. at 564.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423.
42. Id. at 1431.
43. Id.
44. 895 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1990).
45. Robinson, 895 F.2d at 651.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 655.
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ued confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability by pointing
to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to confine
or prosecute him."4 In extending malicious prosecution actions to police
officers, the court clearly broadened the previous scope of malicious
prosecution claims in the Tenth Circuit.49
The Lusby and Robinson cases not only show the development of
the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in the Tenth Circuit, but also
exhibit the broadening scope of the claim generally. In the beginning,
malicious prosecution claims were directed only at the prosecuting attor-
ney. As the subsequent case law indicates, however, § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims later extended to government actors such as police
officers, investigators, and others involved in the pre-trial process.5°
II. THE MODERN § 1983 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CIRCUIT SPLIT
Today it is clear that the Tenth Circuit recognizes § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims; however, prior to 1994, some circuits remained op-
posed to the implementation of the new action. The jurisdictions that
recognized the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim soon faced a new
uncertainty within the doctrine-how to properly implement the new
claim. Due to the "embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion" in the
area, the Supreme Court decided to reconcile the matter by granting cer-
tiorari in Albright v. Oliver.
51
A. The Supreme Court's "Clarification": Albright v. Oliver
Admitting that the majority of circuits recognized some form of a
viable malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the Court focused in-
stead on the modern split among the circuits. The modern concern over
malicious prosecution claims was not whether the § 1983 claim existed,
but rather, whether malicious prosecution, standing alone, could violate
the Constitution. 53 The Court identified the two differing views that di-
vided the circuits. The first, more expansive, view contended that the
elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 were equivalent
to that of the common law tort.54 Under this contention, a party claiming
malicious prosecution must meet the following elements: (i) the bringing
of the action by the defendant, (ii) its successful termination in favor of
the plaintiff, (iii) want of probable cause to bring the action, (iv) malice,
48. Id. at 656 (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,994 (7th Cir. 1988)).
49. Id. (stating that police officers can no longer hide behind the officials they have de-
frauded).
50. See, e.g., Taylor, 558 F.2d at 561 (§ 1983 claim against attorney); Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423
(§ 1983 claim against off-duty police officer acting as security guard); Robinson, 895 F.2d at 649 (§
1983 claim against police officer).
51. 510 U.S. 266, 271 n.4 (1994) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir.
1992)).
52. Albnght, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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and (v) damages." The opposing circuits maintained that common law
tort elements were not sufficient to support a § 1983 claim. Rather, these
circuits contended that an action required a showing of some injury or
deprivation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional
elements of common law malicious prosecution.
56
The Albright Court hoped to clarify the chaotic malicious prosecu-
tion doctrine; however, somewhere in the midst of its analysis, the Court
swayed from its original goal. Instead, the Court addressed the issue of
which constitutional claim produces a proper foundation for such claims,
leaving the pleading issue completely unsettled.5 7 In its redirected analy-
sis the Court concluded: "Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substan-
tive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred."58 Thus the Court asserted that § 1983 is not the
underlying basis of an alleged civil rights claim, but rather the vehicle for
raising such an action.59 The court reasoned that "Section 1983 'fulfills
the procedural or remedial role of authorizing the assertion of the claim
for relief.' However, the statute itself does not grant or create any sub-
stantive rights. Therefore, plaintiffs . . . must rely on another source,
such as the United States Constitution or a federal statute, for the sub-
stantive rights they seek to enforce., 60 Having established the necessity
of a substantive foundation for relief, it was then essential to determine
what constitutional or statutory basis was most appropriate.
While the issue of how to properly establish a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim remained unanswered by the Court, the Albright deci-
sion did clarify what constitutional deprivation was required by § 1983.61
Previously, many claimants based their § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim upon a Fourteenth Amendment due process foundation.
62 The
Court in Albright rejected this basis, finding that "[w]here a particular
Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the
guide for analyzing these claims."' 63 This decision falls clearly in line
with the Court's unwillingness to further expand the boundaries of sub-
stantive due process.64 Although the court articulated that due process
55. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004).
56. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4.
57. Id. at 271.
58. Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
59. Id.
60. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1698-99 (citing Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § IA, IB, IC (3d ed. 1997); Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979)).
61. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271.
62. See, e.g., Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423.
63. Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
64. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1717.
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was an inadequate basis for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, it sug-
gested instead that the Fourth Amendment would provide a more
'explicit' textual support upon which claimants could rely.65 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist reasoned that the "Fourth Amendment relates to 'depriva-
tions of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions,"' and,
thus, provides the proper foundation for § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims.
66
B. The Aftermath of Albright
Two certainties have evolved from the Albright decision: first, the
use of due process as a foundation for § 1983 malicious prosecution ac-
tions is no longer permitted, and second, virtually all federal circuit
courts now recognize malicious prosecution as a § 1983 constitutional
tort.67 The aftermath of the Albright decision has also resulted in uncer-
tainty with regards to the proper pleading requirements of this new con-
stitutional tort.68
The Albright decision left the circuits to decide which, if any, ele-
ments are necessary conditions of a constitutional malicious prosecution
claim. The circuits are currently split over the proper resolution to this
dilemma creating both a majority and minority rule.69 The majority rule,
upheld by the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits,
requires plaintiffs to show only a Fourth Amendment deprivation.70
These circuit courts argue that because § 1983 claims develop from
Fourth Amendment deprivations, and because the language of the
amendment mentions nothing of unreasonable prosecutions, it is unnec-
essary to require the common law tort elements to be pleaded.71
The minority rule, to which the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits subscribe, requires that a plaintiff demonstrate both a Fourth
Amendment violation in addition to the common law elements of mali-
cious prosecution.72 These circuits view § 1983 malicious prosecution
liability as tort actions that implicate constitutional rights.73 As such, the
minority circuits argue that the best method of analysis is to "borrow" the
elements of the underlying malicious prosecution claim from state law
and apply them to the federal § 1983 claim. 74
65. Albright, 510 U.S. at 275.
66. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1718 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 274).
67. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 460-61.
71. Id. at 461.
72. Id. at 459.
73. Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994).
74. Cook, 41 F.3d at 79.
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C. The Tenth Circuit's Shift in Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has taken an interesting stance in the controversy
over how properly to present a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. In a
series of post-Albright decisions, the circuit has recognized that the
common law elements of malicious prosecution are a "starting point" for
§ 1983 claims.75 This "starting point" analysis differs substantially from
the other majority rule circuits in that the other circuits require absolutely
no examination of common law elements. 76 The Tenth Circuit's "start-
ing point" analysis, while unique, has also caused some confusion within
the Tenth Circuit. As discussed later, this confusion was recently clari-
fied by the Tenth Circuit's decision of Pierce v. Gilchrist.
77
To see the Tenth Circuit's post-Albright transition, it is most benefi-
cial to examine the court's more recent decisions in chronological order.
One of the first Tenth Circuit cases to follow the Albright decision was
the unpublished opinion of Sack v. Huggins.78 In Sack, the Tenth Circuit
looked to the Fifth Circuit's minority rule precedent, and held that the
common law element requiring that the criminal proceedings be termi-
nated in plaintiff s favor prior to a malicious prosecution claim is a nec-
essary common law element.79 Alone, this case would suggest that the
Tenth Circuit had sided with the minority rule requiring that common
law elements be shown.
In 1995, however, the court apears to invoke the opposite rule in
its decision of Garcia v. Johnson. In this decision, the court looked
away from the common law elements and invoked a more "majority
rule" analysis. The Garcia court consciously made a distinction between
the plaintiff s claim following state tort law versus constitutional tort law
under § 1983.81 The court went on to state that the plaintiff "can only
maintain this claim if the allegations in his complaint rise to the level of a
constitutional violation., 82  In making such an intentional distinction
between state tort law and constitutional tort law, the court's rationale in
this case seems to fall more in line with the majority rule, than that of the
minority.
The Tenth Circuit further employed the "starting point" analysis in
both the Sanders v. Howlett8 3 and Wolford v. Lasater84 decisions. While
75. See, e.g., Sanders v. Howlett, 1995 WL 143460 (10th Cir. March 30, 1995) (unpublished
table decision); Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556
(10th Cir. 1996); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
76. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 460-61.
77. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
78. 1994 WL 413271 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 1994) (unpublished table decision).
79. Sack, 1994 WL 413271, at *4 (citing Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d, 1178, 1183-84 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
80. 1995 WL 492879 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
81. Garcia, 1995 WL 492879, at *5.
82. Id.
83. 1995 WL 143460 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
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continuing with this analysis, the court added to its rationale by imple-
menting an analysis of the probable cause element that is required in
common law malicious prosecution claims. 85 In Sanders, the court re-
marked that in Kansas, the lack of probable cause to initiate criminal
proceedings "is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecu-
tion.' '86 In Wolford, the probable cause element is the ultimate basis by
which the court dismissed the claimant's malicious prosecution claim.
87
In its reasoning, the court cited New Mexico precedent that under "state
tort law, lack of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings is an
essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution."88 The Wolford
decision went a step further than that of the Sanders decision, however,
in combining both a state malicious prosecution analysis of probable
cause with a Fourth Amendment analysis of probable cause.89  The
court's transition to include both a common law and Fourth Amendment
analysis of the probable cause issue signifies a shift in the court's reason-
ing from common law tort elements to constitutional analysis; this shift
becomes even more apparent in its later decisions.
The court's transition in analysis is more clearly evidenced in Tay-
lor v. Meacham.90 In Taylor, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged its confu-
sion of the issue, and its previous inconsistent decisions.91 The Taylor
court recognized the need for a solid announcement of malicious prose-
cution pleading requirements in the Tenth Circuit. Unfortunately, at
some point the court lost its focus and failed to provide the much antici-
pated "clarification." Instead of announcing a hard and fast rule as to
whether the court requires a showing of common law elements, the court
responded, once again, with a "starting point" analysis.92
While the court did not provide an express rule, it did make another
small step in clarifying the "muddied waters" of the post-Albright mali-
cious prosecution claim. In the midst of the court's "starting point"
analysis it stated "our circuit takes the common law elements of mali-
cious prosecution as the 'starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which
it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional violation. 93
The constitutional violation at issue in this case was a deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights.94 In fact, the court seemed to focus its analy-
84. 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Lasater, 78 F.3d at 489.
86. Sanders, 1995 WL 143460, at *2.
87. Wolford, 78 F.3d at 489.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 82 F.3d 1556 (10th Cir. 1996).
91. Taylor, 82 F.3d at 1561.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 1... at 1562.
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sis primarily on the constitutional violation rather than on a common law
tort analysis.95 Accordingly, the court's shift in focus shows the court's
inclination toward the majority rule § 1983 malicious prosecution analy-
sis.
D. Pierce v. Gilchrist
96
1. Facts
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit was faced with its most shocking mali-
cious prosecution case. The drastic nature of the claim, and the obvious
need for an adequate remedy arguably pressured the court to come for-
ward with a hard and fast rule by which to implement § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims.
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Pierce, was convicted of first degree rape, oral
sodomy, second degree burglary, and assault with a dangerous weapon,
and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison.97 After serving fifteen years
of this sentence, Pierce was exonerated, and his conviction and sentence
were vacated.98 Pierce thereafter filed suit against the forensic analyst,
the Oklahoma City District Attorney, and other governmental units for
compensatory and punitive damages.
99
The events leading to Pierce's conviction and incarceration demon-
strated an offensive abuse of prosecutorial power. On May 8, 1985, a
woman named Sandra Burton was raped in her home. 1° Ms. Burton
lived at the same apartment complex where Pierce was employed as a
landscaper. 10 1 Shortly after the rape, Pierce was taken to the police sta-
tion to participate in a lineup.10 2 Pierce took part in the identification
proceedings, but was not identified as the rapist.10 3 Almost a year later,
pursuant to a warrant, Pierce was arrested again as a suspect in the rape
investigation. 104 Pierce's body was searched, and samples of his head
and pubic hairs, as well as body fluids, were collected for investiga-
tion. 10 5 Five minutes after the samples were collected, Pierce was noti-




96. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
97. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1282.
98. Id. at 1283.
99. Id. at 1281.
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The forensic analysis was conducted by the defendant, Joyce Gil-
christ. 1 7 Gilchrist's report claimed to identify thirty-three scalp and pu-
bic hairs from the crime scene that were "microscopically consistent"
with those taken from Pierce's body.'08 As a result of these findings,
Pierce was charged with first degree rape, oral sodomy, second degree
burglary, and assault with a dangerous weapon, and later convicted.1t 9
Pierce would have served his sixty-five year sentence had the FBI
not conducted an investigation of Gilchrist's forensic work."0 The FBI
released a report in 2001 reflecting that five out of eight cases being in-
vestigated involved "contrived and erroneous statements by Ms. Gilchrist
regarding identification of persons.""' Furthermore, the report revealed
that Gilchrist had "repeatedly made statements beyond the limits of fo-
rensic science. '  It was also later uncovered that Gilchrist had been
professionally reprimanded on various occasions, and had been expelled
from the Association of Crime Scene Reconstruction for providing mis-
represented evidence not factually supported by science. "
3
As a result of the FBI's findings, particularly that Pierce's hairs
were microscopically inconsistent with the hairs found at the crime
scene, the police ordered a DNA analysis of the Pierce case evidence. It
was this DNA analysis that exonerated Pierce, and led to his vacated
conviction and sentence. 14 Thereafter, Pierce brought suit under § 1983
for malicious prosecution to which Gilchrist moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming that she was provided qualified immunity and that Pierce
had failed to state an actionable claim." 5 The district court denied de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury could rea-
sonably conclude that the defendant's actions were instrumental in
Pierce's post-trial confinement. 1 6 Gilchrist appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the district court's find-
ing."
7
Defendant Gilchrist appealed on the basis that Pierce failed to plead
all of the "required" common law malicious prosecution elements
18
Specifically, Gilchrist alleged that the plaintiff did not and could not




110. See id. at 1283 (discussing how an independent FBI investigation prompted the police
department to send the Pierce case evidence for DNA analysis; the result exonerated Pierce, and his
sentence was accordingly vacated).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1284.
114. Id. at 1283.
115. Id. at 1284-85.
116. Id. at 1285.
117. Id. at 1285, 1301.
118. Id. at 1286.
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tion claim-that the action against Pierce was brought by Gilchrist her-
self and that there was a want of probable cause."19 Gilchrist's argument
hit directly to the question the Tenth Circuit had managed to avoid an-
swering: At what point does the "starting point" analysis of common law
malicious prosecution elements end, and a constitutional analysis begin?
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit finally answered this longstanding question by
holding that Gilchrist misunderstood the "starting point" analysis articu-
lated in previous case law.120 The court announced that the first step in
its analysis was to identify a constitutional violation. 121 The court, pur-
suant to Albright, recognized the Fourth Amendment as the most perti-
nent of Plaintiffs alleged claims. 122 Next, the court maintained that the
"[p]laintiff's actual cause of action is for a constitutional violation under
§ 1983; the common law tort of malicious prosecution is relevant only as
,,123an analogy that is helpful in structuring the legal analysis. The court
identified the usefulness in applying the common law principles as a way
to structure a claim; however, it rejected entirely the notion that pleading
common law elements was necessary.1
24
While the court explicitly rejected the necessity of pleading com-
mon law elements, it continued to address Gilchrist's allegations, and
asserted that, even had the court required a showing of all elements,
Pierce's claim would still succeed.125  The court first examined Gil-
christ's allegation that her lack of involvement in procuring the arrest
warrant exonerated her from the § 1983 claim. 26 Ultimately, Gilchrist
contended that the plaintiff s claim failed to prove the first common law
element, and, thus, failed to state a claim. 127 The court responded to this
allegation by looking at the plain language of § 1983, and reasoning that
the statute not only applies to someone "who 'subjects,' but also to any
person who 'causes to be subjected ... any citizen of the United States
.. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws."", 28 As this language suggests, the court rec-
ognized that Congress intended not only for a person who formally initi-
ates prosecution to fall within the bounds of § 1983, but rather for any
119. Id. at 1287.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1285.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1286 n.3 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 1290.
125. See id. at 1290-97 (stating "[W]e fail to see the logic in a position that would confine
constitutional claims to the precise rubric of tort law," but nevertheless addressing each of Gil-
christ's common-law assertions).
126. Id. at 1291.
127. Id. at 1287.
128. Id. at 1292 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (emphasis added)).
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state actor who causes a deprivation of constitutional rights to fall within
the statute. 129 Gilchrist clearly fell within this definition.
30
Second, the court looked at Gilchrist's argument that "under Okla-
homa law, existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, is a complete
defense to malicious prosecution," thus implying that the third common
law tort element of malicious prosecution was lacking.' 3' The court re-
sponded to this argument by asserting that "'[e]ven when probable cause
is present at the time of the arrest, evidence could later surface which
would eliminate that probable cause."" 32  While the victim's photo-
graphic identification may have been sufficient to initially arrest Pierce,
the court held that probable cause was completely lacking when the hair
and blood enzyme analysis exonerated the plaintiff from being the rap-
ist.
133
The court's decision in Pierce provided an opportunity for Pierce to
obtain redress for the fifteen years that were taken from him. In addition,
the court's decision was also a touchstone for the Tenth Circuit. Nearly a
decade after the Supreme Court decided Albright, the Tenth Circuit fi-
nally articulated a clear strategy for implementing § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims.
III. ANALYSIS
While the Tenth Circuit has managed to clearly articulate its posi-
tion on interpreting § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, the other cir-
cuits remain split over which analysis is superior. 134 In an effort to make
an informed conclusion as to which is the better method, it is necessary
to look at both the practical and theoretical implications of each mode of
analysis. After examining the implications of each method, it is clear
that the majority rule, to which the Tenth Circuit subscribes, is the most
efficient and effective method of interpretation.
A. Practical Implications
1. Inarticulate Pleading Requirements Result in Claim Dismissal
and Barred Recovery
The pleading stage of a claim can be one of the most important and
influential stages of litigation. Having a strong initial complaint is an
extremely important method of initial presentation, but more importantly
it is the required showing by which the claimant must prove that she is
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1293.
131. Id. at 1295.
132. Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
133. Id. at 1293-94.
134. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
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entitled to relief and demand a judgment for that relief.135 It remains
common legal knowledge that "fail[ing] to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
12(b)(6) necessitates a dismissal. 36 This concern of 12(b)(6) dismissal
becomes an imminent realization when the uncertainty of § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution pleading requirements is at issue. Such a dismissal is
disappointing to lawyers and potentially devastating to a claimant's at-
tempt at recovery.
As a claimant, it is extremely important to have a clear understand-
ing of a claim's pleading requirements so as not to disregard a necessary
element. Where a cause of action, such as § 1983 malicious prosecution,
has such divergent opinions as to what elements compose the claim, it is
very difficult to confidently plead the action. As such, it is absolutely
necessary to clarify any confusion the circuits have created in this area.
The inarticulate "starting point" language that the Tenth Circuit relied
upon prior to Pierce v. Gilchrist'3 7 did nothing more than confuse § 1983
malicious prosecution and encourage improper pleading. By clearly ar-
ticulating in Pierce that a claimant need not present common law tort
elements, the Tenth Circuit has done its part to avoid such devastating
pleading mistakes. 
138
2. Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation
Further Exemplify the Need for Less Burdensome Pleading
Standards
The court's decision in Pierce is even more important when consid-
ered in the context of heightened pleading requirements for civil rights
cases. 139 Despite what some would argue is a definitive Supreme Court
decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit,'4° many federal courts have imposed heightened
pleading requirements on claimants as a result of the massive inflow of
civil rights litigation.1 41  In 1993, the Leatherman Court unanimously
rejected the notion of heightened pleading requirements in civil rights
actions, yet left open the question of heightened pleading standards in
135. Evan Sanford Schwartz, A Plea for Help: Pleading Problems in Section 1983 Municipal
Liability Claims, 6 TouRo L. REV. 377, 379 (1990) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2-3)).
136. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) (stating, "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.").
137. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
138. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1290.
139. See generally Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts
Should Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Claims, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 267 (2002) (recognizing the courts' modem trend of imposing heightened pleading
requirements).
140. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
141. Korb & Bales, supra note 139, at 271.
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cases involving individual government officials who may assert a quali-
fied immunity defense. 142 This uncertainty has since expanded and cre-
ated its own specific circuit split with regard to the proper level of speci-
ficity in pleading requirements.1
4 3
Furthering the debate over the requisite pleading specificity, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require what is commonly known as
"notice pleading," or more simply, a "'short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' "44 The leading ra-
tionale for maintaining liberal pleading standards is to allow for adequate
discovery. 145  Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
"adopted in response to stringent state code and common law pleading
standards" because "[s]uch stringent standards permitted courts to dis-
miss colorable claims simply for an inartful draft of the complaint."
' 46
These concerns only further weigh in favor of less burdensome pleading
requirements for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. Unfortunately,
however, federal notice pleading standards are not uniformly applied to
civil rights cases. 147 Stringent pleading requirements result in the dis-
missal of potentially viable actions before the actual merit of the case is
ever reached. 148 By requiring heightened pleading standards, a claimant
is obligated to "craft their complaints with factual specificity far in ex-
cess of the minimal specificity prescribed by ... general notice plead-
ing. "149 Without a full understanding of what the court requires, a claim-
ant is likely to improperly plead the claim and potentially bar himself
from recovery.
3. Clear Pleading Requirements are a Necessity in Formulating
Litigation Strategy
Should a claimant move beyond the initial pleading phase of litiga-
tion, the need for a clear articulation of the elementary requirements of a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim is vital. In properly formulating a
litigation strategy it is essential that both claimants and defendants be
aware of a claim's elements. Requiring a § 1983 claimant to prove
common law tort elements requires a much broader and more challeng-
ing burden.150 By requiring the presence of common law tort elements,
the court potentially allows many constitutional violations to go unpun-
142. Id. at 275-77.
143. See generally id. (evidencing the inter-circuit disagreement over heightened pleading
requirements for civil rights cases).
144. Id. at 270-71 (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 8(a)(2)).
145. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 378.
146. Id. at 379-80.
147. See generally Korb & Bales, supra note 139 (articulating the current split among circuits
over civil rights heightened pleading requirements).
148. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 380.
149. Korb & Bales, supra note 139, at 272.
150. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 469.
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ished and, as a result, for many victims to be without redress.'51 To al-
low for such injustice is in direct conflict with the intention of § 1983.152
Similarly, a defendant must know exactly what elements he is up against,
and how best to strategize his defense. Thus it is equally important for
both plaintiff and defendant to be aware of the necessary § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution requirements in pleading, preparing, and arguing their
case.
B. Theoretical Implications
In addition to the practical implications of successfully pleading a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there are theoretical implications
that necessitate a clear ruling on the claim's elements. While many
states provide plaintiffs redress via state malicious prosecution claims,
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims provide a federal alternative to fil-
ing state court actions. 5 3 Furthermore, state malicious prosecution ac-
tions and federal § 1983 actions can be brought concurrently. 154 Because
both state and federal actions are available to claimants, it seems counter-
intuitive to assume that both forums would provide equivalent remedies.
As such, requiring claimants to prove common law tort elements in §
1983 malicious prosecution cases seems to counteract the purpose of an
alternative forum.
1. Statutory Purpose and Scope Demonstrate the Purely Constitu-
tional Nature of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Actions
The purpose of § 1983 is to "interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."'
' 5
Historically, however, the aim of common law tort malicious prosecution
claims has been to protect reputation, bodily integrity and protection of
property. 156 As the primary goals of each action are independent from
the other, it only follows that the claims, themselves, should be consid-
ered separately. The minority circuits have wrongly chosen to intermix
the common law tort elements into what is a purely constitutional § 1983
cause of action. In an analogous § 1983 false imprisonment action, the
Supreme Court even noted that "a public official is liable under § 1983
only 'if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his con-
stitutional rights. ' ,157 The Court went on to criticize the Fifth Circuit's
employment of "traditional tort-law concepts" in determining a constitu-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 § 1.56 (4th ed. 2003).
154. Id.
155. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 466 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
156. Id.
157. ld. at 463 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
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tional claim. 58 While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the
issue of § 1983 malicious prosecution, the Court's statement here pro-
vides for a reasonable analogy to such a claim.
Furthermore, it is clear by the variance in scope between state
claims and § 1983 claims that the two actions are to be treated differ-
ently. Because state malicious prosecutions claims are intended to pro-
tect the reputation and bodily integrity of persons, actions are brought
against any actors that may incite wrongful prosecution. 59 Significantly,
federal malicious prosecution actions are brought against state actors
"under the color of state law."' 160 Similarly, state malicious prosecution
tort claims are available to claimants who have been the victim of misuse
or abuse of civil process. 161 Conversely, § 1983 malicious prosecution
actions are not available subsequent to civil disputes. 162 These diver-
gences in scope clearly depict a vast difference in statutory purpose
based upon the notion of constitutionality. Specifically, this purpose
must be kept in mind when determining the complexity of pleading stan-
dards for the two different claims.
2. Section 1983 Provides Favorable Damage Awards that Federal
Claimants Risk Foreclosure Against as a Result of Common Law
Tort Elements
Damage awards available for common law malicious prosecution
actions have been historically equivalent to that of the § 1983 alterna-
tive. 163 Both compensatory and punitive damages are available in state
and § 1983 malicious prosecution actions respectively. 64 In Oklahoma,
for example, a jury may award punitive damages where the defendant
acted "willfully, wantonly, or in reckless disregard of the rights of an-
other, resulting in injury."' 165 Similarly, the federal § 1983 claim requires
that a defendant's conduct be "motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally pro-
tected rights of others."'166 Because both federal and common law claims
require similar evidentiary standards for recovering compensatory and
punitive damages, the concern of foreclosing federal claimants by way of
stricter common law pleading requirements appears slight. However, in
158. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 463.
159. Id. at 467.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 468.
163. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1436 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. See Zitter, supra note 20, at § 2(a) and Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1698.
165. Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1436 (quoting White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir.
1983)).
166. Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56 (1983)).
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1976, the equal balance between state and federal malicious prosecution
remedies was tilted. 167
While the remedies available to the separate claims initially appear
consistent, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976168 sweet-
ened the federal remedy by authorizing § 1983 claimants to recover at-
torneys' fees. 169 This legislative development not only increased the
damage awards available to § 1983 claimants, but also created another
incentive for claimants to raise their claim federally. 170 Due to costly
litigation expenses, recovery of attorneys' fees is a substantial benefit of
the § 1983 claim. As such, the availability of attorneys' fees provides
yet another reason for requiring only a constitutional pleading require-
ment for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. By mandating this less
burdensome and more appropriate standard, claimants will have a better
opportunity to recover optimum damages.
3. Requiring Common Law Elements in § 1983 Actions Negates
the Purpose of Providing an Alternative Forum and Potentially
Bars Claimant Recovery
Because § 1983 is aimed at protecting individuals from wrongful
state action, the proper showing for such a claim should only be a consti-
tutional violation. Claimants are already afforded the opportunity to
raise claims of malicious prosecution in state courts by proving the re-
quired malicious prosecution elements. Should the federal courts require
a consistent showing of malicious prosecution elements, the federal fo-
rum would fail to reach the claimants that the state courts have otherwise
overlooked. Many of these disregarded actions are extremely important
claims that are intimately linked with individual freedom. For instance,
it would be inconsistent with the Constitution to deny a man redress after
he has spent fifteen years of his life wrongly imprisoned merely because
he could not procure the common law tort elements of malicious prose-
cution. 71 The Tenth Circuit recognized the inconsistency in this reason-
ing by stating "[i]t would be odd to interpret a statute, § 1983, which was
enacted during Reconstruction to provide a federal remedy for violations
of civil rights countenanced under state law, as simply incorporating the
positive law of the states as a standard for evaluating federal constitu-
tional claims."172 The court further explained that they previously relied
on the common law elements in § 1983 actions "not because of its au-
167. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1697.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
169. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1686.
170. Id. at 1697 (attributing the dramatic increase of § 1983 actions, in part, to the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976).
171. See generally Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1288 (stating that § 1983 was enacted to create afederal
remedy for civil rights violations, and that its standards were not intended to be an incorporation of
state law).
172. Id. at 1288.
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thority as positive law, but because. . . 'over the centuries the common
law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a
person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation
of his legal rights'. 17'  Thus it is clear that the common law tort ele-
ments are applicable only by analogy to constitutional tort doctrines.
174
Finally, it has been argued that by relying solely on a showing of
constitutional violation, federal courts will be overburdened by § 1983
claims. 175 While this may initially appear to be the case, careful analysis
reflects that there are other doctrines in place to curtail the influx of
§ 1983 claims. One of these safeguards is the doctrine of qualified im-
munity, which requires that a state official violate clearly established
federal law to be sued. 17 6 Another safeguard provides that § 1983 defen-
dants have the availability of interlocutory appeal from a district court's
determination before the case proceeds.177 As a result of these proce-
dural securities, it is unnecessary to require a showing of common law
tort elements in an attempt to limit § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.
CONCLUSION
The modem status of § 1983 malicious prosecution remains in con-
flict; however, the future appears to be bright. Though the Tenth Cir-
cuit's history of interpreting § 1983 malicious prosecution claims is long
and complex, the court has finally abandoned its inadequate "starting
point" analysis. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit has joined the majority of
circuits in recognizing the importance of separating state and federal
claims. A close analysis clearly reveals that a constitutional deprivation,
and only a constitutional deprivation, is necessary to properly plead a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Requiring the additional common
law tort elements would be inconsistent with federal pleading require-
ments, the statutory purpose of the claim, and all notions of civil rights
justice.
To conclude, it is useful to consider a statement by Justice Harlan:
"a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different
remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right."' 178 While this issue of § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution interpretation remains controversial, it is my hope that
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Schillaci, supra note 2, at 471.
176. Id.
177. id.
178. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1765 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
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the minority circuits will closely review the majority's rationale and real-
ize the civil rights threat that accompanies their employed methodology.
Charissa A. Eckhout*
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like
to thank Steve Rypma, Sara Lewis, and Megan "Ande" Yahr for their many insights into this subject
matter and their assistance in the development of the article.
PROTECTION ORDERS: A PROCEDURAL PACIFIER OR A
VIGOROUSLY ENFORCED PROTECTION TOOL? A
DISCUSSION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
GONZALES V. CASTLE ROCK
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a serious problem in America today. By some
estimates, three to four million women a year are victimized by a hus-
band or partner.' Some experts consider these estimates to be low, since
under-reporting is common due to the private nature of the crime.2
"Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in Amer-
ica."
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took a
controversial and significant step for the protection of battered women in
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock.4 Part I of this article discusses the prob-
lem of domestic violence and the prohibitive tool created by the legisla-
tures and granted by the courts: the protection order. Part II of this arti-
cle explains the Supreme Court's substantive due process precedent, liti-
gation against the state for failure-to-protect, and DeShaney's holding
severely limiting state liability in a failure-to-protect situation. Part III of
this article discusses the history of procedural due process and the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Gonzales. Part IV describes and discusses why the
Gonzales decision is a good one and the public policy arguments for and
against the decision. In conclusion, Part V explains the implications of
the Gonzales decision, and its desired effect on relevant state actors.
A. Domestic Violence and Orders of Protection
States began to recognize domestic violence as a serious problem in
the mid-1970's and responded by passing legislation enabling judges to
issue civil protection or restraining orders.5 Protection orders restrict one
party from contacting or harming another party and can be temporary or
permanent.6 The eligibility requirements necessary to obtain a temporary
1. Sean D. Thueson, Civil Domestic Violence Protection Orders in Wyoming: Do They
Protect Victims of Domestic Violence?, 4 WYO. L. REV. 271, 275 (2004).
2. Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with Domes-
tic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 51,52 (2000).
3. Thueson, supra note 1, at 275.
4. 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
5. Waul, supra note 2, at 53; Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reli-
ance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
499, 502 (2003) ("While improving the criminal justice response to domestic violence was an impor-
tant piece of the new array of legal remedies, the enactment and expansion of civil protection or
restraining orders evolved into a primary strategy for improving the safety of battered women.").
6. Waul, supra note 2, at 54.
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protection order excluding a person from the family home vary among
the states; in Colorado, the courts require a showing that "physical or
emotional harm would otherwise result. ' 7 Currently, all 50 states and the
District of Columbia have laws enabling the issuance of protection or-
ders.8  Violation of a protection order can result in criminal charges.
9
Due to the nature of the protection order, it "must be enforced to be ef-
fective."'
10
Unfortunately, many protection orders are under-enforced by the
police." Although there could be many potential reasons for non-
enforcement, a prevalent reason is based in stereotyped views of
women. 12 For example, in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, the
local police refused to enforce a protection order despite obvious evi-
dence that Mr. Balistreri was assaulting and harassing his wife.' 3  The
police received each of Mrs. Balistreri's complaints "with ridicule"-on
one occasion actually suggesting that Mrs. Balistreri "deserved the beat-
ing.
''14
As a result of this problem, many women sue police departments
and municipalities under state tort law based on the police under-
enforcement of protection orders. 15 However, because state tort law only
affects individuals living in the victim's state, some women choose to
sue under the Constitution, alleging violations of equal protection 16 or
due process.' 7  A successful constitutional suit has much broader
implications, resulting in enhanced protection for a greater number of
women. '
8
7. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-108(2)(c) (2004).
8. Waul, supra note 2, at 53.
9. Id. at 54.
10. Thueson, supra note 1, at 304.
11. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of
Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1321 (1990).
12. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: IV. Making State
Institutions More Responsive, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1990).
13. 901 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1988) (amended May 11, 1990) ("Balistreri's former husband
crashed his car into her garage, and Balistreri immediately called the police, who arrived at the scene
but stated that they would not arrest the husband or investigate the incident.").
14. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 698. See also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Re-
sponse to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 269
n.8 (1985) (discussing a police sergeant that would not prosecute domestic violence cases because of
sexist opinions).
15. E.g., Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985); Nearing v. Weaver,
670 P.2d 137, 141 (Or. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1988).
17. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 715 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
882 (1986).
18. Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1287 ("A Constitution-based claim is available to women in




B. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
Constitutional claims are brought under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. 19 Section 1983 establishes a private, civil cause of action for
citizens whose constitutional rights are violated by a state actor.20 The
pertinent part of section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law
21
Originally written as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the
Civil Rights Act provided "a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the ... rights... guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
' 22
The Supreme Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor23 established two
requirements to sustain a section 1983 action.24 First, a person must have
committed the action "acting under color of state law."2 Second, the
action must have deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.
26
Cases arise alleging either an affirmative act or an omission. In cases
where the State's failure to act is at issue, the plaintiff must prove the
State had "an affirmative duty to act and fail[ed] to fulfill this duty.
27
For a municipality to be liable under section 1983, "the action that
is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy state-
ment, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promul-
gated by that body's officers., 28 The deprivations can consist of merely
customary practices and do not have to be formally approved by the mu-
nicipality' s decision-making channels.
29
Section 1983 is typically used in conjunction with either the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In due
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
20. Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1284.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
22. Breaden Marshall Douthett, The Death of Constitutional Duty: The Court Reacts to the
Expansion of Section 1983 Liability in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices. 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 643,643 (1991); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
23. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
24. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1285.
28. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,690 (1978).
29. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
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process cases, liability claims come in two areas: substantive and proce-
dural.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. History of Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process declares that there are cer-
tain substantive constitutional rights that cannot be infringed upon by
governmental action.30  Historically, the existence of these rights has
been a controversial subject since they are not specifically enumerated in
the Constitution but are derived from the "liberty" element of the Due
Process Clause. 31 Women suing police and municipalities for not enforc-
ing protection orders often allege a deprivation of "liberty" without due
process of law.32 This deprivation arises from the State's failure-to-
protect the victim. 33 However, as evidenced by the Tenth Circuit's con-
troversial decision in Gonzales, alleging a deprivation of procedural due
process based on a "property" interest may bring more success.34
The controlling case in the area of substantive due process rights for
state liability in failure-to-protect situations is DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.35 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in DeShaney to settle the split between the circuits in their de-
termination of a defendant's liability for failure-to-protect arising from a
"special relationship" with the State.36 Prior to DeShaney, several more
active Courts of Appeals held that a non-custodial "special relationship"
arose when the State recognized a danger and undertook protection of the
victim. 37 This "special relationship" created a duty to protect, enforced
through the Due Process Clause.
38
Although DeShaney did not involve the enforcement of protection
orders, it severely limited "failure-to-protect" substantive due process
cases by providing a narrow definition of the "special relationship" test.39
In DeShaney, the Supreme Court limited the application of the "special
relationship" test to situations in which the victim was in state custody. n
30. MICHAEL ARIENS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PART II 313 (2004).
31. Id.
32. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,191 (1989).
33. E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
34. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
35. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
36. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
37. Id. at 197 n.4.
38. Id.
39. Douthett, supra note 22, at 646-47.
40. Id.
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B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services
Joshua DeShaney was one year of age when his mother and father
were divorced.4 A Wyoming court granted custody to Joshua's father,
Randy DeShaney, who subsequently relocated to Winnebago County,
42Wisconsin.
In January of 1982, Mr. DeShaney's second wife reported child
abuse allegations to local police.43 Shortly after the report, a social
worker from the Winnebago Department of Social Services ("DSS")
interviewed the father, who denied the charges of abuse." There was no
follow-up from DSS following the January 1982 allegations.
45
One year later, in January of 1983, the police again suspected Mr.
DeShaney of child abuse when Joshua was admitted to the hospital "with
multiple bruises and abrasions." 46 The county assembled a team consist-
ing of DSS caseworkers, a pediatrician, a detective, a psychologist, a
lawyer and various hospital personnel to make recommendations in
47Joshua's case. After finding insufficient evidence to justify placing
Joshua in state custody, the team recommended Joshua be enrolled in
preschool, for Mr. DeShaney to attend counseling, and for Mr. De-
Shaney's girlfriend to move out of his home.48 A month later, the local
hospital again notified DSS of Joshua's hospital admission with suspi-
cious injuries, and again DSS determined "there was no basis for ac-
tion.,,49
Throughout the following six months, a DSS caseworker visited the
DeShaney house on several occasions. 50 Although there was further evi-
dence of abuse, DSS took no action.51 Eventually, Randy DeShaney beat
Joshua into a coma.52 Joshua was left severely retarded and confined to
an institution for the rest of his life.
53
Joshua and his mother sued Winnebago County, DSS and several
individual employees of DSS for depriving Joshua "of his liberty without
due process of law, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth
41. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
42. Id.
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Amendment, by failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of vio-
lence at his father's hands of which they knew or should have known. 54
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
Joshua and his mother (petitioners) argued that the state had a "spe-
cial relationship" with Joshua since they knew he was in danger and ex-
pressed their intention to protect him.55 This special relationship created
a duty to protect in the state, which should have been carried out "in a
reasonably competent fashion., 56  Petitioners further argued that the
State's incompetency in acting on their duty was an "abuse of govern-
mental power that so 'shocks the conscience' ' 57 that it violated their sub-
stantive due process rights.58
The Court rejected petitioners' arguments, beginning its analysis by
examining the history and precedent of the Due Process Clause.59 The
Court stated that the purpose of the Due Process Clause was to protect
people from government infringement of "life, liberty or property with-
out 'due process of law.' 60 It was therefore not intended to "impose an
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not
come to harm through other [private] means.'
The Court acknowledged that under the Constitution, there could be
circumstances requiring the government to provide care and protection to
individuals, but these circumstances were limited to situations where the
government exercised some sort of custody or control over the individ-
ual62 (for example, by providing medical care to prisoners, or by provid-
ing adequate services to mental patients "ensuring their 'reasonable
safety' from themselves and others.").63 Therefore, the Court found,
"[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge
of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf."64
Since Joshua's father was not a state actor, and Joshua was not in
state custody when he was injured, the elements required for a successful
54. Id.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 198.
60. Id. at 195.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 199 (stating "by reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself, it is
only 'just' that the State be required to care for him") (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291,
293 (N.C. 1926)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 200.
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substantive due process claim were not present.65 Therefore, "the State
had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua." 66
Although the DeShaney Court's holding is a limitation on "failure-
to-protect" substantive due process claims, it left the door open for a
claim based on procedural due process in two ways. First, the DeShaney
Court acknowledged the existence of potential liability if the "courts and
legislatures impose ... affirmative duties of care and protection upon its
agents. .. " such as through a court-issued protection order with a corre-
sponding statute mandating enforcement.67 Additionally, the DeShaney
Court declined to consider petitioners' procedural due process argument
due to an error in the pleadings, leaving the possibility open for a "fail-
ure-to-protect" case based on procedural due process. 68 Based on these
two factors, a state actor could incur a duty to protect, and a tort commit-
69
ted by a state actor could turn into a constitutional violation.
I1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. History of Procedural Due Process
The foundation of the Due Process Clause is set in Chapter 39 of
Magna Carta.70 Chapter 39 states, "No free man shall be taken, out-
lawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or
prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law
of the land."' The drafters of the Magna Carta sought to abolish the ad
hoc trials of the period, which provided no procedural protections to its
72
citizens, often resulting in the use of improvised laws to try cases.
The Due Process Clause, set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, states "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. . The Supreme
Court interprets this clause as prohibiting the federal government from
depriving any citizen of life, liberty or property without first giving the
citizen 1) notice and 2) an opportunity to be heard. 74 The opportunity to
be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."
7 5
65. Id. at 201.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 202.
68. Id. at 195.
69. Id. at 201-02.
70. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968).
71. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
74. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1864).
75. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
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For cases alleging a deprivation of property, the first element of a
procedural due process claim is the identification of a property interest.
76
Property interests can be intangible, as in the enforcement of a protection
order, or tangible, such as personal or real property. When the State is
taking a person's tangible property, the procedural due process violation
is usually evident. For example, in Fuentes v. Shevin,77 Margarita
Fuentes purchased various items on credit from Firestone Tire and Rub-
ber Co. 78 Ms. Fuentes paid her monthly bill for over a year, when a dis-
pute arose causing her to discontinue payments.79 As a result, Firestone
went to small claims court and obtained a writ of replevin, seizing the
goods on the very same day.80 In granting the replevin order, the court
gave Ms. Fuentes no prior notice, nor an opportunity to dispute the or-
der.8' Ms. Fuentes subsequently challenged the replevin procedure in
federal court, charging that it violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.82 The Court held that "[T]he constitutional
right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a
fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his
possessions. 83 Creditors could seize goods to protect their security in-
terests but not until a fair hearing validated their claim.
4
A difficulty in procedural due process cases arises where the prop-
erty interest is not as clear as in Fuentes. For example, in Goldberg v.
Kelly,85 the property interest involved a citizen's entitlement to welfare
benefits. Residents receiving public assistance challenged New York
State's termination of their benefits without notice or a hearing of any
kind.86 The state's procedure provided for a post-deprivation hearing,
but the appellees argued the insufficiency of providing a hearing after the
87termination of benefits. Based on welfare recipients' dependence on
state funds for their food and shelter, the Court, characterizing welfare
entitlements as a property interest, held that welfare benefits were a
"statutory entitlement," and termination constituted state action adjudi-
cating "important rights. 88 The Court specifically rejected the argument
that welfare is a "privilege" and not a "right."89
76. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("[[]t is our practice to begin the inquiry
with a determination of the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the State.").
77. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
78. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 71.
82. Id. at 71.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 96.
85. 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
86. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256.
87. Id. at 259-60.
88. Id. at 261-62.
89. Id. at 262.
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The decision in Goldberg evidenced the Court's willingness to find
property interests in entitlements such as public assistance benefits.
90
Under Goldberg, the enforcement of a protection order would have been
declared a property right. 91 Unfortunately, the entitlement revolution
started by Goldberg was soon limited by subsequent decisions, making
the determination of a property right in public assistance benefits less
predictable.92
In Board of Regents v. Roth,9 3 the Court trimmed the Goldberg de-
cision in finding that property rights were not created by the constitu-
tion.94 Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh ("University") hired David
Roth to teach political science during the period of September 1, 1968
and June 30, 1969.95 After this term was completed, the University noti-
fied Roth of its decision not to re-hire him for the next academic year.
96
The University gave Roth neither a reason nor an opportunity to chal-
lenge the decision.97 Since Mr. Roth had not been employed by the Uni-
versity for the statutory "four years of year-to-year employment," he was
considered a non-tenured employee.98 Wisconsin state law clearly gave
the University the discretion whether to re-hire non-tenured teachers.
99
Mr. Roth challenged his termination, alleging in part that the failure
of the University to give him a reason or fair hearing violated his proce-
dural due process rights.' ° In evaluating Mr. Roth's claim, the Court
looked to the nature of the right to determine if it qualified as "property"
as specified by the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 '
Departing from Goldberg, the Court in Roth further narrowed enti-
tlement property interests to rights created and defined by "existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits."'' 02 Thus, in Roth, the property
interest was only a temporary one created by the "terms of his employ-
ment." 0 3 Since the terms specified employment between the periods of
September 1, 1968 and June 30, 1969, the property interest terminated
90. Id.
91. See id. at 262 n.8.
92. Douthett, supra note 22, at 651-52.
93. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
94. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
95. Id. at 566.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 568.
98. Id. at 566.
99. Id. at 567.
100. Id. at 569.
101. Id. at 570-71 (stating "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
infinite.").
102. Id. at 577.
103. Id. at 578.
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concurrently with the terms. 1°4 Although Mr. Roth had a personal interest
in re-employment, the Court found he did not have a property interest.
10 5
Since Roth, the Court has identified many other entitlement prop-
erty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. These interests in-
clude continued public employment, 0 6 a free education, 0 7 garnished
wages, 0 8 professional licenses,'0 9 driver's licenses,110 causes of action,"'
and the receipt of government utility services. 2  However, it was not
until the Tenth Circuit's bold decision in Gonzales that a federal court
found a property right in the enforcement of a protection order.113
B. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock
On May 21, 1999, Ms. Gonzales went to state court seeking a pro-
tection order to limit her husband's contact with their three daughters."
4
The court granted the order under Colorado Revised Statute § 14-10-108,
excluding Mr. Gonzales from the family home based on Ms. Gonzales'
showing "that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result."
'"1 5
The protection order mandated that Mr. Gonzales stay "at least 100 yards
away from the property at all times" and specified violation of the order
could result in arrest and prosecution. 1 6 The order also warned that po-
lice officers would use "every reasonable means" in enforcing the order,
subjecting violators to arrest and detention in "the nearest jail or deten-
tion facility."' 17
Mr. Gonzales received the order on June 4, 1999, and the court
made the order permanent that same day. 18 The permanent order speci-
fied that Mr. Gonzales could not see his children with the exception of
two circumstances.1 19 First, provided reasonable notice to Ms. Gonzales,
Mr. Gonzales was allowed "a mid-week dinner visit with the minor chil-
dren.' 120 Second, the order permitted Mr. Gonzales to gather the chil-
dren "for the purpose of parental time.'' In each case, during Mr. Gon-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
107. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
108. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
109. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55,64 (1979).
110. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
111. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428 (1982).
112. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
113. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1109 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
114. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096.
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-108 (2004).
116. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096.
117. Id. at 1097 (citing SUSAN WENDALL WHICHER & CHERYL LOETSCHER, HANDBOOK OF
COLORADO FAMILY LAW, ch. IV, F-12 at 2 (3d ed. 1996)).






zales' visits he was not to "molest or disturb the peace" at Ms. Gonzales'
home. 1
22
On June 22, 1999, between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales vio-
lated the order and abducted the children from Ms. Gonzales' front
yard. 23 Ms. Gonzales learned the children were missing at approxi-
mately 7:30 p.m. and, immediately suspecting Mr. Gonzales, called the
Castle Rock police. 124 Shortly thereafter, Officers Brink and Ruisi ar-
rived at Ms. Gonzales' home and reviewed the protection order. 25 The
officers did not comply with the order's terms, and told Ms. Gonzales
"there was nothing they could do."' 126 They directed Ms. Gonzales to call
the police station again if Mr. Gonzales did not return her children by
10:00 p.m.'
27
At approximately 8:30 p.m., Mr. Gonzales called Ms. Gonzales and
informed her that he had taken the children to Elitch Gardens, a Denver
amusement park. 28 Upon receiving this information, Ms. Gonzales
called the police a second time to report the whereabouts of her hus-
band.129 Again, Officer Brink told her to wait until 10:00 p.m. 130 Ms.
Gonzales anxiously waited until 10:00 p.m. when she phoned the police
again.' 31 Unfortunately, Ms. Gonzales received no assistance; dispatch
told her to wait another two hours.' 32 Ms. Gonzales followed the dis-
patcher's instructions and waited until midnight to place a fourth call.
133
With the midnight call provoking no action by police, Ms. Gonzales
drove to Mr. Gonzales' apartment to look for the girls. 34 Upon finding
no one home, Ms. Gonzales phoned police for a fifth time.135 Despite
receiving instructions to wait at the apartment complex until police ar-
rived, no police officer ever met Ms. Gonzales. 136 At 12:50 a.m., Ms.
Gonzales drove to the Castle Rock police station and filed an incident
report with Officer Ahlfinger. 137 Officer Ahlfinger subsequently made
no attempt to enforce the protection order's terms by finding and arrest-















136. Id. at 1097-98.
137. Id. at 1098.
138. Id.
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Approximately eight hours after Ms. Gonzales' initial call to the po-
lice, Mr. Gonzales arrived at the police station and opened fire. 139 The
police shot and killed him at the scene and, upon searching his truck,
found the dead bodies of the three children. 140 He killed them earlier that
day. 141
Ms. Gonzales sued the City of Castle Rock and Officers Ahlfinger,
Brink and Ruisi under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.142 She al-
leged the officers violated her substantive and procedural due process
rights by failing to enforce the protection order against her husband, and
that the city tolerated the officers' non-enforcement of protection orders
resulting in "the reckless disregard of a person's right to police protec-
tion granted by such orders."'
143
C. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's Decision
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dis-
missed Ms. Gonzales' case, finding she failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.44 On appeal, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed Ms. Gonzales' substan-
tive due process claim but held the procedural due process claim could
proceed. 145 The City of Castle Rock and Officers Ahlfinger, Brink and
Ruisi sought review of the panel decision and were granted rehearing en
banc. 1
46
The en banc court reviewed the panel's decision on April 29,
2004.147 Briefly addressing the panel's dismissal of Ms. Gonzales' sub-
stantive due process claim, the court stressed that under DeShaney "the
Constitution itself does not require a state to protect its citizens from
third party harm."' 148 Since the State did not create the danger in Ms.
Gonzales' case, a "danger creation" exception could not be sustained,
and since DeShaney put an end to the expansion of constitutional liability
using the "special relationship" test, the court dismissed Ms. Gonzales'
substantive due process claim. 149
In discussing Ms. Gonzales' procedural due process claim, the court









147. Id. at 1096.
148. Id. at 1099.
149. Id.
150. Id. ("Contrary to the assertions of the city and officers, as well as those of our dissenting




dural due process claims stem from state law.151 Substantive due process
claims are brought based on rights contained in and protected by the
Constitution. 5 2 Note that while the Court in DeShaney held "nothing in
the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors,"153 it left the door open for state-created property rights imposing
"affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents.' 54 Thus, the
court analyzed Ms. Gonzales' case to determine 1) whether state law,
through granting the protection order, created a property interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment 55 and, if so, 2) whether the State
denied Ms. Gonzales "an appropriate level of process."'
' 56
1. Determination of a Property Interest
The Gonzales Court acknowledged Tenth Circuit precedent, holding
that statutory mandates alone cannot create a property interest-but
stressed a different situation was present in this case.' 57 Ms. Gonzales
held a court-issued protection order that was also mandated by state stat-
ute.1 58 The court held that it was the combination of the state statute and
the protection order, both mandating enforcement, that created the prop-
erty interest.1
59
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Olim v. Wakinekona, the
court stressed that an entitlement property interest is only created when
there are "objective and defined criteria" for a decision maker to fol-
low.' 6 If the decision maker "can deny the requested relief for any con-
stitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all, the State has not
created a constitutionally protected . . . interest.'16' In applying these
standards to Gonzales, the en banc court found both the protection order
and the state statute relied upon by Ms. Gonzales contained mandatory
language and specific criteria for a decisionmaker to follow.' 62 The pro-
tection order set forth the state's intent to enforce with language mandat-
ing that police "use every reasonable means to enforce this restraining
order," and officers "shall take the restrained person to the nearest jail or
detention facility ....163 Likewise, the statute contains similar language
151. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: IV. Making State
Institutions More Responsive, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (1993).
152. Id.
153. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
154. Id. at 201. ("A State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative
duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes.").
155. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1100.
156. Id. at 1110.
157. Id. at 1101.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983).
161. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249.
162. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1103-04.
163. Id.
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ordering the arrest of the order's violator, "or, if an arrest would be im-
practical.. . , seek a warrant for the arrest ... when the peace officer has
information amounting to probable cause that the restrained person has
violated or attempted to violate any provision of the restraining order.
'' 64
Recognizing that police officers must use some judgment in their deter-
mination of probable cause, the court noted that "objectively ascertain-
able standards" are used to evaluate probable cause decisions based on
"what a reasonably well-trained officer would know."'165 Therefore, in
the court's view, a statute requiring a showing of probable cause met the
requirement of "objective and defined criteria" for a decision maker to
follow set in Olim.1
66
The Tenth Circuit's holding-that a court-ordered protection order
containing mandatory language requiring enforcement, based on specific
objective criteria, created a constitutionally protected property interest-
had some support from other district courts, 16 7 but no other circuit court
had gone this far. 68
For example, the court in Gonzales cited a district court's decision
in Coffman v. Wilson Police Department 69 as support for its ruling. 70 In
Coffman, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania analyzed facts disturbingly similar to those in Gonzales.
Coffman involved the police's refusal to enforce a protection order de-
spite repeated calls from the victim requesting assistance. 17' Noting that
in DeShaney the Supreme Court "specifically did not reach whether a
Roth entitlement might have existed,"'172 the court in Coffman examined
the statute and protection order for language mandating enforcement.'
73
Although the use of the words "[the arrest] may be without warrant" in
the statute were obviously precatory, the protection order contained the
mandatory, unambiguous phrase "the police department shall enforce the
[protection] orders."'' 74 The court opined, "The word 'shall' is manda-
tory, not precatory, and its use in a simple declarative sentence brooks no
contrary interpretation.' 75 Based on the mandatory language in the pro-
164. Id. at 1104.
165. Id. at 1105.
166. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249.
167. See Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Siddle v.
Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
168. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1131 n.2 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) ("In nearly fifteen years since
DeShaney no other circuit has ventured this far.").
169. See Coffinan, 739 F. Supp. at 254.
170. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1102.
171. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 260.
172. Id. at 264 n.7.





tection order, the court found a "property interest in police enforcement
[of a protection order] that is cognizable under Roth."
1 6
2. Determination of an Appropriate Level of Process
Once the court established that Ms. Gonzales had a protected inter-
est in the enforcement of the protection order, the next step was to de-
termine whether she was denied "an appropriate level of process."'177 An
acceptable level of process can generally be stated as "the opportunity to
be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."",1
78
In Parratt v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that random actions of
a state actor cannot be the basis of a procedural due process claim if there
is an adequate post-deprivation remedy available. 79 However, Ms. Gon-
zales did not allege the non-enforcement of her protection order was
"random" but argued the non-action resulted from a "custom and policy
of the City of Castle Rock not to enforce domestic abuse protection or-
ders."' 8 °
In ignoring Ms. Gonzales' requests for enforcement of her protec-
tion order, the court held that she did not receive any process at all.'8 '
While the court deemed a formal pre-deprivation hearing impractical and
a post-deprivation hearing ineffective, it suggested that "something less
than a full evidentiary hearing [would be] sufficient.' 8 2 As an example,
the court used the process required in' 83 Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft. 184 In Memphis Light, customers sued their utility company
for shutting off their service without providing adequate notice and proc-
ess. 85 The Supreme Court held that procedural due process was satisfied
if a customer had an opportunity to talk with a company employee who
could correct billing mistakes before terminating utility services. 186
The Gonzales Court possessed an undeveloped record, so they were
unable to develop specific procedures in determining what process was
due. 87 However, the court used the statute for direction and suggested a
general process for dealing with protection orders. 88 The process re-
quired "police officers to determine whether a valid order exists, whether
probable cause exists that the restrained party is violating the order, and
176. Id.
177. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 39 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 1994)).
178. Id. at 1111 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
179. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-43 (1981).
180. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1112-13.
181. Id. at I IIIn.15.
182. Id. at 1114 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985)).
183. Id. at 1115.
184. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
185. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 11.
186. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1115.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1116.
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whether probable cause exists that the restrained party has notice of the
order." 189 After completion of these steps, if it is determined the protec-
tion order does not warrant mandatory enforcement, the person holding
the order should be notified of the determination and why. 190 The court
speculated that if the police had followed the procedures outlined in the
statute, the Gonzales children's lives might have been spared. 191
Although the court held Ms. Gonzales' section 1983 action could
proceed, it could only proceed against the municipality. 192 The standard
for holding police officers liable requires it be "sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would have understood that his conduct violated the
right."'193 The court held the officers were therefore entitled to qualified
immunity, since prior to this decision "a reasonable officer would [not]
have known that a restraining order, coupled with a statute mandating its




One of the main reasons the dissenters in Gonzales were unwilling
to expand state protective services under the Fourteenth Amendment was
a fear of endless lawsuits being brought against the State. 195 In his dis-
sent, Judge Kelly quoted the First Circuit case of Estate of Gilmore v.
Buckley:
Enormous economic consequences could follow from the reading of
the fourteenth amendment that plaintiff here urges. Firemen who
have been alerted to a victim's peril but fail to take effective action;
municipal ambulances which, when called, arrive late; and myriad
other errors by state officials in providing protective services, could
all be found to violate the Constitution. 196
However, this parade of horrors argument misses the point and
overlooks the narrow 197 holding of the majority in Gonzales. In finding a
property interest in the enforcement of a protection order, the court spe-
cifically required the order 1) be issued by a court, 2) contain mandatory
language requiring enforcement, and 3) must also contain "specific ob-
189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1118.
193. Id. at 1117 (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)).
194. Id. at 1117-18.
195. Douthett, supra note 22, at 651.
196. Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722-23 (1st Cir. 1986).
197. See, e.g., Lauren L. McFarlane, Note, The Right To Privacy One Hundred Years Later,
Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When The Police Will Not Respond?, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 929, 964-65 (1991) ("At the moment, there are few states with statutory
grants of protection clear enough to support [procedural due process] claims.").
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jective criteria curtailing .. decisionmaking discretion .... ,1 Addi-
tionally, adding weight to its conclusion, the court considered factors
such as the mandatory language in the statute enabling the granting of a
protection order, the statute's legislative history, and, absent malice, bad
faith or non-compliance with adopted rules, the granting of immunity to
police in their enforcement of a protection order.199
In applying the Gonzales analysis to the case of a firefighter not re-
sponding to a fire or an ambulance that is late to the scene of the acci-
dent, it is obvious that these cases would never get past the determination
of a property interest stage of the trial. Neither case involves a specific
statute coupled with a court-ordered protection order.200 The court in
Gonzales was very clear: this holding does not apply to situations in
which a state statute mandates outlined procedures, absent a court or-
der. 20 ' For example, the court distinguished Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee
Co. from Gonzales.2 °2 In the court's view, the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Doe was correct in not finding a property interest in child protective
services created solely by a state statute. 203 Mandatory language in a
state statute alone is not enough.204 Accordingly, the elements required
to find a property interest in Gonzales leave little room for the endless
expansion of due process rights and the potential for a litany of lawsuits
against the State.
Another argument criticizing the holding in Gonzales claims that
requiring police to "conduct pre-deprivation hearings" when dealing with
protection orders is impractical.20 5 This contention arises from a misun-
derstanding of the process the court required due. The Gonzales process
requires "three basic steps" that would take police "only ... minutes to
,,20620perform. A pre-deprivation hearing is not required.20 7 The steps out-
lined by the court provide an opportunity for individuals to have their
protection order enforcement requests examined and, therefore, minimiz-
ing the risk of random, arbitrary denials.20 8 As the Supreme Court stated
in Roth:
It can scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a re-
quirement that the reason be communicated to the person most di-
rectly affected by the government's action .... As long as the gov-
198. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1109.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 100 n.4.
202. Id. (distinguishing Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee Co., 903 F.2d 499, 502-03 (7th Cir.
1990)).
203. Id. at I100 n.4.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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ernment has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure.
It is only where the government acts improperly that procedural due
process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely when it is most
209
necessary.
Finally, the dissenters also argued that "it will always be possible
for plaintiffs to recharacterize their substantive due process claims
against arbitrary action by executive officials as 'procedural due process'
claims ... ,2 10 For example, in the Tenth Circuit case Abeyta by &
Through Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 9,211 a teacher
was sued for continually calling his twelve-year-old student a "prosti-
,,2 12tute. The student alleged the teacher violated her substantive due
process rights "to be free from invasion of her personal security by sex-
ual abuse and harassment and by psychological abuse., 213 The court
denied the student's claim, holding "extreme verbal abuse typically is
insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation.,
214
Judge McConnell argues that, in light of Gonzales, the student in
Abeyta should have "styled the claim as a procedural deprivation (of her
liberty interest in personal security and emotional well-being) and al-
leged that the real harm was that the teacher determined that she was a
prostitute without first holding a hearing on the question.,
215
However, just because Abeyta could be styled as a procedural due
process claim, it does not mean that it is logical to do so; nor does it
mean the result in Abeyta would be different. In Judge McConnell's
hypothetical, the plaintiff in Abeyta would have to show that being called
a "prostitute" was authorized by state policy and not "a result of a ran-
dom and unauthorized act by a state employee. 21 6 The teacher's actions
in Abeyta were obviously random and not state policy. Therefore, a rem-
edy in state court would be all that the Due Process Clause requires; the
plaintiff would be denied an opportunity to sue in federal court.217
Gonzales' narrow holding-that a court-ordered protection order
containing mandatory language requiring enforcement, based on specific
objective criteria, created a constitutionally protected property interest-
does not endlessly expand state liability. It does not create stifling police
procedure. It does not allow the skirting of substantive due process
precedent, such as the Court's decision in DeShaney. It does provide
enhanced protection to battered women and their children by ensuring
209. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972).
210. Id. at 1129.
211. 77 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1996).
212. Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1254.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1256.
215. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1130 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
216. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981).
217. Developments in the Law, supra note 151, at 1566.
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that every request for the enforcement of a protection order is evaluated
in the same way.
V. CONCLUSION
On November 1, 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the State's
appeal of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gonzales.2'8 Lawyers for the
state want to portray the decision as potentially bankrupting "municipal
governments for their inevitable instances of 'less than perfect' law en-
-219 220forcement." "[L]ess than perfect" is an obvious understatement.
As the Court in DeShaney recognized, procedural due process rights
provide a remedy where substantive due process falls short. In using
procedural due process, Gonzales provides a framework for citizens to
have their protection order enforcement requests evaluated, as well as
providing a sufficient cause of action against police and municipalities
for arbitrarily refusing enforcement. The holding does not violate the
constitutional concept of "negative rights," nor does it needlessly expand
state liability.
The substantial step taken in Gonzales also sends a broad message
to police and municipalities that courts, as well as the legislature, con-
sider domestic violence as a serious problem and are committed to its
eradication. With a potential federal lawsuit involved, state officials may
think twice before ignoring a request for enforcement of a protection
order. Procedural due process, in the words of Justice Douglas, "spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance
that there will be equal justice under law.",221
Michael Mattis*
218. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Mull Rights of Those Seeking Police Protection, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A21.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I wish to thank my
wife Shantel for her constant inspiration and my family for their encouragement and support.
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CHALLENGES IN MEETING THE DISABILITY
QUALIFICATION UNDER THE ADA: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S
ANALYSIS IN MASON V. AVAYA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 1 was enacted
in part because of pervasive discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties in this country,a resulting in segregation, 3 inferior status, 4 and a de-
nied opportunity to "compete on an equal basis" with those not disabled.5
A report conducted by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment
of Americans with Disabilities concluded that this discrimination costs
governments and businesses billions of dollars in "unnecessary expendi-
tures resulting from the dependency and non-productivity of persons
with disabilities.",6 Since the ADA was enacted, there has been signifi-
cant litigation over what constitutes a disability and what accommoda-
tions must be made for those with disabilities.7 In January 2004, the
Tenth Circuit added to this debate when it held for the first time in Ma-
son v. Avaya Communications, Inc.8 that working from home is not a
reasonable accommodation. 9 This ruling is not notable in itself, as a ma-
jority of circuits have reached the same conclusion. What makes this
case unique is the manner in which the Tenth Circuit applied the law to
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Mason's disability. Avaya dem-
onstrates that the ADA provides employers great deference in determin-
ing what constitutes an "essential function" of a job. This deference al-
lows employers to make sweeping assertions to support their view of
what constitutes an essential function of the job without the court apply-
ing much scrutiny. As time progresses beyond the enactment of the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
2. ADA: PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES § 1.03 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS] (citing NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE-AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (1986) [hereinafter NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED], available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/l1986/toward.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2005)).
3. ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Id. Inferior status includes "social interactions, economic well-being, vocational pursuits,
and educational attainment." Id
5. Id.
6. Id. Unnecessary expenditures result in part from "provisions of existing Social Security
laws . .. [that] serve to discourage and penalize people with disabilities if they seek to become
employed and selfsupporting." NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 2, at viii-ix. At
the time of the report, annual federal disability programs and benefits cost $60 billion dollars. Id. at
viii.
7. See Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997
(2004) (citations omitted).
8. 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
9. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123.
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ADA, are the disabled more able to compete on an equal basis in the
workplace or has litigation only added more roadblocks on the path to
equality?
The purpose of this article is to explore the ADA and advocate that
decisions like Avaya are not positive steps in the direction of realizing
the policy that drove the enactment of the ADA. Section H is the back-
drop to the discussion. Subsection A discusses the ADA and what Con-
gress hoped to achieve when it enacted the Act. Subsection B discusses
the confusion about the ADA and how it differs from more traditional
civil rights legislation such as affirmative action. Section III discusses
the Avaya case in detail. Section IV is an analysis of the Avaya decision.
Specifically, subsection A discusses the court's ruling that physical at-
tendance in the workplace is an essential job function. Subsection B
discusses inconsistent scrutiny applied to Avaya's and Mason's argu-
ments, and the court's zealous affirmation of Avaya's factual allegations
while derisively crushing Mason's attempts to advocate her position.
Subsection C discusses future directions and advocates that the Tenth
Circuit, and other circuits, should consider taking a more permissive ap-
proach to the merits of valid ADA claims. Section V concludes the dis-
cussion with the argument that the Avaya holding is consistent with the
majority of circuits, but it is not positive step in realizing the legislative
intent behind the ADA.
H. BACKGROUND
The ADA is an anti-discrimination statute like Title VII, but it does
not offer a class-based remedy like its antecedents. Instead, it relies on a
case-specific analysis to determine whether an employer can make a rea-
sonable accommodation for a disabled employee that will not create an
undue burden on the employer.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is a "comprehensive federal antidiscrimination statute"'10
enacted in 1990 to combat widespread discrimination against the dis-
abled 1 in this country.12 The ADA, like its federal antidiscrimination
10. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1996).
11. Under ADA regulations, "disability" as applied to an individual is defined as: "(1) A
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (2) A record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(g) (2004). Exceptions to this definition are found in 29 C.F.R. §
1630.3 (2004), which includes those engaged in the illegal use of drugs, transvestites, kleptomania,
compulsive gambling, psychoactive substance use disorders, and others. Under 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(m) (2004), a "[q]ualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability
who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of such position." This definition is also subject to the
exceptions listed in § 1630.3 (2004).
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antecedents, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, requires employers to ignore
disabilities in the same way that they must ignore sex, race, religion, or
age. 13 This requirement, referred to as the "sameness model of equality,"
means that it is based on a traditional model of equality where the pro-
tected class (the disabled) must be treated exactly the same as other em-
ployees. 14 Under the sameness model, intentional discrimination and the
"application of neutral rules that adversely affect the protected class"' 5
are prohibited. Unlike its antecedents, however, the ADA also requires
employers to provide "reasonable accommodations to disabled employ-
ees who request them."' 6 Commentators call this the "difference model
of equality" and it stems from the realization that the sameness model of
equality "is not enough to guarantee equality to all individuals with dis-
abilities because sometimes those disabilities . . .can negatively affect
job performance unless they are accommodated."' 7  Upon request, an
employer must consider a disability when accommodating the employee
and treat the disabled employee differently. 18 The sameness and differ-
ence models can be distinguished in that blacks, women, and older work-
ers can complain about discrimination under the sameness model, but
only the disabled can "insist upon discrimination in their favor" under
the difference model. 19
The distinction between the two models can be best explained
through a hypothetical.20 Suppose that a blind employee with a guide
dog works for Company A. Under the sameness model, Company A
cannot discriminate against the employee for raises or promotions on the
grounds that the employee is blind. Likewise, under the sameness
model, Company A cannot require the blind employee to adhere to a
neutral policy, such as "no dogs allowed at the workplace," when that
policy would discriminate against the blind employee. Under the differ-
ence model, if the blind employee requests that Company A reasonably
accommodate for her need to care for her dog during working hours,
assuming she is qualified under the ADA, the company must allow her to
do this if it would not create an undue hardship on them.
As this example shows, what constitutes a reasonable accommoda-
tion depends on the specific circumstances of the employee, the em-
12. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 2, at 20.
13. Id. at 27.
14. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 952, 954 (2004); Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 10, at 10.
15. Ball, supra note 14, at 957.
16. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 3.
17. Ball, supra note 14, at 955.
18. Id.
19. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 3.
20. This is an expansion of a similar analogy by Karlan & Rutherglen. See id. at 10.
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ployer, and the working environment. While a blind employee with
guide dog might need an accommodation so that she could care for her
dog during the day, an employee in a wheelchair might need a ramp to
enter the work building. Unlike traditional antidiscrimination statutes,
such as Title VII, that apply to classes of individuals, 2' under the ADA,
each employee with a unique disability requires a unique reasonable ac-
commodation from the employer.22  What constitutes a reasonable ac-
commodation under the ADA is unique to the circumstances because "to
get beyond [an individual's disability], we must first take account of [that
disability]. 2 3 Thus, ADA cases are analyzed on a case-by-case basis.24
Similarly, the facts of each case determine which accommodations
constitute an undue hardship, creating burdens for both the disabled em-
ployee and the employer. 25 The disabled employee bears the burden to
show that reasonable accommodation is possible because the employee
would have a better understanding than the employer of what would be
needed.26 When this accommodation is identified, the burden shifts to
the employer who must show that the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship because the employer has a better understanding of what
meeting this accommodation would cost.
27
When analyzing the facts in an ADA dispute, there are four material
factors that must be considered: (1) the specific disability; (2) the essen-
tial job functions for the disabled employee; (3) the possible
accommodations the employer could make; and, (4) the burden of those
accommodations on the employer.28 Essential job functions and burden
of accommodations are the commonly contested issues because the other
two options are effectively static.2 9  Essential job functions can be
restructured to account for the disability, and thus the critical issue is
whether "job restructuring causes undue hardship to the employer.,
30
B. Affirmative Action and Reasonable Accommodation
Reasonable accommodation under the ADA is often confused with
its Title VII brethren such as affirmative action.31 While the two share
21. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 2; Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
22. See Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
23. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 10 (quoting Justice Blackmun in Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dictum)).
24. See, e.g., Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 ("The Supreme Court has generally eschewed per se
rules under the ADA ... [and this case] must likewise be made on a case-by-case basis.") (citing
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999)).
25. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 12.
26. Id. at 12-13.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. See id. For example, if an employee were blind, this would not generally be a fact in
dispute. Likewise, the job responsibilities, work space, and other relevant factors would determine
the accommodations an employer could make to enable the employee to function effectively.
30. Id. at 14.
31. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 14, at 960.
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similarities, they are also vastly different.32  Indeed, affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation are terms that have been used inter-
changeably by the judiciary, prompting some commentators to distin-
guish between the two.33 While they are similar in that both provide
special treatment to classes of individuals, 34 there are several key distinc-
tions. While affirmative action is a form of remedy for past wrongs,
reasonable accommodation applies to current or future discrimination as
a form of compensation for a handicap35 that enables the disabled to
compete and perform equally with their nondisabled colleagues and it
ensures that they will remain on equal footing in the future. 36 Affirma-
tive action applies to a class of individuals, regardless of their circum-
stances, while reasonable accommodation is a "highly individualized
form of analysis that looks to the particular interaction ... between an
employee's disability and the essential functions of a job. 37 Affirmative
action only requires a person to be a member of a protected class for eli-
gibility, while reasonable accommodation requires the employee to show
membership in a class (disabled) and that "the employer's policies con-
stitute particular barriers ... that interfere with the ability of that particu-
lar employee to perform the essential functions of the job. 38 In other
words, class membership is necessary, but not sufficient, to meet the
eligibility requirement under reasonable accommodation; thus, member-
ship in the disabled class does not, by itself, constitute grounds for pref-
erential treatment under ADA.39
III. MASON V. AVAYA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.4 0
A. Facts
Diane Mason worked for the United States Post Office in Edmund,
Oklahoma.41 After witnessing the murder of several of her co-employees
at the post office in 1986,42 she sought counseling and was diagnosed
with post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").4 3 She changed jobs in
32. Id.
33. See id. at 973; Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 14.
34. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 14.
35. Professor Ball uses the term "substantive liability" to characterize an employer's forward-
looking obligation to compensate for a handicap. See Ball, supra note 14, at 953, 969, 973, 977.
36. Id. at 960, 973. See also Hubbard, supra note 7, at 1039 ("the ADA was the promise of
'the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous."') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101)).
37. Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
38. Id. at 975.
39. Id.
40. Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
41. Avaya, 357F.3dat 1116.
42. Id. at 1116-17. The incident on August 20, 1986 was coined the "Edmund Post Office
massacre." Id. See, e.g., Leonard Saffir, 'Terrified For My Life' Says Post Office Massacre Survi-
vor, LAKE WORTH HERALD, Mar. 28, 2002 (eyewitness account of the massacre and her subsequent
challenges with PTSD), available at http:f/www.postalwatch.org/2002 01_17_lakeworth-postal
_police.htm#Terrified (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
43. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1117.
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1998 because working for the post office aggravated her disorder.44
Avaya hired her as a service coordinator, a position where she scheduled
service appointments for field technicians, monitored the service ticket
queue, and communicated with technicians by "computer, telephone, and
fax.' '4 From January 1998 to March 2000, her work performance was
satisfactory and without incident.46 On March 21, 2000, her co-
employee, Kevin Lunsford, pulled a knife on another employee during a
verbal confrontation and was given a one-week suspension.47 Mason did
not witness the altercation, but she heard about it from other employ-
ees.48 She was also told "that Lunsford had previously threatened to 'go
postal,' retained a cache of weapons, and compiled a 'hit list.'"49 Avaya
informed employees that it had conducted a "fitness-for-duty examina-
tion on Lunsford and concluded that he could safely return to the work-
force.,' 50 When Lunsford returned to work on March 28, 2000, "Mason
called in sick because she was physically and emotionally unable to work
with Lunsford ..... 51 Doctors confirmed that she suffered a relapse of
PTSD.52 Mason told Avaya that she could come back to work, but not in
the same building as Lunsford while he was working.53 Avaya placed
her on short-term disability,
54 which lasted a year. 55
In June 2000, "Mason requested Avaya accommodate her disorder
by (1) relocating Lunsford, (2) allowing Mason to work at another Avaya
facility in Oklahoma City, or (3) allowing her to work out of her
home." 56 After review, Avaya concluded that it could not relocate
Lunsford, it could not allow Mason to work out of her home because
"physical attendance at the administration center was a function of a ser-
vice coordinator's job," and it recommended that Mason inquire about
other service coordinator positions through its transfer program.57 Ma-
son looked into the transfer program; the only available service coordina-
tor positions in Oklahoma City were in the facility where she worked,
and she did not want to move from Oklahoma.58 After a year on short-
term disability, Avaya denied Mason's request for long-term disability












55. Id. at 1118.
56. Id. at lll7.
57. Id. at 1117-18.
58. Id. at 1118.
59. Id.
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B. Background
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual on
the basis of a disability.60  Discrimination is defined as "'not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . em-
ployee[. ' ' 61 To be a qualified individual, the employee must make a
prima facie case for discrimination by showing: (1) the employee was
"disabled within the meaning of the ADA"; (2) the employee is "quali-
fied, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired"; and, (3) the employee was dis-
criminated against because of the disability.62 A disability means that an
individual has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual .... a record of
such an impairment .... or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment.
, 63
The employee "bears the burden of showing she is able to perform
the essential functions of her job." Evidence of whether a job function
is essential includes, but is not limited to:
65
(i) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii)
written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job per-
forming the function; (iv) the consequences of not requiring the in-
cumbent to perform the function; and ... (vi) the work experience of
past incumbents in the job .... 66
Consideration is given to the employer's judgment regarding which
job functions are essential 67 and the court will not second guess this
judgment when its description is '.ob-related, uniformly enforced, and
consistent with business necessity ' ' 8 or requires "the employer to lower
company standards."
69
Mason filed a discrimination claim against Avaya with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which determined
that there was "reasonable cause to believe Avaya violated the ADA.,
70
Mason brought an action under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, in
60. Id. at 1118 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2004)).
61. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1118 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
62. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), which defines a "qualified individual with a disability").
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2004).
64. Avaya, 357 F.3d at I 119.
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004).
66. Id. The Avaya court considered several of these factors in its analysis. Avaya, 357 F.3d at
1120.
67. Id. at 1119 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
68. Id. (citing Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003)).
69. Id. (citing Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2001)).
70. Id. at 1118.
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the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against Avaya,
alleging that Avaya violated the ADA by failing to "accommodate her
post traumatic stress disorder by ... refusing to allow her to work from
home" and terminating her.7 ' The District Court granted Avaya's motion
for summary judgment because Mason failed to prove she was a quali-
fied individual with a disability under the ADA.72 Mason followed with
a direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
73
C. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis
Since Avaya conceded that Mason was disabled, Mason met the
first element of an ADA prima facie case.74 The dispute focused on the
second element, whether Mason was "qualified, with or without reason-
able accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or
desired., 75 To show qualification, Mason must meet at least one prong
of a two-prong analysis: (1) whether a disabled person "can perform the
essential functions of the job," and if not, (2) whether the employer can
make any reasonable accommodations to enable the employee to perform
the essential functions of the job.76 Mason could only pursue the second
prong of this test because she could not perform the essential functions of
her job while working with Lunsford; his presence was the trigger of her
disability. Accordingly, Mason argued she could perform the essential
functions of the coordinator position, but she required a reasonable ac-
commodation because her disability prevented her from working with
Lunsford.77
Due to her unique disability, how it is triggered, and the circum-
stances of her work situation, Mason had only one viable legal argument
to meet her burden: she had to convince the court that working from
home was a reasonable accommodation. First, Avaya would not fire
Lunsford 78 and they were not legally required to transfer him under the
ADA.79 Second, she did not want to move from Oklahoma City,80 Avaya
did not have any open coordinator positions in other service centers in
the city, and they were not legally required to open a new position for her
71. Id. at 1116.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1118.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1190; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
77. Id. at 1119.
78. Id. at 1117.
79. Id. at 1119 (citing Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995), which
stated that an accommodation that adversely affects other employees is not required under the
ADA).
80. Id. The district court held this to be "unreasonable," yet the Supreme rule statement does
not address this issue.
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under the ADA.8 It is implied that there was no flexibility in shifting
her work times such that she could work in the same facility, but not at
the same time, as Lunsford 82  Thus, Mason only had one other option
available to her: convince the court that working from home was a rea-
sonable accommodation that would enable her to perform the essential
functions of the service coordinator position.
83
The Tenth Circuit rejected Mason's argument that physical atten-
dance at the Avaya service center was not an "essential function of the
service coordinator position because she can perform all of the essential
functions of the job at home using a computer, telephone, and fax ma-
chine."84 Instead, the Tenth Circuit determined for the first time that
physical attendance is an essential function of a job when it ruled that
Mason's presence at Avaya's work center is an essential function of the
service coordinator position because the position requires supervision
and teamwork.
85
In making this determination, the court first relied on the ADA's re-
quirement that the court consider Avaya's judgment of what the essential
functions of the coordinator position entailed. 86 Avaya asserted that Ma-
son's physical presence at the service center was an essential function of
her job because the "low-level hourly position is administrative in nature
and requires supervision." 87 If Mason worked from home, Avaya alleged
that it would know that she was logged into her computer, but it could
88not ascertain her computer activities. Likewise, the court ruled that
Avaya supplied "significant evidence demonstrating that teamwork was
an essential function of the service coordinator position" when it noted
that coordinators "typically assist and cover for one another in a job.
' 89
To support their arguments, Avaya presented evidence to the district
81. Id. (citing Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1995), which
held that a reassignment to a vacant position is a possible acceptable accommodation, but it is not
reasonable to require the company to create a new position).
82. Id. This is implied by the lack of discussion on the topic of flex time or changing shifts
(e.g., move from day shift to night shift) as a means for Mason to avoid working with Lunsford.
83. Id. While the court stated that it had to conduct the two-prong qualification analysis, it
was really only determining whether Mason's request to work from home was a reasonable accom-
modation because she could not work at the service center and her other options had already been
whittled away through interim analysis. Further, as both prongs require "essential function" of a
position as a necessary condition, their analysis hung on what they determined was an essential
function. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, "consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2004). Since the court conceded this issue with high deference to
Avaya through a minimal showing, the court effectively rubber-stamped Avaya's determination. See
id. at 1119 ("We will not second guess the employer's judgment ... [or] require the employer to
lower company standards." (citations omitted)).
84. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
85. See id. at 1119,1122.
86. Id. at 1119.
87. Id. at 1120.
88. Id. at 1120-21.
89. Id. at 1121.
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court of four of the seven evidentiary factors identified by the EEOC in
its regulations. 90 Specifically:
(1) .. .attendance at the administration center, supervision, and
teamwork as essential functions of the service coordinator position,
(2) all of its service coordinators work their entire shift at the admini-
stration centers, (3) it has never permitted a service coordinator to
work anywhere other than an administration center, and (4) service
coordinators cannot be adequately trained or supervised if they are
not at the administration center.
91
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly held that "Mason's
physical attendance at the administrative center was an essential function
of the service coordinator position because [it] required supervision and
teamwork.,
92
Mason did not persuade the court that the essential functions of the
coordinator position do not include supervision and teamwork.93 Mason
relied on firsthand experience and she noted that the job description does
not mention supervision or teamwork as a duty or position responsibil-
ity.94 The court dismissed her firsthand experience as "self-serving tes-
timony '"95 and rejected her allegations that any of the fourteen coordina-
tors can cover for one another, or that she could cover for any of them as
long as she had a telephone, computer, and fax machine at home.
96
The court pointed to a Seventh Circuit holding that "[t]he mere fact
that others could do [Mason's] work does not show that the work is non-
essential ' 97 and it placed little credence to Mason's "bald assertion" that
technology would enable her to cover her employees98 because it was "in
no position to second guess Avaya's desire to directly supervise its lower
level employees."
99
The court determined that an at-home accommodation, under the
facts in this case, was facially unreasonable because it would "eliminate
90. Id. at 1120 (referring to 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004)), Under section 1630.2(n)(3)
(2004) code section, the seven evidentiary factors used to determine whether a job function is essen-
tial include, but are not limited to:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions pre-
pared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the
job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
91. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
92. Id. at 1122.
93. Id. at 1121-22.
94. Id. at 1120.
95. Id. at 1121-22.
96. Id. at 1121.
97. Id. (citing Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2001)).
98. d. at 1121 n.2.
99. Id. at 1121.
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or change the essential functions of the service coordinator position."' 00
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited cases in other circuits that
held that an "employee's request for an at-home accommodation is un-
reasonable under the ADA." 10 Here, as noted, the court held that be-
cause the coordinator position required supervision and teamwork, work-
ing in the Avaya service center was an essential function of the job, and
thus an employee cannot "effectively perform all work-related duties at
home."'' 02 As a result, "Mason's request for an at-home accommodation
is, as a matter of law, unreasonable."'' 0 3 The court concluded that Mason
was not a "qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because
she could not perform the essential function of the service coordinator
position with or without a reasonable accommodation ... [and thus she]
failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under
the ADA."' 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted, and dismissed, a con-
flicting opinion in the Ninth Circuit'0 5 in Humphrey v. Memorial Hospi-
tals. Association,10 6 which held that "[w]orking at home is a reasonable
accommodation when the essential functions of the position can be per-
formed at home and a work-at-home arrangement would not cause undue
hardship for the employer."'0 7 The court distinguished Humphrey as a
case involving "unusual" or "extraordinary" facts because the plaintiff,
Humphrey, was a medical transcriptionist whose employer permitted
some of its other transcriptionists to work from home.'0 8 The Fourth
Circuit asserted a similar point in Tyndall v. National Education Cen-
ters10 9 that it is an unusual case "where an employee can effectively per-
form all work-related duties at-home."' 10 The permissive attitude on the
part of Humphrey's employer differed vastly from that of Avaya in this
case.
100. Id. at 1124.
101. id. at 1123 (citing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir.
1995); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 51, 57-58 (lst Cir. 2001); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp.,
134 F.3d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (quot-
ing Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544)).
102. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 (citing Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir.
1994) (this is a synopsis of the Avaya court's reasoning) (italics in original)).
103. Jd. at 1124.
104. Jd. at 1125.
105. id. at 1123-24.
106. Humphrey v. Mem'I Hosps. Assoc., 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136. The Ninth Circuit compared Vande Zande's restrictive rule
(an employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home except in extraordinary
circumstances) with the very permissive rule in Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 959
F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("an employer must consider requested accommodation of
working at home"), and chose instead to "follow the approach taken by the EEOC in its Enforcement
Guidance." Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137 n.15.
108. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123-24.
109. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
110. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 214) (italics in original).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit did not conduct a fact-specific analysis to deter-
mine that physical attendance is an essential job function. Instead, it
adopted this ruling from cases in other circuits whose facts materially
differed from the facts in this case. 1' Ironically, it dismissed a ruling
from the Ninth Circuit that would have supported a fact-based analysis
on grounds that the facts in that case were distinguishable. To add insult,
the court applied inconsistent scrutiny to evidence supplied by the liti-
gants in Avaya's favor and summarily dismissed Mason's only opportu-
nity for legal redress.
A. Physical Attendance in the Workplace as an Essential Job Function
The Tenth Circuit held that physical attendance in the workplace is
an essential function of most jobs. 212 To support this holding, the court
cites cases in several circuits that came to the same conclusion, 1 3 and
placed particular emphasis on Tyndall,"t4 Gantt, t5 and Hypes."16  The
court's reliance on these prominently cited cases is misplaced, however,
because ADA cases require a fact-specific analysis and the facts in
Avaya can be distinguished from these cases.
111. See infra notes 113-15.
112. Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
113. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124. This is the rule in most circuits. See Gantt v. Wilson Sport-
ing Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209 at
213; Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995); Hypes v. First Com-
merce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87
F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Carr v. Reno, 306 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 23 F.3d 525, 530
(D.C. Cir. 1994)); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309-10 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1992);
Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.
1991)).
114. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 209. In Tyndall, the plaintiff, Mary Tyndall, suffered from lupus
erythematosus, an auto-immune disorder. Id. at 211. Due to her disorder and other issues in her life,
Tyndall began missing work frequently. Id. For example, in a six-month stretch, she missed nine-
teen days on account of helping a friend with a legal matter, her son's surgery, and her disorder. Id.
When she requested a leave of absence to help her son with his post-operative problems, she was
encouraged to resign her teaching position because the school administration was concerned that her
disability and the other issues in her life would disrupt the operations of the school. Id. at 211-12.
115. Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1042. In Gantt, the plaintiff, Una Gantt, hurt her shoulder while work-
ing at her job. Id. at 1044. After several months without improvement, her doctor told her she
required rotator cuff surgery. Id. She informed her employer that she would be out of work between
six to twelve months. Id. After a little over a year on leave, she informed her employer that her
doctor had not released her for work. Id. She was terminated because her employer's absence
policy permitted a maximum of one year leave of absence. Id. at 1045. Two weeks after she was
terminated, her doctor released her to go back to work with some restrictions. Id. at 1045. Gantt did
not request a reasonable accommodation from her employer before or after her doctor released her.
Id. at 1046-47.
116. Hypes, 134 F.3d at 721. In Hypes, the plaintiff, David Hypes, suffered from chronic
obstructive lung disease, which he alleged made it difficult to get "started in the morning." Id. at
724-25. Hypes was chronically late and absent from work and he failed to supply medical docu-
mentation explaining why he was tardy and absent. Id. at 725. Hypes' job required him to conduct
his work in his employer's office because he handled confidential loan documents. Id. at 726. Thus,
working from home was not a feasible option. See id.
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First, the court, quoting Tyndall, stated that '.'the employee 'must be
willing to demonstrate [that she can satisfactorily perform the essential
functions of her position] ... by coming to work on a regular basis."'1
7
Despite the Avaya court's acknowledgement that it reviewed the district
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, it is evident that Mason did
not have a problem attending work regularly because she had the job for
two years before Lunsford's actions, her job performance was satisfac-
tory, and there was no mention that she had an attendance problem prior
to the triggering of her disability. This is a very different situation from
Tyndall who was frequently tardy or absent from work on account of her
disability, her son's surgery, and because she helped a friend with a legal
matter.1 8 The Tyndall rule does not apply to the facts prior to the trig-
gering of Mason's disability, and thus is not the best authority in light of
the facts.
Second, the circuit court's reliance on Gantt is misplaced for similar
reasons.' 9 In Gantt, the appellee did not request telecommuting as a
reasonable accommodation; rather, she was off work for one year with
her disability, she failed to request any accommodation under the ADA,
and she was fired because the company could not foresee when she
would return. 20 Avaya and Gantt are vastly different regarding the mate-
rial facts as to what is requested. Much like its reliance on the Tyndall
holding, the Tenth Circuit blindly relies on the Gantt holding without
consideration for the underlying facts in the case.
Third, the court's application of Hypes is misguided. 21 Hypes can
be distinguished from this case in two ways: Hypes' job responsibilities
required him to be physically present at the office because he handled
confidential loan documents that could not be removed from the office,
and he was chronically late or absent from work despite the requirement
that he be physically present.
22
Here, Mason did not handle confidential documents or other tasks
that objectively need to be handled in the office. Rather, she fielded
phone calls from customers, scheduled appointments, logged repair tick-
ets, monitored the repair queue, and communicated with technicians by
"computer, telephone, and fax."'123 These tasks do not appear to be fa-
cially confidential, and neither the case facts nor analysis mentioned that
Mason's tasks, the information she accessed, or the documents she proc-
essed, were confidential in nature. In contrast, Hypes was required to be
physically present in the office because he had to process documents that
117. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119-20 (citing Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213).
118. See supra note 114.
119. Avaya, 357F.3dat 1119.
120. Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1047.
121. Avaya, 357F.3dat ll19.
122. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726.
123. SeeAvaya, 357F.3dat 1117.
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were confidential and thus could not be taken out of the office. 124 There
is no similar constraint in Mason's case. Instead, the Avaya court relied
on more subjectively drawn conclusions that the coordinators required
teamwork and supervision.
25
Hypes' circumstances can also be distinguished because he was
chronically late or absent from work due to his disability, 126 but Mason
was capable of working without incident as long as Lunsford was not in
the building. 27 While Hypes could have conceivably woke up earlier to
arrive at work on time, Mason had no choice regarding working at the
Avaya service center. Her only viable options were (1) move to another
city if she wanted to continue working for Avaya, (2) quit her job, or (3)
work from home.
The application of this rule and the cited case authority imply that
similarity of facts between the instant case and cases in other circuits was
not dispositive to the Tenth Circuit. Instead, the court was swayed by
Avaya's allegation that the position required teamwork and supervi-
sion-goals that could only be met on-site at Avaya's facility-and thus
that physical attendance is an essential function of the job. Therefore,
even when there is no dispute that the employee is disabled, the second
prong of a prima facie showing of discrimination under the ADA, that
the employee be qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
can be easily trumped by any employer if they make the argument that
physical attendance is an essential function of the job. The court did not
need to invoke such a rigid anti-ADA plaintiff approach; merely ruling
that working from home could be a reasonable accommodation does not
bind the court to making this determination as a conclusion of law. The
Avaya court, however, made its objectivity clear when it stated, "[w]e
will not second guess the employer's judgment when its description is




The Tenth Circuit applied inconsistent scrutiny to allegations made
by Mason and Avaya, to Mason's detriment. Specifically, the court
gives deference to Avaya regarding evidence supplied to the district
court in accordance with EEOC regulations.
124. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726.
125. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
126. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 725.
127. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1117 ("From January 1998 until March 2000, Mason worked for
Avaya without incident. Her performance was satisfactory .... [Mason] could not work in the same
building as Lunsford; however, Mason felt she could return to work in Lunsford's absence.").
128. Id. at 1119 (citing Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191).
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The EEOC has set forth seven types of evidence that can demon-
strate how a job function may be considered "essential.' 29 Avaya pre-
sented four pieces of evidence in conformity with § 1630.2(n), while
Mason relied on firsthand experience and observed that the job descrip-
tion, one of the seven factors, did not support Avaya's allegations.
130
The court listed the four factors in which Avaya presented evidence to
the district court in line with EEOC regulations. The first factor is
"[Avaya] considers attendance at the administration center, supervision,
and teamwork as essential functions of the service coordinator position
.... While the court does not mention the form of this evidence, it
states that the job description does not mention this factor, and thus is not
based on an objective specification. The fourth factor, that "service co-
ordinators cannot be adequately trained or supervised if they are not at
the administration center, '132 like the first factor, is an allegation. These
are not objectively-based specifications; they are allegations made in
support of Avaya's argument, and the court finds them compelling. In
comparison, the court interprets Mason's evidence, which is based on
firsthand experience after two years on the job, as "self-serving."' 133 This
reasoning begs the question how Avaya's showing is not "self-serving,"
especially since it is made in an adversarial litigation setting. Further, it
answered Mason's argument that the job description did not support
Avaya's allegations with the comment that:
Avaya probably did not even consider informing its employees that
they were actually required to show up at the workplace and work
with co-employees under supervision when it drafted the service co-
ordinator job description .... Consequently, we find the omission of
physical attendance, teamwork, and supervision from the job descrip-
tion entirely unremarkable.
34
This backhanded dicta supports the argument that the Tenth Circuit will
grant deference to an employer who makes minimally substantiated alle-
gations while granting an employee with a valid and undisputed factual
point that directly applies to an EEOC factor, derision.
Additionally, the other factors Avaya brought forth are equally un-
compelling, even though they are listed by the EEOC as reasons why a
job function might be essential. 135 For example, factors two and three,
that all coordinators work at their service centers and Avaya has never
required them to work anywhere else, only reflect that Avaya has not
placed its coordinators in other work locations; it does not demonstrate
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004). See supro Section 111(C).
130. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1121.
134. Id. at 1122.
135. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004).
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that it could not reasonably accommodate the unique employee who, like
Mason, cannot physically work at the facility due to factors beyond her
control.
C. Future Directions
In comparison to the Avaya analysis and holding, the Ninth Circuit
took a vastly different approach in Humphrey that embraces the policy
behind the ADA. In Humphrey, Carolyn Humphrey was a medical tran-
scriptionist whose work performance exceeded her employer's "stan-
dards for speed, accuracy, and productivity."' 136 She developed an obses-
sive compulsive disorder, she began to arrive late to work or missing
work, 137 and as a result, she received warnings from her employer, Me-
morial Hospitals Association ("MHA"). 138 As a reasonable accommoda-
tion, Humphrey dismissed as infeasible having family or a friend drive
her to work, but she agreed to a flex-time arrangement. 39 After several
months, Humphrey recognized that the flex-time arrangement was not
working and asked to work from home as a reasonable accommoda-
tion. 14  MHA denied the request on grounds that employees who have
received job performance warnings are not eligible for at-home work.141
Even though Humphrey was given a stellar performance evaluation, she
was fired less than a month later due to the problems caused by her dis-
ability. 142 Humphrey differed from Avaya in one key aspect: the Ninth
Circuit's position that "attendance is not per se an essential function of
all jobs,' 143 and therefore "an employer must consider requested accom-
modation of working at home."' 44
Much like Avaya's argument that physical attendance is an essential
job function, MHA argued in Humphrey that she was not "qualified un-
der the ADA because regular and predictable attendance is an essential
function of the [transcriptionist] position." '145 Unlike Avaya, however,
MHA supported their argument with clear evidence that Humphrey's
unpredictability had a direct impact on her effectiveness in the workplace
because she could not attend training sessions scheduled during certain
days of the week. 146 Further, Humphrey concedes that "predictable job
136. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1130.
137. Id. at 1130-31.
138. Id. at It30.
139. Id. at 1131. There was dispute whether a third option was presented. MHA alleges it
offered Humphrey a leave of absence; Humphrey alleges MHA asked her if she would like to "con-
tinue working." Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that this factual point was not material to their analysis.
Id.
140. Id. at 1131-32.
141. Id. at 1132.
142. Id. Her supervisor stated that outside of the problems caused by her disability, she was a
model employee. Nevertheless, she received negative ratings due to these problems. Id.
143. Id. at 1135 n.11.
144. Id. at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
145. Id. at 1135.
146. Id.
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performance is an essential function of the MHA medical transcriptionist
position."'' 47 Despite these facts supporting MHA's case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not end its analysis. Instead, it stated that "attendance is not per
se an essential function of all jobs"'148 and proceeded to analyze the rea-
sonable accommodations Humphrey argued MHA could have made so
that she could perform the essential functions of her job. 
149
In comparison, the Avaya court stated that it was required under the
ADA to consider what the employer asserts are essential job functions.
Like MHA in Humphrey, Avaya argued that attendence was an essential
job function. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Humphrey, however, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that this inquiry was "not intended to second guess the em-
ployer ..." and summarily ended its analysis on this disputed 
fact. 50
The effect was a rubber stamp on Avaya's allegations without any form
of objective analysis.
This approach does not necessarily support the Tenth Circuit's
statement in Avaya that is the facts that separates Humphrey from
Avaya;15 1 rather, it demonstrates that the two courts are vastly different in
how they approach their respective analyses. Where the Tenth Circuit in
Avaya states "[w]e will not second guess the employer's judgment,"' 5 2
and cites Vande Zande's holding that "an employer is not required to
allow disabled workers to work at home except in extraordinary circum-
stances,"'153 the Ninth Circuit in Humphrey shifts the focus of inquiry
because "an employer must consider requested accommodation of work-
ing at home"'154 and they "see no reason not to follow the approach taken
by the EEOC in its Enforcement Guidance."' 155 In other words, the Tenth
Circuit applies a very restrictive scrutiny toward an employee's claim
while the Ninth Circuit is far more permissive in its approach.
V. CONCLUSION
In Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held
that physical attendance in the workplace is an essential function of a
job, and that working from home is not a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA. The court relies on the statutes and valid case law for its
factual analysis and legal conclusion, and its holding corresponds with
those of most other circuits. However, this case demonstrates how a
147. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1135 n.11.
148. Id. See also, id. at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
149. Id. at 1135.
150. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
151. See supra note 110 (citingAvaya, 357 F.3dat 1124) (quoting Tyndall at 214).
152. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
153. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15 (paraphrasing the holding in Vande Zande, 44 F.3d
at 544-45). See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123 ("Many of our sister circuits have similarly held an em-
ployee's request for an at-home accommodation is unreasonable under the ADA.").
154. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
155. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15.
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person with a valid disability could be discriminated against in the work-
place because of their disability. The federal courts in the Tenth Circuit
would not likely invalidate the discrimination because the EEOC's regu-
lations favor the employer, and the courts place high deference to evi-
dence supplied by the employer regardless of whether the evidence is
objectively-based.
Additionally, while ADA cases require fact-specific calculus, the
notable difference in the approaches of the Avaya and Humphrey courts
demonstrates that it is not just facts that drive these cases. When the
Avaya court looked to case law in other circuits regarding whether work-
ing at home is a reasonable accommodation under ADA in the Tenth
Circuit, it had a choice to make: should it follow the restrictive approach
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Vande Zande,15 6 or should it apply the
more permissive Langon/Buckingham157 approach utilized by the Ninth
Circuit in Humphrey? It applied the Vande Zande holding, permitted
Avaya great deference, and effectively dismissed any chance of Mason
being considered qualified under the ADA despite that she had a valid
disability and absolutely no other option for a remedy.
The policy that drove the enactment of the ADA is sameness; it is
about "the promise of having the same opportunities on the same terms
and in the same settings as people without disabilities."'' 58 The Avaya
decision failed to achieve a result consistent with the spirit behind this
policy. Instead, Avaya strengthened the growing view in circuits that
physical presence in the workplace is an essential job function if the facts
minimally support this conclusion. If the courts can find a kernel of facts
supporting the Avaya holding, they can also find a kernel of facts sup-
porting the Humphrey holding. Had the Tenth Circuit ruled that working
from home could be a reasonable accommodation, it does not mean that
they had to rule in Mason's favor; rather, it would have resulted in a less
subjective analysis and it would have added flexibility in the law for fu-
ture cases.
What will it take to swing the courts over to a more flexible Hum-
phrey approach? As a starting point, the ADA must overcome wide-
spread skepticism associated with its application of preferential treat-
ment. 59 Critics of affirmative action complain that it is reverse discrimi-
nation that benefits a class at the expense of others.1 6° The same argu-
ment is levied against preferential treatment, a feature of both affirmative
action and reasonable accommodation. 6' Further, the argument that
reasonable accommodation levels "the playing field" between disabled
156. See supra note 153.
157. See supra notes 154-55.
158. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 1041.
159. See Ball, supra note 14, at 960.
160. Id. at 981.
161. See id. at 960.
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and nondisabled employees 62 can be argued in reverse by its critics, that
it advantages disabled employees over nondisabled employees.
These criticisms ultimately fail because they are based on the inac-
curate premise that reasonable accommodation benefits a class at the
expense of others. First, this is a circular argument because it presumes
that discrimination against the disabled has less of a societal impact or,
alternately, greater societal value, than requiring the employer to remove
these barriers. These are not facts; they are allegations that would be
hotly contested by ADA advocates. Second, reasonable accommodation
benefits individuals, not an entire class, which means that if there is an
ADA-related dispute, there is a fact-based analysis that must occur be-
fore the specific employee is entitled to receive a reasonable accommo-
dation by the employer.' 63 Additionally, if a reasonable accommodation
is made, it permits a disabled employee an equivalent working condition
to that of a nondisabled employee, but not an advantaged one.'64
The resolution to this dispute begins with a balanced analysis by the
judiciary. Not until the judiciary embraces the notion that the ADA ad-
vocates the ability of the disabled to work on an equal footing with their
non-disabled colleagues,1 65 rather than discriminatory "affirmative action
with a vengeance,"' 166 and the courts make rulings that support this pol-
icy, will the purpose behind the enactment of the ADA be realized.
The loser in this whole affair was appellant Mason who, due to a
truly unusual set of circumstances, developed a disability that led to the
loss of her job. The ADA sought in part to eliminate "unnecessary ex-
penditures resulting from the dependency and non-productivity of per-
sons with disabilities." 167 Hopefully, in the future, American business
will more pervasively embrace the advantages of having disabled em-
ployees work from home as a reasonable accommodation and thus em-
brace their important role in reducing the unnecessary expenditures asso-
ciated with the non-productivity of workers like Mason who could "per-
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 24, 61.
164. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 14, at 960-61. The author presents a case demonstrating how a
reasonable accommodation does not translate to unfair advantage of the disabled, Id. In the exam-
ple, a disabled professional golfer requested a reasonable accommodation in the form of a golf cart
because his degenerative circulatory condition forced him to endure severe pain when he walked.
Id.
165. Id. at 963. Preferential treatment given by an employer to one disabled employee may
have no relevance to another disabled employee because the nature of their disabilities may be
different. For example, accommodations for a blind employee may have no value to an employee in
a wheelchair. Thus, while the "disabled" are a class of individuals, treatments are not necessarily
"fungible" between members of the class. Id. at 975.
166. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (Judge Posner
clarifies his position on the "principle" behind the ADA).
167. ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
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form all the essential functions of her job' 't68 provided that her employer
make a reasonable accommodation.
Patrick Rogers*
168. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Steven J. Rypma, Jennifer Grafton, Professor Rachel S. Amow-Richman, and Kellie Dougherty for
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MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES V. FTC: PRIVACY
INTERESTS TRUMP COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN UPHOLDING
THE NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2004, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals delivered
an opinion that places privacy interests in the home above the constitu-
tional protections commonly afforded to commercial speech. In Main-
stream Marketing Services, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,1 the court
considered the constitutional validity of a government regulation prohib-
iting most commercial telemarketers from calling telephone numbers on
a national list.
2
The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act ("Do-Not-Call Act") 3 repre-
sents a governmental intervention that paternalistically protects individ-
ual privacy against nongovernmental intrusions. The Do-Not-Call Act
authorized the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to implement, en-
force, and administer a national do-not-call registry.4 Additionally, the
Do-Not-Call Act ordered the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") to consult and coordinate with the FTC to maximize consis-
tency in the do-not-call regulations of both government agencies.5 In
Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit consolidated four cases from
several jurisdictions challenging various aspects of the national do-not-
call registry. 6 Each challenge was refuted and the Do-Not-Call Act was
upheld in its entirety. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
Mainstream Marketing,8 the constitutional validity of the Do-Not-Call
Act has been affirmed, allowing a new means for individuals to prohibit
commercial speech in their homes.
"We live in a remarkably commercialized culture, one that has con-
stantly been changing but, for the moment, whose commercialization
1. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
2. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1232.
3. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 6101 (2003).
4. Id.
5. Id. at § 4.
6. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1236. Case No. 03-1429 is an appeal from the District of
Colorado, which held that the FTC's do-not-call rules were unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. Id. at 1236 n.9. Case No. 03-6258 is an appeal from the Western District of Oklahoma,
which held that the FTC lacked statutory authority to enact its do-not-call rules. Id. Additionally,
Case No. 03-9571 and Case No. 03-9594 regarding the Federal Communications Commission Order
were reviewed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342. Id. Case Nos. 03-1429, 03-
6258, and 03-9571 involved First Amendment challenges. Id. at 1236. Case No. 03-9594 involved
challenges to the Federal Communications Commission rule's "established business relationship
exception" on administrative law grounds. Id.
7. Id. at 1236.
8. 125 S. Ct. 47 (2004).
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seems inevitable."9 Some ways of living are less commercialized than
others, but the "cultural predominance of commercialism" is undeni-
able.' o However, at some point, the privacy of consumers becomes a
greater concern for Congress than the constitutional protections of an
advertiser's commercial speech. This Article discusses the holding in
Mainstream Marketing, focusing on the privacy interest of consumers
and the commercial speech guarantees of telemarketers that are at odds
with each other in this appeal.
Part I of this Article provides a background of the commercial
speech protections and privacy interests that frame the constitutional
challenges to the national do-not-call registry. Part II examines the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Mainstream Marketing. In this part, the leg-
islative history and key aspects of the national do-not-call registry are
discussed in detail. Part III provides a critical analysis of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion and Congress's decision to promulgate legislation leading
to the do-not-call registry. Additionally, Part III analyzes the implica-
tions toward television commercials in light of technological advances in
telecommunications equipment, statutory initiatives directed toward
Internet advertising, and the Mainstream Marketing holding. This part
illustrates how technological advances resulting from convergence in the
telecommunications industry could potentially be used for privacy regu-
lations of television commercials at some time in the future. In conclu-
sion, this Article asserts three things: (1) the Tenth Circuit correctly ap-
plied the law governing commercial speech regulations to the national
do-not-call registry; (2) Congress should have let market forces deal with
the privacy concerns of consumers; and (3) Congress's choice to regulate
should be cause for concern among broadcasters and video service pro-
viders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment's Protection of Commercial Speech
The First Amendment of the Constitution secures the right of free
speech to every individual." The protection accompanying this right is
afforded to both the speaker and its recipients. 2 While any speech may
be regulated, the degree of judicial scrutiny that governmentally regu-
lated speech must satisfy under the First Amendment usually depends on
whether the speech "is classified as 'commercial' or 'noncommercial'
9. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS: FREE SPEECH IN A COMMERCIAL CULTURE 13-14
(1997).
10. Id. at 14.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances").
12. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S 748, 756 (1976).
[Vol. 82:3
2005] MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES V. FTC 561
.... ,,13 "[R]egulation of political speech and other so-called 'fully pro-
tected' speech must survive strict constitutional scrutiny ... How-
ever, commercial speech, when regulated, "has usually been subjected to
... less rigorous" judicial scrutiny.' 5
Although a relatively new canon, speech that "propose[s] a com-
mercial transaction" is protected by the First Amendment.16 In fact, the
Supreme Court indicated that commercial speech may be more important
to individuals than certain political speech.' 7  Additionally, our "pre-
dominantly free enterprise economy" actually makes commercial speech
pertinent to the political process. 18 The free flow of information, to
which commercial speech largely contributes, serves to "enlighten public
decisionmaking" in a democratic society.19 While commercial speech,
like other varieties of speech, is protected under the Constitution, the
Court has acknowledged that it may be regulated.2 °
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,21 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of when
government may regulate commercial speech.22 In Central Hudson, the
New York Public Service Commission ordered electrical utilities to
'cease all advertising" designed to increase demand for electricity. 23
While enacted during a fuel crisis, the New York Public Service Com-
mission sought to continue the order banning promotional advertising
after "the fuel shortage had eased .... Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. opposed the continued banning of promotional advertising on First
Amendment grounds. 25  The Court held that the "total ban on promo-
tional advertising" violated Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.'s First
13. See P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE §2:1 (perm. ed., release no. 4 2003).
14. Id. Strict scrutiny requires government to prove the regulation has a compelling interest
that is directly advanced by the least restrictive means available. Id. (referring to Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 588 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
15. DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, §2:1; see also id. §2:1, at 2-2 n.3 (noting a degree of
"intermediate scrutiny" applied to government restrictions on commercial speech),
16. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
17. Id. at 763 (noting that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent politi-
cal debate").
18. Id. at 765. Spending in a free market society is largely "made through numerous private
economic decisions." Id. Therefore, it is a "matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed." id. Product advertising, "however ... excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information." Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. (arguing that commercial speech passes even the most restrictive test, one which
requires speech to enlighten public decision making in a democracy before being afforded constitu-
tional protection).
20. Id. at 770.
21. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
22. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
23. Id. at 558. The order was based on the New York Public Service Commission's findings
that the utility system in New York State did not have sufficient reserves during a fuel shortage from
1973 to 1976 to meet customer demands. Id. at 559.
24. Id.
25. Id.
562 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
Amendment rights and reversed the New York Public Service Commis-
sion's order.
26
In striking down the New York Public Service Commission's order,
the Supreme Court "purported to synthesize the rule of law established"
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and later commercial speech deci-
sions. 27 Traditionally, the Court had provided less constitutional protec-
tion to commercial speech than the protection afforded other types of
expression because commerce in general is an area commonly subject to
regulation by the government. 28  The constitutional guarantee that does
exist is rooted in the First Amendment, which protects commercial
,,29
speech to safeguard the "informational function of advertisement.
The extent of constitutional protection available to a "particular commer-
cial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the gov-
ernmental interests served by its regulation. 3°
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court established a four-part test to
determine when the government may regulate commercial speech. 1 The
first element of the Central Hudson test is satisfied when the commercial
speech sought to be regulated is indeed speech protected by the First
Amendment.32 To be protected by the First Amendment, the speech in
question must not be misleading or unlawful.33 The second element of
the Central Hudson test requires that the government "assert a substantial
interest to be achieved" by the speech-banning regulation.
34
The third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test "are de-
signed to measure the appropriateness of the ... regulation in relation to
the government's substantial interest."35 The third element of the test
requires that the speech-banning regulation directly advance the govern-
mental interest. 36 The regulation must do more than provide "only inef-
fective or remote support" for the government's asserted purpose.37 The
26. Id. at 571-72. The Court noted that its holding did not consider the powers that a state
may have over utility advertising in emergency situations. Id. at 572 n.15.
27. DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, §3:12, at 3-26.
28. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
29. Id. at 563 (emphasis added). While many advertisements communicate true but incom-
plete information, "the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no
information at all." Id. at 562. Consequently, there can be no constitutional protection afforded to
advertisements relating to unlawful activity or containing misleading information. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 563.
31. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3.7.3 (2d ed. 2002).
The Central Hudson test is very similar, if not identical, to "intermediate scrutiny" in evaluating
government regulation of truthful advertising. Id. The Tenth Circuit articulates the Central Hudson
test as a three-part test presuming that the first element, only advertising that is not false or deceptive
or of illegal activity may be protected, has been met. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1237.
32. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
33. Id. at 566.
34. Id. at 564.
35. See HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 3.3.A (1999).
36. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
37. Id. at 564.
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fourth and final element of the Central Hudson test requires that the
speech-banning regulation be narrowly tailored so it does not restrict
more speech than necessary. 38 "[I]f the governmental interest [can] be
served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, [any]
excessive restrictions cannot survive" under the First Amendment.
39
Essentially, the third and fourth elements of Central Hudson test require
that a reasonable fit exists between the government's objectives and the
means it chooses to accomplish those ends.4°
B. Residential Privacy
"The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which
'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality .... In con-
temporary American jurisprudence, the right of privacy is sacrosanct
within one's home.42 While often subject to unwanted speech in public,
individuals enjoy the ability to avoid such intrusions within their own
walls. 43  This special benefit, the ability to control unwanted speech
within the home, is one that the government may protect on behalf of its
citizens.44
Privacy in the home "was originally conceptualized as a bulwark
against the force of the state and is embodied in the Fourth Amendment
",45.... The Fourth Amendment "guarantee[s] the right of the people to
be secure in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' against unreason-
able searches and seizures." 46 The long history of privacy in one's home
from governmental intrusions "has evolved into a broader concept [of
residential privacy] in which the home is [deemed] essential to one's
",47autonomy ....
38. Id.
39. id. However, the selected regulation need not be the least restrictive means available to
advance the government's interest. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 11.3.7.3 (noting that Justice
Scalia expressly rejected that the "least restrictive alternative test" be used in commercial speech
regulations).
40. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31,
§ 11.3.7.3.
41. Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
42. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (stressing previous Supreme Court deci-
sions had "repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their
own homes").
43. Id. at 484-85.
44. Id.
45. Brief of Amici Curiae of Undersigned Members of the United States Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation § IA, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Mainstream Mktg. Serv.,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1429) [hereinafter Senate Committee Brief].
46. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
47. See id. The Senate Committee expresses this powerful privacy interest by quoting Judge
Jerome Frank's dissenting opinion in United States v. On Lee:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence
from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying
the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty-worth protecting from encroach-
ment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from
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In Frisby v. Schult, 48 the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, enacted
an ordinance making it unlawful for a person to picket at an individual's
residence or dwelling. 49 The primary purpose of the ordinance was to
"protect and preserve" the privacy in one's home.50 Shultz and others,
who were strongly opposed to abortion and wished to picket on a public
street outside the Brookfield residence of a doctor who supposedly per-
formed abortions, alleged that the ordinance violated the First Amend-
ment.5
The Supreme Court first noted that "[t]he antipicketing ordinance
operates at the core of the First Amendment" because it prohibits indi-
viduals from engaging in expression regarding "an issue of public con-
cern." 52 Next, the Court focused on the forum that the speaker sought to
employ in order to ascertain what limits may be placed on the protected
expression. 53 In finding that the streets of Brookfield are traditional pub-
lic fora, the antipicketing ordinance was judged under the most "stringent
standards" established for regulations on speech.54
The Court determined that the antipicketing ordinance enacted by
Brookfield was narrowly tailored, served a significant government inter-
est, and left open "ample alternative channels of communication .. .
First, the Brookfield ordinance was narrowly tailored to protect unwilling
listeners because the picketing ban was specifically directed "at the
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man's castle.
Id. But cf, Lee C. Milstein, Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking the Desirability
of Bright-Line Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1789, 1791 (2003) (arguing that declaring
scanning activity unconstitutional when it targets a specific area like the home indicates a problem-
atic scheme for identifying unconstitutional searches and should be permitted when little or no
intrusion to the individual occurs).
48. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
49. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 474.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 474, 476.
52. Id. at 479. However, the Court qualified that "even protected speech is not equally per-
missible in all places at all times." Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788,799 (1985)).
53. Id. The Court has identified three types of fora: "the traditional public forum, the public
forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Id. at 479-80 (quoting Corne-
lius, 473 U.S. at 802). The standards by which limitations on protected expression must be evalu-
ated differ depending on type of forum at issue. Id. at 479 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)).
54. Id. at 481. "The appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distin-
guishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of content." Id. The Court determined
that the antipicketing ordinance was content neutral. Id. at 482. Therefore, the appropriate test was
to determine "whether the ordinance was 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government inter-
est' and whether it 'leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication,"' as opposed to the
test for content-based regulations, which would have required the ordinance to be necessary to serve
a compelling government interest that is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id at 481-82 (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45).
55. Id. at 488.
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household, not the public., 56 Second, the Court noted that the govern-
mental "interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home" is certainly significant as it is "of the highest order in a free
and civilized society." 57 An "important aspect of residential privacy" is
the government's role in protecting unwilling listeners from unwanted
speech in the comfort of their homes.58 Although expected to simply
avoid speech in many locations, individuals do not have to bear that bur-
den at home. 59 Third, ample channels of communication were left open
because the Brookfield ordinance uses the singular form of the words
"residence" and "dwelling" indicating that "the ordinance is intended to
prohibit only picketing" targeted at a particular residence. 60  General
dissemination of a message was still permissible under the antipicketing
ordinance since protestors had not been barred from the streets of the
residential neighborhoods. 6' Thus, the Court concluded, the facial chal-
lenge to the antipicketing ordinance failed because the elements required
for a constitutionally valid content-neutral regulation speech were met.62
In Frisby, the Supreme Court declared that "[tihere simply is no
right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener. ' 63 This prin-
ciple of privacy in the home is "reflected even in prior decisions in which
[the Court] invalidated complete bans on expressive activity .... -64
Therefore, when the regulatory method to control unwanted speech
56. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis added). The Court noted that a complete ban can be narrowly
tailored only if each activity within the proscription's scope is appropriately targeted at the exact
source of "evil" sought to be remedied. Id. at 485.
57. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 482.
61. Id. at 483-84. The traditional public fora of the residential streets and sidewalks are open
to protestors, alone or in groups, should they (1) go marching, (2) go door-to-door to proselytize
their views, (3) distribute literature door-to-door or by mail, or (4) contact residents by telephone. Id.
at 484.
62. See id. at 488.
63. Id. at 485. But see Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues In Information
Privacy, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 49 (2002), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volnine/Cate-Litan.pdf (stating that many times the Court has upheld the right
to speak irrespective of the asserted privacy right) (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
The First Amendment is ... also a significant restraint on the government's power to re-
strict the publication or communication of information. The Supreme Court has decided
many cases in which individuals sought to stop, or obtain damages for, the publication of
private information, or in which the government restricted expression in an effort to pro-
tect privacy. Virtually without exception, the Court has upheld the right to speak or pub-
lish or protest under the First Amendment, to the detriment of the asserted privacy inter-
est. For example, the Court has rejected privacy claims by unwilling viewers or listeners
in the context broadcasts of radio programs in city streetcars, R-rated movies at a drive-in
theater, [as well as] ... [striking] down ordinances that would require affirmative opt-in
consent before receiving door-to-door solicitations, Communist literature, or even "pat-
ently offensive" cable programming.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; see, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) (not-
ing that when the door-to-door ban enacted by the city of Struthers was invalidated, it was done on
the basis that the home owners could protect themselves from such intrusions by placing an appro-
priate no-solicitation sign on their doors).
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within the home does not involve a complete ban, it is more likely to be
constitutionally valid.65
II. MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES, INC. V. FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'
In Mainstream Marketing, a consolidated appeal of four cases,67 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions and
held that the national do-not-call registry validly regulated commercial
speech.68  The Tenth Circuit determined that the Do-Not-Call Act "di-
rectly advance[ed] the government's important interests in safeguarding
personal privacy and reducing the danger of telemarketing abuse without
burdening an excessive amount of speech., 69  In terms of the Central
Hudson test, there was a "reasonable fit between the do-not-call regula-
tions and the government's reasons for enacting them.,
70
A. Facts and Procedural History
Telemarketing companies provide work for "roughly 5.4 million
persons in the United States" and generate approximately "$275 billion
dollars annually ... ,,71 For-profit and non-profit organizations, such as
commercial corporations, religious groups, charities, and political par-
ties, "generate revenue by calling individuals in their homes and solicit-
ing sales and donations., 72  Most of these organizations hire "telemar-
keting companies that operate call-centers to make solicitations on their
behalf."73 Congress recognized that the large growth in telemarketers, in
conjunction with new telecommunications technologies that permitted
telemarketing companies to make a greater volume of calls, raised resi-
dential privacy concerns for telephone consumers.74 Further, "[s]tudies
presented to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation indicated that only 0.1% of the population likes to receive
65. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485; see also supra text accompanying note 56.
66. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
67. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1232.
68. Id. at 1232-33. Judge Ebel also held that (1) the annual access fees that telemarketers
were required to pay were a "permissible regulatory measure" to offset projected administrative
expenses; (2) the FCC had not acted in an "arbitrary and capricious manner in adopting the estab-
lished business relationship exception" to the national do-not-call registry; and (3) the FrC had
"statutory authority to promulgate" the Do-Not-Call Act regulations. Id. at 1248, 1250.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. See id.
71. Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1154 (D. Colo. 2003),
rev'd, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). These employment and revenue figures were accurate prior
to the Tenth Circuit's opinion upholding the national do-not-call registry.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1154-55.
74. James Sweet, Opting-Out Of Commercial Telemarketing: The Constitutionality Of The
National Do-Not-Call Registry, 70 TENN. L. REV. 921,931 (2003).
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unsolicited telephone" calls, and many consumers favor some regulation
of these unsolicited calls.75
Congress was particularly concerned with the privacy issues raised
by commercial telemarketers because the record "d[id] not contain suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that calls from [charitable and political]
organizations should be subject to the restrictions provided for under the
bill. 76 The report proffered by the House Committee included statistics
compiled by the National Association of Consumer Agency Administra-
tors which indicated that the "vast majority of complaints [were] about
commercial telephone solicitations." 7  Because the record before Con-
gress suggested that "most unwanted telephone solicitations [were]
commercial in nature[,]" Congress found consumer-based support to
treat commercial telephone solicitations and charitable and political so-
licitations differently under its do-not-call regulations.78
In response to these consumer concerns, Congress first passed the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), which gave the
FCC authority to enact rules to limit the telemarketing sales calls that
many telephone subscribers consider an "intrusive invasion of privacy.
"The purpose of the bill ... is to protect residential telephone subscriber
privacy rights by restricting certain commercial solicitation and advertis-
ing uses of the telephone and related telecommunications equipment. ' 80
Finding the TCPA regulations insufficient, Congress passed the Do-Not-
Call Act, which directed the FTC and FCC to promulgate rules that cre-
ated the national do-not-call registry. 81 This registry is the result of a
regulatory effort spanning thirteen years aimed at protecting the privacy
82rights of consumers.
The national do-not-call registry is a database containing the tele-
phone numbers of individuals who "do not wish to receive unsolicited
75. Sweet, supra note 74, at 932. Although such studies lend support Congress' decision to
regulate telemarketers' unsolicited calls, whether the general population likes or dislikes a certain
kind of speech is not a persuasive argument in favor of regulation. In fact, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). A poll of Texas citizens with respect to
flag burning regulations would likely result in similar, if not stronger, support for such a government
intervention.
76. Sweet, supra note 74, at 932 (quoting the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in
H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 16).
77. Id. The House Committee additionally noted that "noncommercial telephone solicitations
[were] more expected, and that noncommercial speech was 'core' First Amendment speech." Id. at
933.
78. See id. at 932 (quoting the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in H.R. REP. No.
102-317, at 16).
79. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1235.
80. H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 5 (1991). The bill "is designed to return a measure of control
to ... individual residential telephone customers[,]" not "to make all unsolicited telemarketing...
illegal." Id. at 6.
81. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233-34.
82. Id. at 1235.
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calls from commercial telemarketers. '83  Once an individual has placed
his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry,
"[c]ommercial telemarketers are generally prohibited from calling" that
individual's telephone number.84 By the time this case came before the
Tenth Circuit, approximately 50 million telephone numbers had been
placed on this registry. 85 To fund the associated administrative costs of
the do-not-call regulations, each commercial telemarketer must pay an
annual access fee.86
The lead plaintiff in the case, Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc.
("Mainstream"),87 filed a complaint in United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, seeking an injunction prohibiting the FTC's
application and enforcement of the do-not-call regulations that were to
go into effect on October 1, 2003.88 Mainstream alleged, inter alia, that
the national do-not-call registry violated the First Amendment because it
unconstitutionally targets commercial speech by telemarketers, but it
does not apply to charitable and political callers. 89 Mainstream asserted
that the First Amendment does not permit the FTC "to impose regula-
tions that discriminatorily restrict commercial speech in order to serve an
asserted interest unrelated to the commercial nature of the speech. 9 °
The district court held that the FTC regulations relating to the do-not-call
registry violated the First Amendment's protection of free speech be-
cause the rules created an impermissible content-based distinction be-
tween different categories of speech.91 Because the do-not-call registry
created a burden on the speech of commercial telemarketers "without a
logical, coherent privacy-based or prevention-of-abuse-based reason
83. Id. at 1234.
84. Id. Telemarketers are only "generally prohibited from calling telephone numbers" on the
national do-not-call registry because they "may call consumers who have signed up for the national
registry if [the seller for whom the telemarketer represents] has an established business relationship
with the consumer or if the consumer has given that seller express written permission to call." Id.
(emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id. Currently, the annual national do-not-call registry fee is $25 per area code of telephone
number data. Id. at 1246. However, "the first five area codes are provided free of charge and the
maximum annual fee is capped at $7,375." Id. at 1246-47.
87. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. Other co-plaintiffs include TMG Marketing,
another telemarketing company, and the American Teleservices Association, a national non-profit
association of telemarketing companies which represent its members' commercial interests and
engages in self-regulation of the telemarketing industry. Id.
88. Id. at 1156. The initial complaint was filed on January 29, 2003. Id. at 1158. On Febru-
ary 28, 2003, Mainstream Marketing Services filed a motion for a preliminary injunction which was
subsequently withdrawn after filing their motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2003. Id. On
August 5, 2003, the complaint was amended to state claims against the FTC based on the new do-
not-call registry fees. Id.
89. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
90. See Reply to Opp'n to Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at 1, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 125 S. Ct. 47 (No. 03-1552) (2004) (emphasis added). Mainstream Marketing Services argues
that the do-not-call regulations should not be evaluated under Central Hudson, but rather "evaluated
under the standards applicable to regulations of fully protected speech." Id. (quoting City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
91. Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
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supporting the disparate treatment" of the speech of charitable and politi-
cal telemarketers, the district court concluded that the speech-banning
regulations failed the third element of the Central Hudson test requiring




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
holding. 93 The Tenth Circuit held that First Amendment requirements
for banning commercial speech under the Central Hudson test were satis-
fied because the do-not-call registry (1) restricted "only core commercial
speech[,]" (2) targeted "speech that invades the privacy of the home," (3)
was an "opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers[,]" and (4) "materi-
ally further[ed] the government's interests in combating the danger of
abusive telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer privacy
[by] blocking a significant number of the calls that cause these prob-
lems." 94 Further supporting the constitutionality of the FTC's regula-
tions, Judge Ebel noted:
A number of additional features of the national do-not-call registry,
although not dispositive, further demonstrate that the list is consistent
with the First Amendment rights of commercial speakers. The chal-
lenged regulations do not hinder any business' ability to contact con-
sumers by other means, such as through direct mailings or other
forms of advertising. Moreover, they give consumers a number of
different options to avoid calls they do not want to receive. Namely,
consumers who wish to restrict some but not all commercial sales
calls can do so by using company-specific do-not-call lists or by
granting some businesses express permission to call. In addition, the
government chose to offer consumers broader options to restrict
commercial sales calls than charitable and political calls after finding
that commercial calls were more intrusive and posed a greater danger
of consumer abuse. The government also had evidence that the less
restrictive company-specific do-not-call list did not solve the prob-
lems caused by commercial telemarketing, but it had no comparable
evidence with respect to charitable and political fundraising.
95
Just as a homeowner "can avoid door-to-door peddlers by placing a 'No
Solicitation' sign in his or her front yard," the national do-not-call regis-
try offers individuals a tool with which they can protect their homes
92. Id.
93. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1251. The constitutionality of the national do-not-call
registry and its fees under the First Amendment were reviewed de novo by the court of appeals. Id.
at 1236.
94. Id. at 1233.
95. Id.
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against intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly inva-
sive.
9 6
The national do-not-call regulations are content-based restrictions
on commercial speech. 97 To determine whether the national do-not-call
registry was a valid regulation of commercial speech, the circuit court
applied the Central Hudson test.98 Further, the circuit court noted that
"[t]he government bears the burden of asserting one or more substantial
governmental interests and demonstrating a reasonable fit between those
interests and the challenged regulation." 99 However, the "government is
not limited in the evidence it may use to meet its burden[J" and the na-
tional do-not-call registry could "be justified by anecdotes, history, con-
sensus, or simple common sense. ' °
Applying the First Amendment's protection to only truthful tele-
marketing calls,' l the circuit court bypassed the first element of the Cen-
tral Hudson test. The circuit court determined that the government-
asserted interests in protecting the "privacy of individuals in their
homes". and "protecting consumers against the risk of fraudulent and
abusive solicitation" were substantial and justified.10 2  Supreme Court
cases involving residential privacy have repeatedly recognized that the
government's "interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and pri-
vacy of the home is certainly of the highest order. . . , Additionally,
the Court has recognized a substantial governmental interest in "prevent-
ing abusive and coercive sales practices."' 4 Thus, the circuit court con-
cluded that either government-asserted interest "undisputedly" met the
second element of the Central Hudson test.
10 5
Moving to the third and fourth elements of the Central Hudson test,
the circuit court analyzed whether a "reasonable fit" existed between the
national do-not-call registry and the governmental interests, "privacy and
consumer protection interests[,]" which were advanced on behalf of indi-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1236.
98. Id. The Central Hudson test is perhaps most difficult to apply when the government
"seeks to regulate truthful, nondeceptive advertising of legal activities in order to achieve other
goals." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 11.3.7.7, at 896. In each instance where the government
determines it necessary to regulate commercial speech, the restrictions are based on the premise
"that people will be better off with less information." Id. This concept is seemingly "at odds with
the very core of the First Amendment." Id.
99. Id. at 1237 (citing Utah Licensed Beverage Ass'n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
100. See id. (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
101. See supra note 31.
102. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1237.
103. Id. at 1237-38. The court noted that the Supreme Court has stressed the unique nature of
the home and the heightened privacy that exists in the confines of one's home. Id. (citing Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
104. Id. at 1238 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,768-69 (1993)).
105. Id. at 1237.
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viduals who are telephone consumers. 10 6 Unlike the district court, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the national do-not-call
registry was a reasonable fit because it directly advanced the governmen-
tal interests and was narrowly tailored.
The circuit court addressed the telemarketers' argument that the na-
tional do-not-call registry is "unconstitutionally underinclusive because
[it] does not apply to charitable and political solicitations.' ' 7 The circuit
court stressed that "First Amendment challenges based on underinclu-
siveness face an uphill battle in the commercial speech context.' ' 0 8 As a
matter of common sense, the government cannot be required to "regulate
all aspects of a problem before it can make progress on any front."' 9
"The underinclusiveness of a commercial speech regulation is relevant
only if it renders the regulatory framework so irrational that it fails mate-
rially to advance the aims that it was purportedly designed to further."" 0
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,"' the Supreme Court "struck
down a law prohibiting commercial newsracks on public property, pur-
portedly to promote the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and
sidewalks.' 12 The key factual distinction between Mainstream Market-
ing and Discovery Network was the effectiveness of the two government
regulations."t 3 The commercial speech ban in Discovery Network ap-
plied to "only 62 of the 1,500 to 2,000 newsracks in the city, thus ad-
dressing only a 'minute' and 'paltry' share of the problem" that the gov-
ernment asserted it was attempting to remedy.' '4
In stark contrast, the national do-not-call registry goes to the root of
the problem and directly advances the government goal "to reduce intru-
sions into personal privacy and the risk of telemarketing fraud and abuse
that accompany unwanted telephone solicitation.""' 5 While the do-not-
call list will not block every unwanted call into the home, a substantial
number of unwanted calls will be prohibited by the regulation. 1 6 The
circuit court concluded that the national do-not-call registry satisfied the
third element of the Central Hudson test proclaiming that it is "difficult
106. Id. at 1238.
107. See id.; see also Brief For The Respondent In Opposition at 17, Mainstream Mktg. (No.
03-1552) (noting that Mainstream Marketing Service's arguments were mischaracterized as only
indicating that the do-not-call registry was "fatally underinclusive").
108. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238.
109. Id. (citing United States v. Eagle Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,434 (1993)). In Eagle Broad.,
the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ithin the bounds of the general protection provided by the Consti-
tution to commercial speech, we allow room for legislative judgments." Eagle Broad., 509 U.S. at
434.
110. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238-39 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476, 489 (1995) (emphasis added)).
IIl. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
112. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1239.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1240.
116. 1.
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to fathom how the registry could be called an 'ineffective' means of
stopping invasive or abusive calls, or a regulation that 'furnish[es] only
speculative or marginal support' for the government's interests."
1'1 7
Next, the circuit court addressed the fourth element of the Central
Hudson test. A commercial speech regulation is narrowly tailored if it
"promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation."1' 8 Recognizing that the govern-
ment was not required to use the least restrictive means available, the
circuit court considered whether "numerous and obvious alternatives"
existed that would limit less speech while serving the "government's
interest as effectively" as the national do-not-call registry.
1 9
The fourth element of the Central Hudson test was met because the
national do-not-call registry did not regulate more constitutionally pro-
tected speech than necessary.1 20 The circuit court noted that the national
do-not-call registry "restrict[ed] only calls that were targeted at unwilling
listeners." 12  The national do-not-call registry prohibited telemarketing
calls that were commercial in nature intended for individuals who have
"affirmatively indicated that they do not want to receive such calls" in
their homes and "for whom such telemarketing calls would constitute an
intrusion of their privacy."1 22 Focusing on the opt-in feature of the na-
tional do-not-call registry, the circuit court commented that the "Supreme
Court had repeatedly held that speech regulations based on private choice
... are less restrictive than laws that prohibit speech directly."' 2 3 In fact,
the Court has often reasoned that an opt-in version of a regulation is a
way to show that the law in question was not narrowly tailored.
24
In sum, the national do-not-call registry was a reasonable fit be-
tween the government's means and ends because the government's inter-
ests were advanced by effectively blocking a significant number of the
calls that cause the problems the government sought to redress, and the
government did not suppress an excessive amount of speech because the
opt-in character ensures that it does not inhibit any speech directed at the
home of a willing listener.
1 25
117. Id.




121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. (citing Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000)).
123. Id.
124. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240. The court also discusses Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943), explaining that there 'the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibit-
ing door-to-door canvassing" by reasoning "that the govemment's interest could have been achieved
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HI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit elevated privacy inter-
ests in the home to a powerful fundamental right, which can easily trump
the constitutional protections courts commonly afford to commercial
speech. While the Tenth Circuit's analysis focused primarily on demon-
strating that the national do-not-call registry was a valid regulation of
commercial speech, Mainstream Marketing speaks volumes toward the
value placed on privacy in the home. The commercial speech proscribed
by the do-not-call registry is substantial.126 A victory over a significant
commercial enterprise, like the telemarketing industry, shows exactly
how strong of a constitutionally protected right privacy in the home has
become. 27 After Mainstream Marketing, one's home has almost be-
come sovereign territory into which neither government nor the private
sector may enter.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Decision Was a Correct Analysis of Commercial
Speech Regulations Involving Telecommunications
Mainstream Marketing was a case of first impression with relation
to the First Amendment commercial speech rights of telemarketers.
However, other circuit courts have upheld similar telecommunications
regulations. 128 As telecommunications advertising grew exponentially in
the 1990s, a variety of regulations were enacted, aimed at regulating the
use of rapidly evolving media technology.' 29
In Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 30 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded that the TCPA provision banning unsolicited fax
126. The do-not-call list not only prohibits a "significant number of commercial sales calls, but
also a significant percentage of all calls causing the problems that Congress sought to address
(whether commercial, charitable or political)." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240 (emphasis added
to significant). "[A]bsent the do-not-call registry, telemarketers would call consumers who have
already signed up for the registry an estimated total of 6.85 billion times each year." Id.
127. See discussion supra Part 1.B; see also Michael E. Shannon, Note, Combating Unsolicited
Sales Calls: The "Do-Not-Call" Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381,
384 (2001) (stating that "reasonable regulation of telemarketing ... is unlikely to trigger intense
constitutional debate" because the "courts have consistently held that an individual's privacy" rights
are at the highest in the home).
128. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246 n.13. The Tenth Circuit specifically points out the
Ninth Circuit decisions in Destination Ventures, Ltd v. FCC., 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), and Moser
v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995), as consistent with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Mainstream
Mktg. Id. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that provisions of the TCPA, the ban on fax
advertising in Destination Ventures and the prerecorded voice machines in Moser, did not violate the
First Amendment even though noncommercial speech was causing the same problems as commer-
cial speech. Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 57; Moser, 46 F.3d at 974. The Ninth Circuit indicated
that the First Amendment did not require the govemment to "make progress on every front before it
can make progress on any front." Moser, 46 F.3d at 974 (quoting Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 434).
Further, the Tenth Circuit identified the Eight Circuit decision in Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc.,
323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003), as a similarly consistent holding. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246
n.13.
129. See generally DEVORE & SACK, supra note 13, § 11:3.
130. 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
advertisements satisfied the Central Hudson test. 31 American Blast Fax,
Inc. and Fax.com ("fax companies") provided promotional services for
their clients by transmitting advertisements to fax machines of potential
customers. 32 "In response to numerous consumer complaints, [the state
of] Missouri sought injunctions and civil penalties against the [fax] com-
panies," alleging that they had violated § 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA pro-
vision making it unlawful to send unsolicited fax advertisements.'
33
The fax companies argued that § 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA was an
unconstitutional restriction on their freedom of speech. 134 The lower
court decided that the legislative record was insufficient to decide the
constitutional questions. 135 After the court ordered an evidentiary hear-
ing and granted the intervention to the United States government, evi-
dence indicated that unsolicited fax advertising shifts costs to the recipi-
ents who are forced to contribute ink, paper, wear and tear on their fax
machines, as well as personnel time to deal with the unsolicited faxes.
136
Further, the evidence showed that fax advertisements interfered with the
recipient's use of their fax machines by preempting the telephone line
used by the fax machine for the time it takes to receive the unsolicited
message.
1 37
The lower court believed that there was not a substantial govern-
mental interest in restricting unsolicited fax advertising.' 38 Further, even
if a substantial governmental interest could be reasoned, the court con-
cluded that the § 227(b)(1)(C) restriction would neither "materially alle-
viate the asserted harm" nor was the restriction "sufficiently narrow."
139
Finding that the restriction on commercial speech was unconstitutional
under the Central Hudson test, the lower court dismissed the action
brought by Missouri and the United States. 140 The Eight Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the lower court's holding that § 227(b)(1)(C) of the
TCPA violated the First Amendment. 141
The Eighth Circuit found that the government had a substantial in-
terest in restricting unsolicited fax advertisements and need not support
its assertions with empirical studies at trial. 142 Because the commercial
and noncommercial content was relevant to the asserted governmental
131. Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 660.
132. Id. at 652.
133. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(C)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Am. Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 652.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 653 (noting that "empirical data on costs or evidence that the majority of unsolicited




142. Id. at 655.
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interest, the Eight Circuit distinguished the instant case from Discovery
Network. 143 Both the purpose behind proscribing commercial speech and
the magnitude of commercial speech as compared to noncommercial
speech being proscribed were key facts relevant to the goal of reducing
the costs and interference associated with unwanted faxes.'
44
In American Blast Fax, a complete ban on unsolicited fax advertis-
ing was upheld. In contrast, the national do-not-call registry at issue in
Mainstream Marketing provides an opt-in feature that permits individu-
als to determine whether or not they wish to ban the commercial speech
of telemarketers. The less restrictive regulatory scheme of the national
do-not-call registry allows this commercial speech proscription to "easily
satisfy" the Central Hudson test.145  Unless the most absurd rationale is
provided for a given regulation, 46 the Central Hudson test provides al-
most no First Amendment protection for commercial speakers when in-
dividuals, not the government, choose whether to receive the commercial
speech.
B. The Problem Addressed by the National Do-Not-Call Registry Should
Have Been Left to Market Forces
Irrespective of the constitutional validity of the national do-not-call
registry, this government act was superfluous because market forces
were in place to solve the same problem as the legislation. The problem
that the government sought to remedy was the multitude of annoying
calls made by telemarketers to individual's homes. 147 Telephone service
providers had created products like Caller ID, which allows consumers to
see the number of the caller before they answer the phone, and even
more specialized privacy-centric products to solve this same problem of
intrusive telemarketing calls. 148 "Public policymakers in the regulatory
and legislative arenas have a variety of choices for the telecommunica-
tions industry ranging from a total reliance on market forces at one end
143. Id.
144. Id. at 656.
145. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552). The FTC highlighted that the do-not-call
regulations differ significantly from the kinds of laws typically at issue in First Amendment cases
because they do not establish a government-imposed ban on speech that some individuals may wish
to hear, but rather establish a framework to enforce consumer's own choices about commercial
speech and privacy in their own homes. Id. Understood in this manner, the do-not-call regulations
easily satisfy the standard established in Central Hudson. Id. at 14.
146. See e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436 (1993) (striking
down a local ordinance prohibiting 62 commercial newsracks out of 1,500 to 2,000 total newsracks
for the alleged reason of reducing litter).
147. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1235; see also Sweet, supra note 74, at 922. While
both protecting privacy rights of consumers and curbing the risk of telemarketing abuse are identi-
fied as the two goals of the national do-not-call registry, stopping telemarketing calls from reaching
individuals ostensibly eliminates any possibility of fraud associated with those calls.
148. See e.g., Brian Quinton, Ameritech Declares War On Telemarketers: Caller ID Feature
Lets Customers Turn Away Callers, TELEPHONY, Sept. 28, 1998, at * 1.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
of the spectrum to continued reliance on invasive government regulation
at the other."
' 149
Faced with customer dissatisfaction regarding the increasing num-
ber of unsolicited telemarketing calls received, telephone service provid-
ers designed enhanced services to address the growing problem. 50  For
example, Privacy Manager, a feature that compelled callers from blocked
or unidentified numbers to identify themselves or have their call rejected,
was a product resulting from additional customer demand for privacy.' 51
By working in tandem with the Caller ID service, unidentified incoming
calls were intercepted before they could ring through. 152 The operation
of this feature would work to block all telemarketers,153 not just commer-
cial telemarketers as the national do-not-call registry does.
1 54
Given that market forces existed, why did Congress proceed with
the Do-Not-Call Act? Congress may have believed that the market
forces were insufficient, or perhaps their directive was aimed at garner-
ing goodwill from the public and ensuring continued political telemarket-
ing activity. 55  Because consumers are more likely to choose the free
149. William R. Drexel, Telecom Public Policy Schizophrenia: Schumpeterian Destruction
Versus Managed Competition, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 117 (2004) (discussing regulatory efforts in the
context of promoting competition between telecommunications carriers).
150. See Quinton, supra note 148, at *1.
151. See id. "Privacy Manager" is a feature typical of all major telecommunications providers,
and privacy-related products are still offered by the major telephone service providers. SBC offers
Privacy Manager, Verizon offers Call Intercept, Bell South offers Privacy Director, and Qwest offers
Caller ID with Privacy. Privacy Manager, at http://wwwOl.sbc.com/ProductsServices/Residential
/Prodlnfo_1/1,,97--6-3-0,00.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005); Call Intercept, at
http://www22.verizon.conforyourhome/sas/ProdDesc.asp?ED=6063&state=NY&CategorylD=93
(last visited Jan. 27, 2005); Privacy Director, at http:l/www.bellsouth.comlappslipc/
ICReqDispatcher?userEvent=displaySearchDetailsEvent&offerGroupld= 145&segmentld=
2  (last
visited Jan. 27, 2005); Caller ID with Privacy, at http://pcat.qwest.com/pcat/pmductDetail.do?
salesChannel=Residential&offerld-6615 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
152. Quinton, supra note 148, at *1. When a customer with the service receives incoming calls,
a recording asked the callers to state their name. Id. at *2. If the caller complied, the call was com-
pleted, told the customer who was calling, and gave the customer the option to (1) accept the call, (2)
reject it politely, or (3) play a recording that explained that the customer did not accept telemarketing
calls and wanted to be placed on the telemarketer's company specific "do-not-call" list. Id.
153. See id. at *2.
154. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240, 1246. Company-specific do-not-call lists remain for
individuals to block to for charitable and political telemarketing calls, although the FTC indicated
that the company-specific lists were ineffective in the commercial context.
155. Acknowledging this likely inference, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation addressed this in its Amicus Curie Brief:
Do-Not-Call is not some newfangled concept rushed into regulation on an impulsive po-
litical tide. It is rather a concept that has evolved over time, as Congress and two federal
agencies have labored to balance the compelling societal interest in the protection of the
privacy of the home with the free speech interests of telemarketers. Congress in 1991
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S. § 227 ("TCPA"). The law was
enacted "to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid telephone
solicitations to which they object." The FCC was directed to promulgate regulations that
restricted the use of automatic telephone dialing systems.
The FTC exempted charitable organizations from the do-not-call requirements. The FTC
made this exception partly in deference to the heightened First Amendment protection af-
forded to charitable speech. The FITC also found that abusive telemarketing practices of
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national do-not-call registry over privacy features for which service pro-
viders charge a fee,' 56 Congress ensured that political and charitable con-
tributions from individuals remained unaffected by the regulation.
There is no questioning the efficacy of the national do-not-call reg-
istry, 15 7 and the national do-not-call registry arguably resolved the prob-
lem of excessive and annoying telemarketing calls quicker than would
have market forces. However, leaving the problem of annoying telemar-
keting calls to market forces in the telecommunications industry would
have been a better solution than implementing a paternalistic regula-
tion. I5 8 The Do-Not-Call Act was about combating privacy intrusions,
and any reference to fraud reduction objectives of the regulations is, at
best, insultingly paternalistic, and, at worst, completely disingenuous.
Closing a legitimate access channel to goods and services as a means to
combat the fraud of some does not make sense. Would Congress shut
down Wal-Mart to protect consumers from fraud by some of the makers
of products sold in the retail chain? Would Congress shut down the
NYSE because several companies scammed investors out of their retire-
ment savings? No, it would be an absurd application of cause and ef-
fect.
American consumers are savvy enough to handle a pushy salesper-
son on the end of a telephone, just as they are capable of handling a
pushy or fraudulent salesperson on a car lot, and did not need the gov-
ernment to step in to protect them. The result of thirteen years of legisla-
tive initiatives and taxpayer dollars for reports, orders, briefs, trials, and
appeals is that the American citizens no longer have to spend a few sec-
onds a day either ignoring or answering a commercial telemarketing call
and saying, "no thank you."
C. Future Implications for Commercial Speech in a Convergent Tele-
communications Marketplace
Was the Do-Not-Call Act an anomaly or just the beginning of regu-
lations aimed at commercial speech? As demonstrated in Mainstream
the sort the registry sought to combat were more likely to be undertaken by commercial
telemarketers than those soliciting charitable and political contributions. The FCC fol-
lowed suit, ultimately adopting rules that paralleled those of the FTC.
Senate Committee Brief, supra note 45, at 43-44 (internal cites omitted). But cf Mainstream Mktg.,
283 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (stating this argument to exclude charitable and political telemarketers must
fail because there is no evidence before the District Court that abusive and fraudulent practices are
more often instigated by commercial telemarketers, and, in fact, the importance of repeat business
provides a commercial telemarketer with an incentive to act in a responsible and decorous manner).
156. See supra note 151. Each privacy-related product costs between $5-10 per month, some
with an additional $6-9 installation fee.
157. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1240.
158. See ROBERT CORN-REVERE, RATIONALES AND RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 10-11 (1997). "Regulation must be applied only as 'a last recourse,' and 'the
burden of proof is for the least possible regulation of communication."' Id. This principle is one of
four First Amendment visionary Ithiel de Sola Pool proposed to guide freedom of expression into the
digital age.
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Marketing, residential privacy interests easily trumped commercial
speech under the Central Hudson test.159 The most significant fact in the
Tenth Circuit's constitutional analysis of the do-not-call registry was that
it "is an opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers." 6 Further, the
Supreme Court appears to be "extremely vigilant in shielding the sanctity
of the home from unwanted communications ... as long as the statutorily
approved method of preventing the communication involves some af-
firmative action by the homeowner."161 Technological advances in tele-
communications equipment, coupled with the limited First Amendment
protections afforded commercial speech, place additional privacy in the
home regulations within the reach of Congress.
Compared to the radio broadcast technology that served as the
backdrop for the Communications Act of 1934,162 modern telecommuni-
cations equipment provides functionality that gives end-users control of
the information they receive. Information is transmitted from one place
to another in the form of signals. Digital encoding and packet-switching
of signals allow for a more cost efficient telecommunications network.
163
The destination of packet-switched signals must be known prior to
transmission, and the device receiving the packets of information has
control over whether it will accept or deny them.' 64 Therefore, the in-
formation control functionality in modern telecommunications equip-
ment 165 could act as an enabler for additional privacy-related government
regulations.
1. The Dawn of the Convergent Telecommunications Industry
Congress passed the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996166
("Telecom Act") representing the most significant overhaul of the Com-
159. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v.
FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552).
160. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1233; see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition at
13-14, Mainstream Mktg. Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1552).
Without the opt-in function, the do-not-call registry acts as a prior restraint creating a more signifi-
cant constitutional hurdle. The govemment would be forbidding certain communications in advance
of the time that such communications are to occur. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31,
§ 11.2.3.1 (discussing prior restraint concerns).
161. Shannon, supra note 127, at 385 (emphasis added) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept, 397
U.S. 728 (1970)). Regulations that require affirmative action by consumers should survive any
constitutional challenges that telemarketers might bring under the First Amendment. Id. This argu-
ment is equally applicable to constitutional challenges that any commercial broadcast marketer
might bring under the First Amendment. See discussion infra Part IH.C.2.
162. Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
163. See RAY HORAK, SYSTEMs & NETWORKS: VOICE, DATA, AND BROADBAND
TECHNOLOGIES 205 (1997).
164. Id.
165. See e.g., Matthew Scherb, Free Content's Future: Advertising, Technology, and Copy-
right, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2004). "Interactivity means that consumers have more control
over content. More control over content means consumers can more easily manipulate content to
avoid.., advertisements .... " Id.
166. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
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munications Act since its inception in 1934.167 The 1996 Act confirmed
the transition of the telecommunications industry from a closed system of
regulated monopolies to an industry driven by competition and techno-
logical advance.' 68 "Rather than unleashing the competitive gale of crea-
tive destruction .... federal regulators again perpetuated a paradoxical
regulatory dichotomy between the technologically converging wireless
and coaxial cable voice and broadband worlds on the one hand and the
twisted pair telephony voice and broadband world on the other."'
169
While varied across certain segments of the telecommunications indus-
try, each provision of the 1996 Act "ha[s] a similar purpose-to bring
regulations in line with evolving technological and economic reali-
ties.,' 7( As a result of changes in the regulatory landscape and technol-
ogy, cable, wireless, and telephone now compete directly with one an-
other. Furthermore, any company can or will be able to offer telephone,
internet, and video products and services over similar digital packet-
switched networks.
171
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,172 the Supreme Court
acknowledged forthcoming convergence of telecommunications and real-
ized cable companies were in a unique position to benefit from conver-
gence. "Given the pace of technological advancement and the increasing
convergence between cable and other electronic media, the cable indus-
try today stands at the center of an ongoing telecommunications revolu-
tion with still undefined potential to affect the way we communicate and
develop our intellectual resources.' 73 Convergence has become a reality
for cable television, 74 but that advantage could become a detriment with
167. Drexel, supra note 149, at 6.
168. ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 9.1.
169. Drexel, supra note 149, at 2.
170. See ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 9.3, at 717 (noting that the regulations imposed on radio
and television broadcasting were less drastic than the regulations opening the local telephone market
to competition imposed on telephone carriers). For example, the Title 11 provisions of the 1996 Act
recognize that in a "multichannel world of cable television, direct broadcast satellite, and the Inter-
net," no one provider in the broadcast industry "controls the only source of electronic mass commu-
nication." Id. Consequently, regulations based on the premises of "spectrum scarcity and broad-
caster power" are becoming obsolete and substantially reduced. See id.
171. See 2 FRANK W. LLOYD, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2003: COMPETITION IN VIDEO,
INTERNET AND TELEPHONY 147 (2003). There is a strong economic force for broadband carriers to
converge multimedia services into one platform because economies of scale and scope are realized.
See id.; see also JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 23-30 (2005).
172. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
173. Turner, 512 U.S. at 627.
174. Cable television "was not originally intended to be a general-purpose communications
mechanism." See WALTER CICIORA ET AL., MODERN CABLE TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY: VIDEO,
VOICE, AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS 5 (1999). Since its inception, cable television networks have
primarily utilized a broadcast architecture--one-way signal transmission from a central location to
each customer's home. Id. The signals received at one customer's home are the same as the signals
received by every other customer's home served by the same central location or distribution point.
Id. The central location or distribution point in a cable television network is called a headend. Id. A
cable network's "primary and often sole purpose is the transportation of entertainment television
signals . I..." ld. However, recent changes in cable technology from a one-way analog broadcast
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significant financial implications should Congress attempt to use the
technological advances that accompany convergence to proliferate com-
mercial speech regulations similar to the national do-not-call registry into
digital television,"' In fact, the FCC has implemented regulations in-
tended to hasten the conversion of the nation's television broadcast sys-
tem from analog to digital television technology. 76 The hastening of a
conversion to digital television may be in part Congress's desire to im-
plement further commercial speech regulations.
2. Is a National Do-Not-Advertise Registry Next?
Recognizing the potential regulations that could ensue in the wake
of Mainstream Marketing, the current FFC administration publicly an-
nounced that it would not create a similar national "do-not-spam" regis-
try to control the problem of invasive and fraudulent commercial internet
advertisements.117  Further, the FTC stated that its decision to restrain
from such legislation "presents a perfect opportunity for telecom carriers
to step up to a leadership position" on this problem. 78  In its report to
Congress, the FTC indicated that a national do-not-spain registry, fash-
ioned after the hugely popular national do-not-call registry, would be
ineffective and possibly increase spam, yet implied it would be an easily
implemented solution for telecommunications service providers.1 79 Ap-
plication of a "do-not-spam" registry rests on identifying the originators
of commercial emails or pop-up advertisements. 180 Once the final tech-
nological hurdles regarding identification are resolved, a national do-not-
architecture to a two-way hybrid-fiber coax architecture allow digital transmission and permit the
electronics at the customer's home to be intelligent devices. See id. at 18. "The hybrid fiber-coax
(HIFC) architecture is an optimized combination of fiber in the trunk and coaxial cable in the [distri-
bution network]" that makes "it possible to cost-effectively increase bandwidth, signal quality, and
reliability ... ." Id. Two-way signal transmission, communications both from the headend to the
home and from the home to the headend, becomes practical with a hybrid-fiber coax network be-
cause transmission paths are reduced and signal interference is drastically minimized. Id. at 19.
These two conditions, shorter transmission paths and low signal interference, enable low-power
electronic devices at a customer's home to transmit on the return path back to the headend. See id. at
576.
175. See Scherb supra note 165, at 1791 (noting that "total television advertising revenue came
in at about $44.8 billion for 2001 ... [and] [albout 44% of that figure went for network spots, about
33% went for broadcast spots, and the remainder, about 23%, went for cable spots").
176. Second Periodic Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conver-
sion to Digital Television, Report and Order, FCC-04-192, Sept. 7, 2004, available at
http://www.fcc.gov.headlines2004.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
177. Vince Vittore, Spare This, TELEPHONY, June 21, 2004, at 28.
178. Id. This type of regulatory threat is not uncommon. See e.g. CORN-REVERE, supra note
158, at 46. "Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) similarly has described broadcasting regulation as a
'social compact' based on an explicit 'quid pro quo,' and lectured industry witnesses at congres-
sional hearings that broadcasters would be unlikely to receive favorable consideration in legislation
to reform communications infrastructure unless the industry supported his 'V-chip' proposal." Id.
179. See Vittore, supra note 177, at 28; see also New System to Verify Origins of E-Mail Must
Emerge Before "Do Not Spam" List Can Be Implemented, FTC Tells Congress, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa2004/06/canspam2.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
180. National Do Not Email Registry: A Report to Congress, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
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span registry would neither be any more complex nor any more of an
administrative burden than its do-not-call counterpart.
In Mainstream Marketing, the FTC expressed a substantial govern-
mental interest in protecting privacy in the home. Was Congress's goal
in promulgating the Do-Not-Call Act to safeguard residential privacy a
means to other ends, or a genuine interest in enabling individuals to
choose whether or not to be subject to commercial speech within the
sanctity of their homes?' 81 If the answer is the latter, a similar opt-in
commercial speech regulation will likely be promulgated against the
biggest commercial speech intrusion in one's home, television commer-
cials.
18 2
Applying the Central Hudson test in the context of an opt-in regula-
tion of television commercials could prove extremely complicated.
Courts have found the Central Hudson test difficult to apply toward
various types of commercial speech. 183 Following Central Hudson and
subsequent cases, "the commercial speech doctrine ha[s] been seriously
weakened . . , leaving much, though by no means all, commercial
speech vulnerable to governmental regulation."' 84 However, the opt-in
181. See CORN-REVERE, supra note 158, at 11 (commenting that "the culture of regulation is
motivated more by political imperatives than by constitutional values"). As an example, "the special
urgency with which the FCC and the White House approached the children's IV issue was not
unrelated to the fact that 1996 was a presidential election year." Id. The long gridlock in the FCC's
proceedings "ended only after the White House scheduled a 'summit' on children's TV and engaged
in down-to-the-wire negotiations with the National Association of Broadcasters." Id. "These issues
... were a key part of President Clinton's campaign for reelection, and were incorporated into the
Democratic platform." Id.
182. The possibility to change the highly commercialized culture of American society exists
should Congress wish to implement a bold initiative like a television commercial regulation modeled
after the national do-not-call registry.
[W]hat sorts of policy goals or interests count as reasonable in regulating commercial
speech? As we suggested, even nondeceptive commercial speech can sensibly be regu-
lated in the name of environmental protection or nutritional education, for example. A
more interesting question might center on the claim that a culture of commercial con-
sumption does not promote freedom and well-being as much as we had hoped. Could a
government cite that very belief, by itself, as a reasonable grounds for regulating com-
mercial speech?
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 75. After Mainstream Marketing, the answer is residential privacy, which
by itself provides all the justification necessary for regulating commercial speech.
183. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection For Commer-
cial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1216 n.76 (2004) (arguing that a more straightforward
and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech has
been growing in intensity in recent years); see also ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 3.3.A, at 220
(criticizing the four-part test of Central Hudson because "it requires highly subjective judgments by
judges as to the substantiality of state's interest in regulation, the efficacy of the particular regulation
involved and the permissible breadth of the regulation.").
184. ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 3.4.C, at 228. The section further discusses the unanswered
question "whether the [Supreme] Court would apply the Central Hudson test in a conscientious
manner or would continue to erode.., its limited protection in order to permit government to regu-
late commercial expression concerning admittedly legal products, services and activities which
legislatures, administrative agencies and a majority of the justices feel are harmful to the public
good." Id. With respect to telemarketing calls, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari would imply
that the intrusion to privacy in the home by such a form of advertisement is harmful enough that it be
prohibited should an individual choose. See Mainstream Mktg., 125 S. Ct. at 47.
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character of a commercial speech regulation ensures that any speech di-
rected at the home of a willing listener will not be inhibited, thereby sat-
isfying the "narrowly tailored" requirement of the Central Hudson test.
85
Nevertheless, Congress should stop at the Do-Not-Call Act before
further residential privacy regulations do irreparable harm to the non-
commercial content supported by advertisements.1 86 Although techno-
logically possible and constitutionally valid, the government should re-
frain from enacting laws that place residential privacy interests above the
interest of commercial speakers because the "public's supply of content
will diminish, perhaps to the vanishing point[,]" should broadcaster and
video service providers lose the advertising revenue that supports free
content. 187
CONCLUSION
The national do-not-call registry is a constitutionally valid regula-
tion of commercial speech under the Central Hudson test. The Central
Hudson test provides commercial speakers almost no First Amendment
protection in the context of the Do-Not-Call Act's opt-in regulatory
scheme, which places the decision to proscribe commercial speech that
enters the home in the hands of individuals. However, the do-not-call
registry was a superfluous governmental intervention because market
forces were in place to solve the privacy concerns of residential tele-
phone consumers. Moreover, it is a paternalistic regulation that provides
a diminutive consumer protection benefit.
Privacy in the home is a powerful individual right. The Mainstream
Marketing decision demonstrates the supremacy that residential privacy
has over commercial speech. More so than telephone solicitations,
commercial speech enters individuals' homes through television adver-
tising and has little First Amendment protection in that private forum.
With a national do-not-call registry in full force and do-not-spam regula-
tions on standby, Congress could take the next logical step and enact opt-
in regulations restricting television commercials.
In the convergent telecommunications industry, all media content
will be transmitted digitally, and information control functionality in end
user equipment allows content to be identified and eliminated prior to
185. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1238. Several differences between television com-
mercials and telephone and internet solicitations could possibly tip the scales in favor of commercial
speech over privacy concerns. For example, regulations on television commercials could be consid-
ered as burdening an excessive amount of speech or less of an intrusion to privacy in the home.
186. See Scherb supra note 165, at 1791 (commenting that "[w]hcther creative or not, whether
enjoyable or not, advertisements enable consumer access to an unbelievably large amount of content
without charge").
187. See id. at 1823.
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viewing, whether packetized or encoded in a digital format.'88 With
some minor technological adjustments, government-initiated do-not-
advertise regulations could empower individuals to assert their privacy
right to its fullest and eliminate television commercials in their homes,
and along with them, revenues for broadcasters and video service pro-
viders that help offset costs for programming content. Congress should
restrain from enacting further privacy legislation now enabled by techno-
logical advances and allow the marketplace to determine how commer-
cial speech reaches or doesn't reach consumers.
Jeffrey E. Santry*
188. See HORAK, supra note 163, at 207-08; ZUCKMAN, supra note 35, § 13.4.B.2, at 1115-23
(discussing the V-Chip regulation of programming content); see also Scherb supra note 165, at 1795
(describing that as "technology on the consumer end becomes more complex, and there are more
possibilities for enhancing, altering, or otherwise customizing" video content and commercials, and
that it has "never been so easy for end users and intermediary relayers to remove advertisements
from transmitted content").
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The views expressed
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POWERS V. HARRIS: HOW THE TENTH CIRCUIT BURIED
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
A democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where fifty-one percent




Thomas Jefferson recognized this inherent problem with our de-
mocratic system: A democratic government unchecked does not prevent
a legislature from enacting naked preferences. A naked preference is an
evil that can by defined as "the distribution of resources or opportunities
to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored
have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want." 3 Inter-
est group politics have posed a problem since the time of our founding
fathers.4 In fact, the problem of "faction" greatly concerned James
Madison and was one of the reasons the Constitution was enacted.5
Fortunately, the Constitution now provides individuals with some
protection of their liberties against the whims of state government ma-
jorities. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents state legislatures from
encroaching on certain individual liberties.6 The relevant text of the
amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.7
However, these clauses have little effect in modem constitutional
law, especially when applied to economic liberties, and "have been spun
1. Available at http://www.wisdomquotes.com/cat-democracy.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2005).
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1689(1984).
3. Id.
4. Steven Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interest, 6 CHAP. L. REV.
173, 173 (2003).
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. Id.
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into a quagmire of convoluted jurisprudence so entangled that some ju-
rists have suggested their elimination.,
8
In Powers v. Harris,9 the U.S Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals fur-
ther limited the protection offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 The
Court broke with past precedent in deciding that state governments could
permissibly enact legislation for the sole purpose of intrastate economic
protectionism." In doing so, they also split with a U.S. Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision involving an almost identical fact pattern in
Craigmiles v. Giles. This dangerous holding has drastic implications
for economic liberties because it gives state governments the virtually
unchecked authority to meddle in the economic affairs of their citizenry.
This comment will argue that Powers was decided incorrectly, while
Craigmiles was decided correctly. The court in Powers wrongly de-
clared naked economic protectionism to be a legitimate government end.
The Tenth Circuit should have held such economic protectionism, by
itself, to be an illegitimate government purpose. Then, it should have
correctly applied the rational basis test as the Craigmiles Court did to
determine that the Oklahoma legislation restricting the sale of caskets
was not rationally related to any other legitimate government purpose.
Part II of this comment will discuss the legal principles underlying
economic liberty jurisprudence and the current state of the law. Part M
of this comment will describe the facts of Powers and the decision
reached by the 10th Circuit. Part IV will describe the facts of Craigmiles
and the decision reached by the 6th Circuit for purposes of comparison.
Part V analyzes the unfortunate holding of the 10th Circuit in Powers
and discusses how the Supreme Court can handle the case more appro-
priately.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
The plaintiffs in Powers, operators of an online retail casket busi-
ness, challenged an Oklahoma law requiring that most intrastate casket
sales be made only by licensed funeral directors. 13 The plaintiffs argued
that the law violated the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 The current
jurisprudential state of each clause will be discussed in turn.
8. Jessica E. Hacker. The Return to Lochnerism? The Revival of Economic Liberties from
David to Goliath, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 675 (2002).
9. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cit. 2004).
10. See generally Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (approving of the casket
monopoly by declaring naked economic protectionism to be a legitimate state interest). However,
the Supreme Court has never declared that governments can permissibly grant monopolies without
an underlying public purpose.
11. Id. at 1225.
12. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
13. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211.
14. Id. at 1214; U.S CONST. amend. XIV.
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The vague Privileges or Immunities clause has been difficult to in-
terpret since its inception.
I5  However, the Slaughter House Cases'
6
greatly restricted whatever substantive meaning the clause was meant to
have.' 7 In the Slaughter House Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Louisiana law giving slaughter houses a 25 year monopoly.' 8 In doing
so, the majority "virtually eradicated the clause by determining that it
was not a tool to protect state citizens from their own state actions."'
9
However, in the recent Saenz v. Roe2 0 decision, the Court relied on the
Privileges or Immunities clause to invalidate a durational residency re-
quirement for California welfare benefits. 2' Thus, the Court "restored
the possibility of practical weight to the Privileges or Immunities clause
for the first time in 130 years." 22 Even Justice Thomas in his dissenting
opinion expressed a willingness to reexamine the meaning of the clause
and apply it along with or instead of an Equal Protection or substantive
Due Process analysis in certain cases.23 However, lower courts have not
used this clause to review the constitutionality of state economic regula-
tions.24
With the demise of the Privileges or Immunities clause, plaintiffs
have sought to protect their economic rights through the substantive ele-
ment of the Due Process clause.25 The degree of protection against state
limitations of economic liberties has varied widely throughout our na-
tion's history.26 In the infamous 1905 case Lochner v. New York,2 7 the
Supreme Court found a state law limiting the number of hours that bak-
ers could work per week unconstitutional.28 The Court found "liberty to
contract" to be a fundamental right and applied a strict scrutiny standard
of review, holding that the law violated substantive Due Process. 29 In the
years following Lochner, the Court invalidated hundreds of state laws.3 °
This era could be seen as the high-water mark for Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive Due Process protection of economic liberties.
31
15. See Hacker, supra note 8, at 680.
16. 86 U.S. 36 (1872).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Hacker, supra note 8, at 681.
20. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
21. See id.
22. Hacker, supra note 8, at 676.
23. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. See Powers, 379 F.3d. at 1214; see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
25. Hacker, supra note 8, at 677.
26. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486-513
(5th ed. 2004).
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45-46, 64-65.
29. Id. at 53-54.
30. Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
31. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26.
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However, in the wake of the Great Depression, the Court reversed
its position in Nebbia v. New York. 32 In this case, the Court upheld a
New York law fixing milk prices, reasoning that the prices were fixed in
the interest of the public.33 This case broke with Lochner in the standard
of review used in evaluating state economic regulations.34 Instead of
reviewing the economic regulations with strict scrutiny, the Court ap-
plied a rational basis test-a test that is highly deferential to the state
legislature.35 The Nebbia Court describes this standard as follows: "If
laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are [satisfied]."36 This abandonment of stare decisis had the
effect of the Court upholding many state economic regulations with little
to no consideration. 37 Although this rational basis test is highly deferen-
tial, the Supreme Court has occasionally used the standard to strike down
state laws. 38 Thus, the rational basis test still has "some bite, ' ' 39 and the
standard of review is not "toothless," as recognized by numerous courts,
including the Tenth Circuit in Martin v. Bergland.40
Certain cases outline how the test is supposed to be used. "When a
statute regulates certain 'fundamental rights' (e.g. voting or abortion) or
distinguishes between people on the basis of certain "suspect characteris-
tics (e.g. race or national origin), the statute is subject to 'strict scru-
tiny.-' 41 Under Romer v. Evans,42 the Court "will uphold a law that nei-
ther burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the
legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent
and legitimate legislative end."43 When applying the test, legislation is
strongly presumed to be valid and will be upheld "if there is any rea-
sonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis."
44
A plaintiff who wants to strike down a piece of state legislation using the
rational basis test has the burden to "negative every conceivable basis
that might support it."45 However, the courts insist on knowing the rela-
32. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
33. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 502 (1934).
34. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 502.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hacker, supra note 8, at 687.
38. Simpson, supra note 4, at 189.
39. Id.
40. 639 F.2d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 1981) (rejecting assertion that "no amount of evidence"
could overcome the strong presumption of validity afforded to state legislation under rational basis
review).
41. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 2002).
42. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
43. Romer, 517 U.S. at 621.
44. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224 (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001)).
45. Id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)).
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tion between the means and end sought to be attained by a piece of legis-
lation.
46
Equal Protection jurisprudence closely parallels that of substantive
due process. 47 In fact, the Craigmiles Court used the same analysis to
find the legislation unconstitutional under both clauses.4 8 Generally, it is
well settled that the rational basis test is the applicable standard of review
for both substantive Due Process and Equal Protection claims.49 How-
ever, the Equal Protection clause protects a different aspect of personal
liberties than that which is protected by the substantive aspect of the Due
Process clause. While the Due Process clause is concerned with viola-
tions of rights that affect persons equally, the Equal Protection clause
prevents state governments from enacting legislation that arbitrarily
treats similar groups differently or arbitrarily treats different groups the
same. 50 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "[s]ometimes the gross-
est discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though
they were exactly alike ... . If such state legislation is to be constitu-
tional, there must be some "plausible connection between the distinction
and a legitimate public purpose. 52 The Court in Powers decided to ad-
dress the plaintiffs' claims in an Equal Protection discussion, but recog-
nized that the "substantive due process analysis proceeds along the same
lines as an equal protection analysis ....
IlI. POWERS V. HARRIS
A. Facts
Under Oklahoma law, the funeral industry is regulated by the Okla-
homa Funeral Services Licensing Act ("FSLA") and the Board it cre-
ated. 4 The FSLA stipulates that any person engaged in selling caskets
must be a licensed funeral director operating out of a funeral establish-
ment This restriction is not applied to people engaged in selling other
funeral-related merchandise, including urns. 56 This strict regulation is
only applied to "time-of-need" casket sales (when the person for whom
46. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
47. Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations
Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668,
674 (2002).
48. See generally Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 223-30 (describing the standard of review to be the
same under both clauses and evaluating the claims under both clauses simultaneously).
49. Sanders, supra note 47, at 674.
50. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 59, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-6014).
51. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
52. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1690; see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539
U.S. 103 (2003).
53. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1215.
54. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 395.1-396.28 (2004).
55. Id.
56. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004).
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the casket is for is already dead). 7  A license is not necessary to sell
"pre-need" caskets, but the salesperson must be acting as the agent of a
fully licensed funeral director.58 In fact, plaintiff Kim Powers engaged in
the "pre-need" sale of thousands of caskets as the agent of various fu-
neral homes. 59 Also, the licensing requirement only applied to the intra-
state sale of caskets. 60 Thus, no license is required for an Oklahoman to
sell a casket to a customer outside of the state, nor is a license required
for an out-of-state salesman to sell a casket to customer located in Okla-
homa. If the law were to apply to interstate casket sales, it almost cer-
tainly would be held unconstitutional under the dormant commerce
clause.61
Becoming a licensed funeral director in Oklahoma is not an easy
task. "According to the Board's rules, an applicant for a funeral direc-
tor's license must complete both sixty credit hours of specified under-
graduate training and a one-year apprenticeship during which the appli-
cant must embalm twenty-five bodies." 62 Also, applicants are required to
pass two exams, one dealing with Oklahoma law.63 Additionally, to gain
a license, a business must meet certain specific requirements, including,
"a fixed physical location, a preparation room that meets the require-
ments for embalming bodies, a funeral-service merchandise-selection
room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas
for public viewing of human remains. ' '64 Essentially, to sell caskets in
Oklahoma a person has to jump through numerous hoops entirely unre-
lated to the sale of caskets. In fact, the district court found that "very
little specialized knowledge is required to sell caskets. 65
The plaintiffs, Kim Powers and Dennis Bridges, desired to sell
"time-of-need" caskets intrastate in Oklahoma over the internet. 66 They
are not licensed under the FSLA and "have no desire to obtain the appro-
priate Oklahoma licenses because they view their requirements as irrele-
-,67vant to the operation of an intrastate, Internet, retail, casket business.
In order to lawfully engage in their chosen business, the Plaintiffs would
have to "spend years of their lives equipping themselves with knowledge
57. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212.
58. Id.
59. Opening Brief for Appellant at 11, Powers v. Harris 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
60. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212 (emphasis added).
61. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (reasoning that for
dormant commerce clause review, "where simple economic protectionism is effected by a state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected"). Incidentally, the Craigmiles Court
applies this same reasoning to their substantive due process/equal protection analysis. Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
62. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1212-13.





and training which is not directly relevant to selling caskets. 68  The
Plaintiffs do not provide any funeral services or offer any other funeral-
related products. 69 However, they have refrained from making these
kinds of sales because they "have a reasonable and genuine fear that if
they were to sell caskets to Oklahoma consumers, they might be prose-
cuted for violation of the FSLA and Board rules. 70  The Plaintiffs
brought suit in federal district court "asserting that the FSLA violates the
Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.'
B. Decision
The Powers Court quickly dealt with the Privileges or Immunities
clause claim by relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, reasoning that it
was not its place to overrule them.72 The court then turned to evaluate the
merits of the equal protection claim. The court correctly identified the
"rational basis test" as the proper tool for its analysis.73 The rational
basis test, as applied in the equal protection context, essentially has two
elements: a law's disparate treatment of two similar groups, or similar
treatment of different groups, must serve a legitimate government pur-
pose; and any such distinction must be rationally related (albeit mini-
mally) to that legitimate government purpose.74 The defendant Board
argued that the interest served by the FSLA was consumer protection
because casket purchasers were a "particularly vulnerable group."75 The
defendant Board initially also proffered the argument that the licensure
requirement advanced public health, but abandoned this argument before
trial.76
The Powers Court then discussed whether the FSLA was rationally
related to serving the government interest of consumer protection.77 The
Plaintiffs presented strong evidence that the FSLA's licensing scheme
was not rationally related to furthering the legitimate government interest
of consumer protection. 78 The Board did not even argue that the provi-
68. Id. at 1214.
69. Id. at 1213.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1214.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1215.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
77. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1215.
78. Id. ("Less than five per cent of the education and training requirements necessary for
licensure in Oklahoma pertain directly to any knowledge or skills necessary to sell caskets."); see
also Opening Brief for Appellant at 36-37, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014) (arguing that a casket is not a "complex piece of equipment," and that "everything one
needs to know about purchasing a casket can be conveyed in just a few minutes;" also pointing out
that plaintiff Kim Powers successfully sold caskets on a pre-need basis to grieving individuals (for
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sions of the FSLA were relevant to consumer protection; rather, it merely
suggested that they were not "wholly irrelevant.,
79
Because of the radical reasoning of the majority, whether the licens-
ing scheme was rationally related to the goal of consumer protection
effectively became a moot point. The court decided that the state interest
being sought by the FSLA could actually be "protecting the intrastate
funeral home industry."80 Ironically, this is exactly what the plaintiffs
had attempted to demonstrate.8s  The court then declared that intrastate
economic protectionism, even in the absence of any public value, consti-
tuted a legitimate state purpose.82 Because the licensure requirement was
rationally related to protecting funeral directors by giving them a virtual
monopoly on casket sales, the legislation was deemed valid.83 Thus, the
court allowed Oklahoma to treat casket retailers differently than retailers
of other similar products (as well as treating the very different profes-
sions of casket salesmen and funeral directors exactly the same) because
the legislation was in furtherance of a legitimate public purpose and ra-
tionally related to that purpose.84 The court then discussed the differ-
ences between their reasoning and that of the Sixth Circuit case Craig-
miles v. Giles.
85
IV. CRAIGMILES V. GILES 
86
A. Facts
Craigmiles v. Giles is a U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case
with a virtually identical fact pattern to that of Powers. Similar to Okla-
homa's law at issue in Powers, the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers Act ("FDEA") forbade persons from selling caskets unless they
were a licensed funeral director.87 Also similar to Oklahoma's law, be
coming a licensed funeral director required a two year time commit-
ment.88 An applicant could "complete either one year of course work at
an accredited mortuary school and then a one-year apprenticeship with a
licensed funeral director or a two-year apprenticeship. ' 89 After this pe-
riod of time, the applicant is required to pass the Tennessee Funeral Arts
Examination.9" The district court found that "no more than five percent"
many of whom the death of a loved one was imminent) for years without any mortuary education or
grief psychology training).
79. Id. at 1216.
80. Id. at 1218.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1222.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1223-24.
86. 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).






of the curriculum at the only accredited funeral director school related to
the sale of caskets. 9 1
The plaintiffs operated independent casket stores in Chattanooga
and Knoxville. Although the stores did sell other funeral merchandise,
they "engage[d] in no embalming or arranging of funeral services, cre-
mations, or burials."92 Both of the plaintiffs' stores only engaged in
"time-of-need" sales, "after the death of the intended occupant. ' 9  The
Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers ("FDEA") then
issued a cease and desist order, which banned the plaintiffs from continu-
ing their business of selling caskets because they were not licensed fu-
neral directors. 94 When the plaintiffs brought suit, the district court
found that the FDEA, as it applied to the plaintiffs' businesses, violated
their rights under both the Equal Protection and substantive Due Process
clause.95 However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
law also was invalid under the Privileges or Immunities clause.
96
B. Decision
The initial reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in examining the states'
appeal mirrors that of the Tenth Circuit in Powers. However, the court
considered the constitutionality of the law under both the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process clauses simultaneously. 97 The court here also cor-
rectly identified the rational basis test as the proper standard of review,
"requiring only that the regulation bear some rational relation to a legiti-
mate state interest., 98 The court then went on to discuss the wide defer-
ence given to state legislatures under such a test. "Even foolish and mis-
directed provisions are generally valid if subject only to rational basis
review. ' 99 The court made it clear that "protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental pur-
pose."'1 This is the essential difference in the reasoning between Pow-
ers and Craigmiles. Once the court decided that protecting the economic
interests of licensed funeral directors was not a legitimate government
purpose, the Court looked to see whether the FDEA was rationally re-
lated to any other legitimate government purpose.'0 ' Unlike, the defen-
dants in Powers, Tennessee proffered two explanations for the legitimate
91. Id.






98. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
99. Id. at 223-24.
100. Id. at 224.
101. Id. at 225.
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government interest being served, claiming the licensure requirement
advanced both consumer protection and public health and safety. 
02
The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by either of these explanations.
While recognizing that the quality of a casket could potentially affect
public health, the court reasoned that the law "does not require that any
particular type of casket, or any casket at all, be used at burial."'0 3 Also,
there was no evidence that caskets sold by licensed funeral directors
were any more protective than those sold by unlicensed casket salesman:
The only difference was that caskets sold by licensed funeral directors
were "systematically more expensive."'104 Thus, the licensing require-
ment may actually reduce the quality of caskets being used because of
the artificially high prices it creates. s05 The court of appeals, like the
district court, was not convinced that poor quality caskets posed any
health risk whatsoever, but reasoned, "even if casket selection has an
effect on public health and safety, restricting the retailing of caskets to
licensed funeral directors bears no rational relationship to managing that
effect." 1
06
The Court next analyzed whether the licensing requirement was ra-
tionally related to the legitimate government purpose of consumer pro-
tection. Tennessee argued that because the FDEA regulates the conduct
of funeral directors, consumers are protected from salesman "making
fraudulent misrepresentations, making solicitations after death or when
death is imminent, or selling a previously used casket." 10 7 The court
countered this argument in several ways. First, the court reasoned that
civil and criminal sanctions are available to govern the conduct of casket
salesmen even without the FDEA.10 8 The court also reasoned that the
"legislature could develop similar standards for casket retailers, or even
make Section 317 [of the FDEA (which prevents funeral directors from
making fraudulent representations)] directly applicable to casket retail-
ers, without requiring the licensure that is the subject of complaint."'
1 9
The court recognized that the legislature "could.. . have addressed the
interest of consumer protection without imposing a prohibitive cost" in
the form of two years of unnecessary training."10
The state also argued that "the course of study required for licensure
trains directors in the best ways to treat individuals who have suffered
profound loss...1 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that indi-
102. Id,
103. Id.






110. Sanders, supra note 47, at 684; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 227-28,
111. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 288.
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viduals purchasing a casket from an independent retailer will still require
the services of a licensed funeral director and many other vendors are
dealt with by survivors, none of whom are required to have such train-
ing. 112
After finding "no rational relationship to any of the articulated pur-
poses of the state," the Court explicitly examined "the more obvious ille-
gitimate purpose to which licensure provision is very well tailored."'1 13
The Courts finds this purpose to be imposing a "significant barrier to
competition in the casket market." 14 Finally, the Court recognized that
"invalidation of economic regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment
has been rare in the modem era," but emphasized that its' decision was
"not a return to Lochner, by which this court would elevate its economic
theory over that of legislative bodies."'1 15 Because the law failed to meet
the even minimal requirements of the rational basis test, Justice Boggs
and the Sixth Circuit found Tennessee's licensing requirement to sell
time-of-need caskets intrastate to be unconstitutional as violating both




In Powers, the Tenth Circuit upheld an Oklahoma law limiting the
sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors despite plaintiffs' challenges
that the law violated their rights under the Privileges or Immunities and
Equal Protection clauses, and the substantive element of the Due Process
clause. 117 By doing so, the Tenth Circuit failed to protect the economic
liberties of its citizens.
First, this comment will briefly examine the wisdom of using a
highly deferential standard of review when protecting individuals' eco-
nomic rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Sec-
ond, this comment will discuss whether the court could have invalidated
the Oklahoma law by relying on the Privileges or Immunities clause,
which was intended to protect an individual's right to earn an honest
living, and has been recently revived by the Supreme Court. Third, this
comment primarily argues that the Tenth Circuit wrongly found naked
economic protectionism to be a legitimate government interest for the
purpose of rational basis review. This dangerous and radical holding
could have drastic implications for the future of economic liberty and is
not supported by past precedent. Fourth, this comment argues that the




115. Id. at 229.
116. Id. at 228-29.
117. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
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requirement. After determining that protecting the intrastate funeral in-
dustry is not a legitimate government interest, the Tenth Circuit should
have invalidated the state law using the highly deferential rational basis
test. Finally, this comment discusses the likely future of Powers v. Har-
ris.
A. Do Economic Rights Deserve Greater Protection?
Although the framers intended the courts to be a significant check
on legislative power, they have largely been absent in the arena of eco-
nomic rights for much of this century.' 1 8 The Court now distinguishes
between "certain fundamental rights and liberty interests" and economic
liberties, the latter of which are less protected.'19 Why should this be the
case? Are economic rights, specifically, the right to earn an honest living
free from government interference, less important to citizens of this
country than other rights? In fact, "there is little justification for elimi-
nating the use of substantive due process for challenges to economic
regulations while retaining its use in areas concerning personal liber-
ties.,
1 20
Modern constitutional jurisprudence makes it extremely difficult for
a court to overturn an economic regulation because of the highly deferen-
tial rational basis test.' 2' This gives the state legislatures much leeway to
control the economic affairs of their citizens. Thus, state regulatory
powers are at an all time high. 122 Not surprisingly, interest groups now
have great influence in legislation.123 Individuals and corporations "often
must pit their economic survival against state regulations seeking to limit
or prohibit their rights.' 24 Thus, it may be time to reexamine the impor-
tance of economic liberties and the role of the courts in protecting
them. 25 After all, "a large and active government requires an active ju-
diciary to counter its excesses."'
126
What would be so wrong with the courts taking a cautious step to-
wards returning to the reasoning of Lochner and elevating the status of
economic rights? Even three of the four dissenting justices in Lochner
"accepted that a liberty to contract could be found in the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 127 The only, real debate in Lochner was the amount of
118. Simpson, supra note 4, at 177.
119. Sanders, supra note 47, at 672 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997)).
120. Hacker, supra note 8, at 735.
121. Simpson, supra note 4, at 177.
122. See id. at 176.
123. Id. at 176-77.
124. Hacker, supra note 8, at 675.
125. See Simpson, supra note 4, at 177.
126. Id.
127. Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
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deference given to the state legislatures. 128 This "liberty to contract"
which the Court relied on was only removed in the face of a national
crisis, the Great Depression. 129 Now that this country is in a period of
general economic stability, maybe the time is ripe for the Supreme Court
to reevaluate the importance and historical significance of economic
rights and the protection offered to them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Nebbia, the Court "moved from the extreme of near per se invali-
dation of economic regulation to the opposite extreme of near per se
validation." 130 This overzealous elimination of economic substantive due
process should be reexamined. 1
31
Such consideration would be consistent with the recent elevation of
the right of privacy, illustrated in the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.132
In this case the Supreme Court effectively invalidated anti-abortion laws
by finding privacy to be a fundamental right protected by the substantive
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 If privacy can be
characterized as a fundamental right, then could not the right to earn an
honest living also be characterized as fundamental? Affording economic
rights such a status would allow courts to apply a stricter standard of
review when confronted with restrictions like the licensure requirement
in Powers, making their decision to invalidate such needless laws even
easier. However, this comment argues that such an expanded judicial
role in evaluating economic regulations is not necessary to invalidate the
law upheld by the Tenth Circuit in Powers.
B. Does the Privileges or Immunities Clause Provide Protection for the
Plaintiffs?
Could the Tenth Circuit have relied on the Privileges or Immunities
clause to invalidate the Oklahoma licensure requirement? The court cor-
rectly noted that "it is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to over-
rule one of its precedents."' 134 It is not the place of the Tenth Circuit to
essentially overrule The Slaughterhouse Cases.'35 Even the Craigmiles
Court thought it would be beyond its authority to "breathe new life into
the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' 136 However, the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, accompanied with the Supreme Court's recent
128. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The dissent in Lochner ac-
cepted that a liberty to contract could be found in the Constitution. However, the dissent would have
upheld the law, which restricted the number of hours bakers could work per day, because it had a
"real and substantial" relation to the protection of health." Id. at 69. The use of the word "substan-
tial" implies an intermediate standard of review, more exacting than the current minimum rationality
standard.
129. See Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
130. Id. at 730.
131. Id.
132. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
133. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
134. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1214 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 698 (quoting Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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decision in Saenz v. Roe, merits discussion of whether the clause does in
fact provide protection for the plaintiffs in Powers.
The Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was modeled after the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
clause. 137
The difference between the two clauses is that while the Privileges and
Immunities clause protects residents of one state against the action of
another state government, the Privileges or Immunities clause was en-
acted to protect U.S. citizens against state action, including action taken
by their own state government. 38 The plaintiffs claim that "[t]he Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause clearly protects Americans against their
home state's legislative power when that state's power is exercised in a
manner that abridges a privilege or immunity of national citizenship."
139
Furthermore, since the Article IV provision undisputedly provides pro-
tection for the right to earn an honest living, it can be assumed that the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects such a right.14° At least one of the
framers of the clause included within its' scope "the liberty.., to work
in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to yourself,
to the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the enjoyment of
the fruits of your toil.' ' 141  Because the right to earn an honest living
stems from U.S. citizenship and not state citizenship, the Privileges or
Immunities clause should afford protection to economic liberties.14
2
The Supreme Court recently showed an interest in reviving the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as it applies to citizens' economic
rights. 143 Saenz signified an important step in reviving the Privileges or
Immunities clause. 144 The Court held that "the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protected citizens' rights to be treated like other state citizens in
the state to which they move, the Court relied on the unenumerated right
to travel.' 45 Even in his dissent, Justice Thomas expressed an openness
to reexamine the meaning of the clause in an appropriate case, using it
either in addition to or instead of an equal protection or due process
analysis.' 46 At the very least, the Supreme Court's decision in Saenz,
combined with historical background, raises the question of whether
economic liberties are protected by the Privileges or Immunities clause
137. Opening Brief for Appellant at 63, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
138. Id. at 64 n.18.
139. Id. at 64.
140. Id. at 63-64.
141. Id. at 64 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham)).
142. Id. at 65.
143. See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a durational residency
requirement for welfare benefits by relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
144. See Hacker, supra note 8, at 693-94.
145. Id. at 695.
146. Id. at 696.
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and whether that protection would include a more exacting standard of
review than the rational basis test. 1
47
The plaintiffs' argument that the Privileges or Immunities clause
protects their right to earn an honest living may not square with existing
Supreme Court precedent. 148 However, the plaintiffs are correct in the
assertion that the Privileges or Immunities clause should protect this
right. After all, in our capitalist society, what could be more important to
an individual than the right to engage in honest trade to support oneself
and one's family? Surely the vast majority of Americans would agree
that the freedom to choose a lawful occupation is fundamental to their
happiness and survival. Moreover, a more expansive reading of the
Privileges or Immunities clause would be beneficial from a legal stand-
point because it would relieve courts' excessive reliance on the Equal
Protection and substantive Due Process clauses to support economic and
individual rights. 149 When reviewing this or a similar case, the Supreme
Court should consider expanding the scope of the protection offered by
the clause.
C. Naked Economic Protectionism is NOT a Legitimate Government
Interest
The Powers decision split from the Sixth Circuit decision in Craig-
miles and wrongly upheld an irrational state law that served no legitimate
government purpose. By doing so, the court not only failed to protect the
economic liberties of Oklahoma citizens, but also blatantly misstated the
law. In order to invalidate the Oklahoma licensing scheme, which the
Court itself recognizes as a "needless, wasteful requirement,' ' 50 the
Tenth Circuit would not have to take what could be interpreted as ex-
treme measures in reviving the Privileges and Immunities clause or ele-
vating the status of economic rights. Invalidating the Oklahoma law as
either violating Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process or equal
protection would not be tantamount to a return to Lochner. All the Tenth
Circuit had to do to strike down the law was adequately apply the current
"minimum rationality" standard of review to the given fact situation.
State legislation "is generally upheld under an economic due proc-
ess analysis if it furthers a permissible police power end."' 5' Protecting
the "general welfare" is a permissible police power end. 52 What consti-
tutes general welfare? One thing is clear: Purely private interest legisla-
147. Reply Brief for Appellant at 22-23, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-6014).
148. Slaughter House Cases, 86 U.S. 36 (1872).
149. Hacker, supra note 8, at 713.
150. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
151. Hacker, supra note 8, at 733.
152. Id.
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tion does not protect the general welfare. 153 This type of legislation
treats one group of people differently from another group because of a
"raw exercise of political power."'' 5 4 Such exercises of power are prohib-
ited by our constitution. 155  "Economic redistributions that do not in-
crease community welfare, help a disadvantaged group or those harmed
by "natural or market forces," or promote public health or safety are gen-
erally impermissible."'
' 56
No Supreme Court case supports the proposition that naked eco-
nomic protectionism, without even the guise of furthering the general
welfare of the state, is a legitimate government interest.1 57 Not only has
virtually every court confronted with a similar licensing requirement for
casket salespersons invalidated the law, 58 none of them have even enter-
tained the idea that protecting the interests of funeral directors, by itself,
constituted a legitimate government interest. 159 The defendants them-
selves did not even argue such a justification for the law, and instead
concocted the far-fetched consumer protection rationale. 6° The plain-
tiffs also lacked the foresight (albeit understandably) to demonstrate in
their arguments why pure economic protectionism is not a legitimate
government purpose.16
In fact, even the concurring opinion in Powers recognized that "all
of the cases rest on a fundamental foundation: The discriminatory
legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a public inter-
est."1 62 Thus, the Powers Court actually engaged in radical judicial rea-
soning in concluding that the Oklahoma legislature could benefit funeral
directors by giving them a virtual monopoly on the sale of caskets with-
out any public interest being served. And let there be no doubt that the
funeral directors did benefit from their effective monopoly, at the ex-
pense of consumers. Funeral directors in Oklahoma routinely marked up
casket prices 300-600%. 163 Even the defendants' own expert witness
testified that he had never seen a markup of greater than 300% outside of
153. See id. at 734.
154. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1693.
155. Id. at 1697.
156. Hacker, supra note 8, at 734.
157. See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
158. Opening brief for Appellant at 26, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03 -6014).
159. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th
Cir. 2002); Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
160. See generally Powers, 379 F.3d 1208. The defendants did not proffer the argument that
the protection of funeral directors, by itself, could be a legitimate state interest. The 10th Circuit
devised this rationale on its own.
161. Opening brief for Appellant at 26, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
162. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.




Oklahoma. 164 The complete deference to the legislature embodied in the
Powers holding puts a stamp of approval on all intrastate private interest
legislation, and allows state governments to openly do favors for special
interests and friends. This effectively removes all meaning from the term
"legitimate." Could a majority now pass a law enjoining a certain indi-
vidual or group from participating in a business for any reason at all?
Could the legislature now give an individual or group a monopoly for
any reason at all? This is what the Powers majority is apparently author-
izing.
The Powers reasoning blatantly conflicts with the ideas of the fram-
ers of the Constitution. "That Madison included economic liberty within
the rights of individuals is clear from his views on how governments
often abuse rights."' 65 To Madison, a prime example of an unjust gov-
ernment exists "where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice
of their occupations."' 66 The Oklahoma law at issue in Powers is exactly
the type of arbitrary restriction Madison was referring to. Fortunately for
proponents of economic liberties, courts need not look all the way back
to the Federalist Papers to invalidate such legislation.
Case law precedent directly conflicts with the Powers holding. The
Sixth Circuit recognized this in Craigmiles and declared that "protecting
a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
government purpose.' ' 167 In fact, this proposition was so obvious to the
Craigmiles Court that they spent little time defending it.' 68 To support
the proposition, the court cites City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,169
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,170 and Energy Reserves Group, Inc.
v. Kansas Power.171 The Powers Court rejected these cases as applicable
precedents because they dealt with state regulations of interstate com-
merce and not intrastate commerce. 172 Because the licensing scheme in
Powers did not apply to casket sales across state borders (interstate, i.e.
someone in Oklahoma buying a casket from or selling a casket to some-
one outside of Oklahoma), it was acceptable. 173 What the Court failed to
recognize was that these cases give no indication that the definition of a
164. Id.
165. Simpson, supra note 4, at 181.
166. Id.
167. Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224.
168. See id.
169. 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding a New Jersey law banning waste from entering the state to
be protectionist and unconstitutional).
170. 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (finding the application of a New York licensing statute for milk
processing receiving facilities to be protectionist and unconstitutional).
171. 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (finding that the Kansas Natural Gas Protection Act, which permitted
increases in gas prices under contractual escalator clauses was constitutional because regulation of
the natural gas industry was directed at protecting consumers and the Act was rationally related to
that goal).
172. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
173. See id.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"legitimate state purpose" should be different under a "dormant" com-
merce clause analysis than under an equal protection/substantive due
process analysis. 174 The City of Philadelphia Court simply stated: "Thus,
where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."'' 75  Also, at least
some constitutional scholars find that the tests involved in a dormant
commerce clause analysis should be virtually the same as the test in an
equal protection analysis. 176
Moreover, as a practical matter, what sense does it make to allow a
state to treat its own citizens worse than citizens of other states? Should
protection offered by the dormant commerce clause be greater than the
protection clearly articulated in the Fourteenth Amendment? The law in
Powers effectively gives Oklahoma residents seeking to sell caskets to
other Oklahoma residents two options: Either become a licensed funeral
by complying with all the licensure requirements, or simply move their
place of business just across the Oklahoma border where they could law-
fully sell caskets interstate in Oklahoma. This "loophole" illustrates the
arbitrariness of the law's distinctions.
Although they are not wholly irrelevant, it is entirely unnecessary to
use "dormant commerce clause" cases to determine what constitutes a
legitimate state purpose for equal protection and substantive due process
claims. They may not invalidate state laws, but every substantive due
process and equal protection case identifies some sort of general welfare
state interest beyond mere economic protectionism. 177
The Powers Court misinterpreted some of these cases when relying
on Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,'78 Fitzgerald v. Racing Asso-
ciation of Central Iowa, 179 and City of New Orleans v. Dukes.
180 Not
only can these cases be differentiated on their facts, but none of them
stand for the proposition that the court raises: That naked economic pro-
tectionism is a legitimate state purpose.
First of all, in Fitzgerald, the Court seems to hint that when tax lev-
els are at issue, an even more deferential standard of review is applied
than the usual rational basis standard. 181 The Court also did not phrase
174. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power, 459 U.S. 400
(1983).
175. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
176. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1689-90.
177. See generally Williamson, 348 U.S. 483 (reasoning the law advanced public health); see
generally Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (reasoning the law could have been enacted to encourage river-
boat communities); see generally Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (reasoning the law could have been enacted
to protect the appearance and custom valued by city residents).
178. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
179. 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
180. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
181. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003).
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the issue as whether the legislature could favor one gambling industry
over another without justification. The Court reasoned that "the legisla-
tors may have wanted to encourage the economic development of river
communities or to promote riverboat history, say, by providing incen-
tives for riverboats to remain in the State, rather than relocate to other
States."'' 8 2 The Court also speculated that the legislation might be pro-
tecting the "reliance interests of riverboat operators."'' 8 3 These rationales
show that the Court is searching for a legitimate policy purpose beyond
arbitrary economic protectionism. Encouraging economic development
and promoting riverboat history certainly relate to the general welfare of
the state.
In Williamson, the Plaintiffs challenged a law making it "unlawful
for any person not a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses
to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical
appliances, except upon written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma
licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist."'184 The Court upheld the legis-
lation against a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenge.' 8 5
However, implicit in the Court's reasoning was that the restriction was
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of public health: 186
An eyeglass frame, considered in isolation, is only a piece of mer-
chandise. But an eyeglass frame is not used in isolation.., it is used
with lenses; and lenses, pertaining as they do to the human eye, enter
the field of health. Therefore, the legislature might conclude that to
regulate one effectively it would have to regulate the other.
187
Thus, the Supreme Court requires that some public value be in-
voked in order to legitimize a piece of state legislation. 88  Judge
Tymkovich recognized this in his Powers concurrence, stating, "[r]ather
than hold that a government may always favor one economic actor over
another, the Court, if anything, insisted that the legislation advance some
public good."'
189
Dukes involved legislation banning street vendors from selling
foodstuffs out of pushcarts in a certain area of New Orleans unless they
had been operating there for a specified period of time.190 The Court
found that the legislation rationally furthered the legitimate state interest
of preserving "the appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's resi-
182. Id. at 109.
183. Id.
184. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S 483, 485 (1955).
185. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Sunstein, supra note 2, 1713.
189. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
190. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 297.
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dents and attractive to tourists."' 191 The Court did not hold that legisla-
tion could simply favor long-term vendors over short term vendors with-
out an overriding public purpose. 192 On the contrary, the Court described
invalid legislation to be "the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbi-
trary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 93 What could the Court possibly be referring to in this statement,
if not a licensing requirement that could plausibly advance no other state
interest than the mere economic protection of funeral directors?
The Court went on to defend the difference in treatment as a gradual
approach to limiting street vendors and reasoned that the city could have
reasonably been concerned about the reliance interest of the older ven-
dors. 194 Again, this reasoning used by the Court here does not lend sup-
port to the Powers holding that "intra-state economic protectionism... is
a legitimate government interest."'195 Of course, the argument could be
made that upholding the licensing requirements in Oklahoma would fur-
ther the reliance interests of funeral directors who have always enjoyed a
monopoly on casket sales. However, none of the cases discussed lend
any credibility to the assertion that a piece of legislation can be justified
on a reliance interest alone.' 96 Moreover, there is no gradual opening of
the intrastate casket market over time, nor is there evidence that funeral
directors in Oklahoma enjoyed a monopoly on the sale of caskets prior to
1989.197 Also, neither the defendant Board nor the Tenth Circuit relied
on such reasoning.
Even the concurring opinion in Powers agrees that economic pro-
tectionism alone, without any other legitimate government interest, is not
a legitimate state interest. 198 After examining Williamson, Dukes, and
Fitzgerald, Judge Tymkovich reasoned "the majority, in contrast to these
precedents, effectively imports a standard that could even credit legisla-
tive classifications that advance no general state interest."' 99 If economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest, then what justification would
not be considered legitimate? There must be some principled purpose
behind a government action that (at least in theory) relates to the overall
good of the society.
191. Id. at 304.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 303-04.
194. Id. at 304-05.
195. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222.
196. See generally Wiliamson, 348 U.S. 483 (reasoning the law advanced public health); see
generally Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (reasoning the law could have been enacted to encourage river-
boat communities); see generally Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (reasoning the law could have been enacted
to protect the appearance and custom valued by city residents).
197. Opening Brief for Appellant, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
6014).




Requiring a legitimate state interest that somehow relates to a public
value or benefit is not only consistent with past precedent-it also makes
sense. Requiring a public value ends to justify legislation protects
against the power of factions that worried Thomas Jefferson. 200 Requir-
ing something more than a naked economic preference to validate a piece
of legislation helps to ensure that state government action truly promotes
the public welfare, and prevents interest groups from exercising raw po-
litical power. 201 "Moreover, it reflects the notion that the role of gov-
ernment is not to implement or trade off preexisting private interests, but
to select public values., 20 2 A return to Lochner is entirely unnecessary to
support such a proposition. In fact, "the minimum requirement that gov-
ernment decisions be something other than a raw exercise of political
power has been embodied in constitutional doctrine under the due proc-
ess clause before, during, and after the Lochner era.
'" 203
With the ability to pass purely protectionist legislation, state gov-
ernments would have virtually unlimited power to regulate every aspect
of their economy. Imagine a society where every profession was re-
quired to be licensed by the government. Political savvy and high-
powered connections would determine a person's livelihood. One's
quality craftsmanship or skill would be entirely irrelevant to their success
in business. Prices on all goods would be inflated, and a black market
would inevitably open, pushing honest businessmen underground. Al-
though this sounds extreme, such a controlling state government would
be perfectly constitutional under the majority's holding.
The Powers Court also failed to apply the reasoning of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center as the Craigmiles Court did.204 The Court seems
to inconsistently reject the notion that Cleburne uses anything but a typi-
cal rational basis standard of review while recognizing Cleburne as some
sort of anomaly.2 °5 In its discussion of Cleburne, the majority gives its
only indication of what would constitute an illegitimate government in-
terest, namely, a "bare desire to harm a politically unpopular minor-
ity.''2°6 The Court's reasoning implies that even if the legislation was
designed to harm non-licensed casket salespeople, it is valid because it
furthers the legitimate government interest of benefiting funeral direc-
tors. After all, casket salespeople are not a politically unpopular minor-
ity. The Powers Court seems to be saying that state governments can do
whatever they want as long as their objective is not tantamount to obvi-
200. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1697.
201. Id. at 1689.
202. Id. at 1697.
203. Id.





DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ous and invidious racism. 20 7 This seems like a rather lenient place to
draw the line on permissible state action.
It is important to note that the Powers majority is completely unsat-
isfied with Oklahoma's regulatory scheme.20 8 In fact, the court was not
able to validate the law using traditional rational basis analysis (i.e. ex-
amining whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate purpose re-
lating to the public good).2 °9 Instead, the Tenth Circuit had to embrace
the troubling and highly suspect economic protection rationale, which
was not even put forth by the defendants. 210 In doing so, the court
impermissibly broadened the definition of what constitutes a legitimate
government purpose, and deviated from any sort of traditional rational
basis review of state economic regulations.
How the Tenth Circuit would have ruled had it considered only the
consumer protection rationale is uncertain. However, if it had been per-
suaded by the defendant's arguments, there would be no need to declare
economic protectionism a legitimate state interest. While it is possible
that the court wanted to use this case to establish a precedent under
which economic protectionism is an acceptable state interest, it is more
likely that the majority wished to defer to the Oklahoma legislature, but
simply could not bring itself to conclude that the licensure requirement
was rationally related to consumer protection. Thus, the court had to find
another way to validate the law.
Such judicial restraint in the face of legislation that the court knows
to be wrong is dangerous. According to Richard Epstein, "when [courts]
use transparent arguments to justify dubious legislation, they cannot raise
the level of debate. When courts ... hold that the state has the right to
say X, when they know X is wrong, they fritter away their own political
authority on an indefensible cause.",
211
After examining the plaintiffs' arguments, the court should have
found the Oklahoma law to be unconstitutional under a traditional ra-
tional basis review because it is not rationally related to consumer pro-
tection. Although the court may have been obligated to seek out other
possible justifications for the law,212 economic protectionism is not a
legitimate justification.
D. The Arbitrary Nature of the Oklahoma Licensing Scheme
One area of analysis that neither the Powers Court nor the Craig-
miles Court focused on was the arbitrary nature of a regulating scheme
207. See id.
208. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1218-22.
211. Simpson, supra note 4, at 190.
212. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
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that requires years of study completely unrelated to one's chosen profes-
sion. The Craigmiles Court "missed an opportunity to demonstrate how
absurd the FDEA's requirements truly are. 2 13 Even the majority opinion
in Nebbia recognized that "[p]rice control, like any other form of regula-
tion, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstra-
bly irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty."
214
This "any other form of regulation" would presumably include industry
licensure requirements.
215
The Oklahoma law at issue violates the Equal Protection clause by
both arbitrarily treating similar groups differently and arbitrarily treating
quite different groups exactly the same.216 First of all, the law arbitrarily
treats casket salespeople differently than people selling other merchan-
dise, "such as hardware, books and computers," because Oklahoma law
does not force people seeking to sell these types of merchandise to spend
years of their lives learning knowledge that is useless to their chosen
trade.21 7 Moreover, Oklahoma does not require a license to sell even
other funeral merchandise, such as urns or flowers.
The Oklahoma law also arbitrarily (and unconstitutionally) treats
218two very different professions as if they were the same. A funeral
director's role is fundamentally different from that of a casket salesper-
son. A casket salesperson does not need the extensive training required
of a licensed funeral director.219 However, the Oklahoma law at issue
here "treats two distinct occupations-funeral directing and casket retail-
ing-as if they were the same ....
The Fitzgerald Court, quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
reasoned that "the Equal Protection Clause requires States, when enact-
ing tax laws, to 'proceed upon a rational basis' and not to 'resort to a
classification that is palpably arbitrary.' 221 If Equal Protection provides
that tax laws cannot be arbitrary, then should it also not provide for li-
censing measures to also not be arbitrary? What other arbitrary method
could the state of Oklahoma employ to regulate the sale of caskets?
Could the legislature vote to simply find a random homeless man on the
street and give him a monopoly on casket sales? This would "conceiva-
213. Sanders, supra note 47, at 685.
214. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (emphasis added).
215. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539.
216, Opening Brief of Appellants at 59, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
217. Id. at 60.
218. Id. at 61.
219. See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 220.
220. Opening Brief of Appellants at 61, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
221. Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 107 (quoting Allied Stories of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
527 (1959))-
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bly" serve the government interest of regulating casket sales because
there would only be one person to oversee. Moreover, it would certainly
advance the "legitimate" government interest in protecting the homeless
man's monopoly.222
When applying the rational basis test to intrastate economic regula-
tions, the defendant Board in Powers claims that any conceivable gov-
ernment interest would be sufficient to validate the challenged legisla-
tion.223 The Board was essentially arguing that if the Oklahoma licensing
scheme could conceivably do something good (i.e., further consumer
protection), then it should be valid under the rational basis test.
224
In contrast, Fitzgerald stands for the proposition that "[t]he Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason
for the classification." Under Fitzgerald, there must be a "plausible in-
ference" that a certain piece of legislation was actually enacted to ad-
vance "some legitimate government interest. 2 25 The appropriate ques-
tion is not whether the licensing requirement could advance consumer
protection in some hypothetical fact situation, but whether it is plausible
to believe that the legislature passed the law to advance consumer protec-
tion. 26 If the court is looking for just any conceivable policy reason,
then there will hardly be any law that will not pass the rational basis test.
Even the most arbitrary of classifications could conceivably relate to
some public good. For example, under the district court's assumptions, a
legislature could decide to require a person to be a licensed funeral direc-
tor to sell not only caskets, but also "shoes, hamburgers, washing ma-
chines, computers, or any other type of merchandise-because, of
course, the increased regulatory oversight of those transactions" could
conceivably further the legitimate state interest of consumer protec-
tion.227 Of course, "[i]t is axiomatic that increased government regula-
tion of a particular transaction can provide greater protection for con-
sumers. ' 228 This mere fact does not prevent a licensure requirement from
being unreasonable or arbitrary.
What if the state of Oklahoma decided to require that casket sales-
people be not only licensed funeral directors, but also licensed physi-
cians, because some knowledge of anatomy would be helpful in their
222. See generally Powers, 379 F.3d at 1208 (reasoning that granting one group a monopoly,
for the sole benefit of that group, is legitimate. Extending this reasoning, granting one person a
monopoly would also be legitimate.).
223. See id.
224. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
6014).
225. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2-3, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2160 (2003)).
226. See id. at 2-3 & n.2 (pointing out that the actual motivations of the legislature are entirely
irrelevant under a rational basis review).




trade?229 Could the legislature further force people seeking to sell cas-
kets to become licensed pilots or licensed architects? 230 There must be a
point where the relationship between the knowledge actually required of
casket salespeople and the requirements of the Oklahoma licensing
scheme "[rise] to the level of arbitrary and unreasonable." 231 A proper
examination of the facts reveals that the licensing scheme in this case,
which requires casket salespeople to spend years of their lives learning
information wholly irrelevant to their chosen profession, reaches this
threshold.
E. The Likely Fate of Powers v. Harris
Now that the plaintiffs have filed a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court to appeal the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Powers, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to decide this im-
portant issue and resolve the split between the Tenth and Sixth Circuits.
This survey suggests that the Court should evaluate Oklahoma's licens-
ing scheme with a stricter standard of review than minimum rationality
by either (1) applying the Privileges or Immunities clause or (2) elevat-
ing the status of the right to earn an honest living that it might receive
greater judicial scrutiny. However, even if the Court analyzes this case
using traditional rational basis review, it should first use the opportunity
presented in Powers to announce that economic protectionism is not a
legitimate state purpose. This will prevent future courts from making the
mistake of the Tenth Circuit, and confusing deferential review with the
complete absence of review.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court can either accept the consumer pro-
tection rationale, or invalidate the law. This survey anticipates that the
Supreme Court would likely choose between the reasoning of the district
court in Powers and the reasoning of the Craigmiles court. Because the
plaintiffs presented incredibly strong evidence that the licensure re-
quirement could not have conceivably been passed to protect consum-
ers,232 this survey argues the Court should determine that the legislation
is not rationally related to consumer protection.




232. The plaintiffs argue that if the licensing requirement truly was enacted to advance con-
sumer protection, then the legislation is plagued with inconsistencies. The plaintiffs/appellants used
an interesting analogy in their Opening Brief:
Imagine [if] the State said that one possible justification for its casket licensing require-
ments was the problem of spontaneously-combusting caskets. Presumably it would
arouse at least some suspicion if, in addition to providing that only licensed funeral direc-
tors may sell caskets, the legislature also decreed that caskets be stored only in wooden
buildings. True, that provision wouldn't necessarily mean the legislature's avowed con-
cem about flaming caskets was specious, but it would certainly tend to cast doubt on it.
And eventually, if enough provisions like that were piled one on top of another, a review-
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The Court must recognize that invalidating this law would not sym-
bolize a return to or even a step in the direction of Lochner (even though
that might not be such a bad thing). It is true that legislation is rarely
invalidated under the rational basis test.233  However, the rational basis
test is still a test, and it is possible for some pieces of legislation to fail.
The fact that the defendants initially proffered a public health argument
and later dropped it shows that some rationales simply will not hold. 34
If the Court were to accept the consumer protection rationale, the test
would effectively lose all meaning, leaving lower courts powerless to
strike down even the most absurd and arbitrary economic regulations.
Even the concurring judge in Powers admits that he "can imagine a
different set of facts where the legislative classification is so lopsided in
favor of personal interests at the expense of the public good, or so far
removed from plausibly advancing a public interest that a rationale of
'protectionism' would fail. '235 Although the concurring opinion deserves
credit for not completely eliminating equal protection of economic liber-
ties, it is difficult to imagine legislation further "removed from plausibly
advancing a public interest" 236 than the licensing requirements for casket
salespeople in Oklahoma.
In summary, the Powers Court failed to protect the economic liber-
ties of its citizens by engaging in radical judicial reasoning. A strong
argument can be made that economic rights deserve more protection than
they are presently afforded by substantive due process jurisprudence.
Another strong argument can be made that the Privileges or Immunities
clause should provide at least some protection for economic liberties
against state interference. However, the Tenth Circuit needed only to
rely on the highly deferential rational-basis test to invalidate Oklahoma's
ing court might well conclude that the State's flaming-casket rationale was simply too
riddled with inconsistencies to take seriously.
Opening Brief of Appellants at 53-54, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
6014).
Consider the following inconsistencies in the licensing requirement, assuming it was
enacted to protect consumers. The licensing requirement only applies to "time-of-need" casket sales.
However, there is evidence that "pre-need" customers, for whom the death of a loved one is immi-
nent, are often grieving as well, and thus are just as vulnerable as "time-of-need" customers. The
licensing requirement is applied only to casket sales, and not the sale of other funeral-related goods,
including urns, which are also receptacles for human remains. The licensing requirement is directly
inconsistent the position of the Federal Trade Commission, which "has enacted specific rles to
ensure that consumers are not forced to buy caskets from funeral homes." Id. The regulation directly
injures consumers through the outrageous markup in price funeral directors apply to caskets. Fi-
nally, the provision that the law only apply to intrastate casket sales effectively undoes any protec-
tion that consumers might have under the law. Out-of-state casket salespeople do not have to be
licensed in any way and do not have to go through any training. These inconsistencies make it clear
that the legislature could not have plausibly enacted the licensure requirements to advance the le-
gitimate public interest of consumer protection. See id. at 54-57.
233. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
234. Id.




licensing requirement. Unfortunately, they declared naked economic
protectionism, by itself, to be a legitimate state interest. This holding is
not supported by past precedent, historical insight, or common sense.
The Tenth Circuit should have found that protecting the economic inter-
ests of funeral directors was not by itself a legitimate state purpose.
Then, like the court in Craigmiles, the Powers Court should have ade-
quately applied the rational basis test to strike down the legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent times, economic liberties have been almost completely ig-
nored by the courts. However, economic liberties may still find some
minimal protections under the Equal Protection and substantive Due
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, this pro-
tection comes in the form of the highly deferential rational basis test.
This test requires that a piece of legislation be rationally related to a le-
gitimate government interest. The court in Powers v. Harris wrongly
concluded that economic protectionism is a legitimate government inter-
est. The enactment of naked preferences by state legislatures is abso-
lutely prohibited by both the Equal Protection and the substantive Due
Process clauses.237 Moreover, allowing states to pass legislation based
solely on the raw exercise of political power conflicts with the views of
the founding fathers that legislatures should not be used for factional
takeovers.238 The Sixth Circuit decided a virtually identical case much
more appropriately in Craigmiles v. Giles. The Craigmiles Court cor-
rectly identified legislation unmistakably benefiting only a private inter-
est as serving an illegitimate government interest, and further found that
the wholly arbitrary licensing requirements were not rationally related to
the legitimate government interest of consumer protection. Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will agree with Craigmiles and refuse to place the last
nail in the coffin of economic liberties. The Supreme Court should over-
rule Powers v. Harris and hold that purely protectionist legislation does
not further a legitimate government interest, and arbitrary licensing re-
quirements-such as those in Oklahoma governing licensing of casket
salespeople discussed here-are not rationally related to consumer pro-
tection or any other legitimate government interest.
Jim Thompson*
237. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1689.
238. Simpson, supra note 4, at 173.
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author
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ERISA's SILENCE: STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN DEEMED
DENIAL EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") to protect participants' employee benefits and to estab-
lish uniform requirements for employers who provide these benefits.,
Although Congress intended to provide a framework for the distribution
and enforcement of participants' benefits,2 ERISA does not set the judi-
cial standard of review of an administrator's decision to deny benefits.3
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court held
that the standard of review is de novo unless the plan administrator has
discretion to award benefits, in which case the standard of review is arbi-
trary and capricious. 4 Under the de novo standard, a court does not defer
to the plan administrator's decision. Under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, however, a court does defer to the administrator's decision
unless it is arbitrary and capricious. Circuits are split not only as to when
to apply the de novo standard, but also as to whether a court may con-
sider evidence outside of the administrator's record when applying the
standard of review.5
This paper examines the recent Tenth Circuit's holding in Finley v.
Hewlett-Packard. 6 In Finley, the Tenth Circuit used an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard to review a plan administrator's "deemed denial" of
a participant's benefits. A "deemed denial" occurs when an administra-
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of Titles 5, 18,
26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Mason Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits
Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (1994)
("[E]RISA brought employee benefit plans under federal regulatory authority. ERISA regulates
pension plans and aspects of 'employee welfare benefit plans,' which include health, disability, and
death benefit plans.").
3. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) ("[E]RISA does not
set out the appropriate standard of review for actions.., challenging benefit eligibility determina-
tions.").
4. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
5. Compare, e.g., Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that evidence outside the administrator's record could not be examined in de novo review);
S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) with Quesinberry v. Life
Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 1017, 1026 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence outside the administrator's
record may be examined under de novo review when the court deems it necessary); Moon v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence outside the adminis-
trator's record can always be reviewed under de novo review for ERISA cases).
6. Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168
(10th Cir. 2004).
7. Finley, 379 F.3d at 1174.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tor fails to notify the participant of its decision to deny benefits within
ERISA' s timeframes.
Part I of this paper examines ERISA's history and the federal
courts' interpretations of ERISA. Part II examines the scope of employee
benefits under ERISA and the provisions providing the framework of an
administrator's internal review and the availability of judicial review.
Part 1I examines judicial standards of review. Part IV examines federal
circuit splits over "deemed denial" cases commencing with the Tenth
Circuit's holding in Finley. Part V analyzes the Tenth Circuit's reasoning
in Finley and recommends a consistent standard in "deemed denial"
cases that reflects other circuits and the legislative intent behind ERISA.
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 after escalating concerns of em-
8ployer abuse of workers' benefit plans. Examples of abuse include
breach of fiduciary duty, funding failures, and wrongfully denied bene-
fits. 9 Congress intended to establish a framework that would provide a
comprehensive and consistent set of federal regulations to govern em-
ployment benefit plans.' 0 To provide consistent laws, ERISA pre-empts
all state laws relating to "any employment benefit plan."'"
ERISA states that a plan participant or beneficiary has a right to
federal court review for termination and denial of benefits claims.12 Fur-
ther, Congress intended federal common law to develop under ERISA.
13
ERISA, however, is silent on the appropriate standard of review.
1 4
II. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
Because ERISA's preemption clause was drafted broadly enough to
exclude most state claims, a claim under the federal statute usually pro-
vides the only relief for a participant or beneficiary. 15 ERISA authorizes
8. Enzio Cassinis, Employment Law: The Tenth Circuit's Stance on the Evidentiary Scope of
a "De Novo" Review in ERISA Benefits Suits, 80 DENV. U. L REV. 529, 532 (2003).
9. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-
forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
10. Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in Man-
aged Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004) (stating that ERISA preempts state law); Jayne Elizabeth
Zanglein, Employee Benefits for General Practitioners: Ten Rules That Every Attorney Should Know
About ERISA, 26 TEx. TECH L. REV. 579, 580 (1995); Cassinis, supra note 8, at 532.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2004).
13. Cassinis, supra note 8, at 532 (citing Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th
Cit. 1985)); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
14. Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 824-25 (10th Cir. 1996).
15. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1083, 1090-91 (2001).
[T]o the extent ERISA's preemption clause is construed broadly to restrict and preempt
other State tort and contractual causes of action, more emphasis is obviously placed on
ERISA's federal causes of action which then may be the sole or predominant cause of ac-
tion and provide the only form of remedy for the participant/beneficiary.
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an individual to bring only certain types of suits in federal court. 16 Schol-
ars have criticized the limitations of ERISA remedies as a "shield for
plan fiduciaries and insurers to limit their liability," which is contrary to
the legislative intent of ERISA to protect employee benefit plan partici-
pants. 17
A. Claims Under § 1132(a)(1)(B)
ERISA authorizes plan participants to sue in federal court for denial
of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty. 18 A participant may sue for de-
nial of employee benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), which provides:
A civil action may be brought-(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to en-
force his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan. 19
ERISA authorizes three different causes of action under § 1132(a).20 The
first claim (relevant to Finley and this paper), under § 1132(a)(1), "af-
fords a cause of action for the participant/beneficiary to request recovery
of plan benefits, enforcement of plan rights or clarification of plan
rights.",21 Section 1132(a)(1) provides for both legal22 (i.e., monetary)
and equitable (i.e., injunctive or declaratory) relief.
23
B. Plan Level Review
Under ERISA, employee benefit plans are subject to an "internal
claim-review procedure." 24 The enforcement rules are codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1133, which provides:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor], every
employee benefit plan shall-(1) provide adequate notice 25 in writ-
ing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under
the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such
denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the par-
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
17. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1091.
18. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION, § 3.05[A], 3-107 (2d ed.
Supp. 2004) (outlining the statutory relief and right of civil action).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
20. Id.
21. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1092.
22. Id. (citing Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989); Novak v. Andersen
Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992)).
23. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993)).
24. Jay Corison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 21 (1992).
25. "Notice" is defined by the regulation as "[t]he delivery or furnishing of information to an
individual in a manner that satisfies the standards of 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-l(b) as appropriate with
respect to material required to be furnished or made available to an individual." 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(m)(5) (2004).
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ticipant, and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant
whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by
the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
26
Before a participant or beneficiary can sue, he must exhaust the in-
ternal remedies provided in § 1133.7 All circuits enforce these internal
limitations. 28 The ERISA Handbook on Litigation states that these inter-
nal requirements ensure that a plan participant who appeals an adminis-
trator's denial of benefits decision will "be able to address the determina-
tive issues and have a fair chance to present his case."
29
Ill. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The judicial standard of review under ERISA benefits suits is un-
clear and has caused conflict since the inception of ERISA.30 ERISA
31requires a participant to exhaust all the internal remedies before suing.
The administrator's handling of the patients benefit claims, and all
documents involved in the process, form a detailed administrative re-
cord.32
A. Review of the Plan Administrator's Decision
ERISA gives plan participants an express private right of action to
recover benefits due to them under the terms of their plan regardless of
whether other claims are available.33 However, as mentioned above,
ERISA does not set forth any standard of review in adjudicating denial of
benefit claims.
34
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2004); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (requiring written notice to a participant of a denied claim);
JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.03[A], at 4-8; Whitman F. Manley, Litigation Under
ERISA: Civil Actions Under ERISA Section 502(a): When Should Courts Require That Claimants
Exhaust Arbitral or Intrafund Remedies?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 952, 972 (1986) ("[Clourts should
require claimants seeking section 502(a)(1)(B) judicial review of benefit denials to exhaust adminis-
trative procedures before bringing suit, regardless of whether those procedures consist of internal
review by plan administrators or binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.").
28. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1996); Variety Chil-
dren's Hosp., Inc. v. Century Med. Health Plan, 57 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 1995); Hickey v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1995); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T,
40 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994);
Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Curry v. Contract Fabricators, Inc. Profit
Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 1990); Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199
(2d Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir. 1988).
29. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.03[D], at 4-15; see also Ellis v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 236-37 (4th Cir. 1997); Booton v. Lockheed Med. Benefit Plan, 110
F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1997); Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133; Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1091-92 (citing Amato v. Bernard, 618
F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1990)).
32. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1092.
33. JAMEs F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-48; see 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B).
34. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-48.
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After ERISA was enacted, the courts "almost uniformly" applied an
arbitrary and capricious standard to review an administrator or fiduci-
ary's benefit decision, giving great deference to the plan decision-
makers.35 This highly deferential standard drew criticism, especially in
cases where the administrator was "not necessarily impartial in the de-
termination of benefit eligibility or construction of plan terms. 37 Further,
some scholars have stated that the adoption of the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review indicated "little regard for the language of
ERISA."
38
B. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch
The United States Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of review in denial
of benefit cases under § 1132(a)(1)(B). 39 The Court held that "a denial of
benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de
novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan. ' 4° The Court set forth the following principles:
* Unless the language of a plan gives a fiduciary discretion to de-
termine eligibility or construe the terms of a plan, a claims decision
by a fiduciary should be reviewed under a de novo standard;
o If the plan language gives the fiduciary discretion to determine eli-
gibility or construe the terms of a plan, a court should not disturb the
decision unless it constituted an abuse of discretion; and
* If a plan fiduciary could gain from denying a claim, the potential
conflict of interest should be taken into account in determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
4'
Post Firestone, most circuits use one of two standards to review
employee benefit claims: de novo or the more deferential abuse of discre-
tion standard.42 A plan administrator's decision to deny benefits is gener-
35. Id.; see George L. Flint, ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule, 39 CATH. U. L. REv.
133, 139 (1989); Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1108-09.
36. See Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333-34 (3d
Cir. 1984); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.
1983); Dennard v. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1982).
37. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1109.
38. Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants; Practical Assessment of a Ne-
glected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 746 (1994) ("[C]onflict of interest al-
most always exists between ERISA benefits plans and benefits claimants. Incongruously, and with
little regard for the language of ERISA, the courts initially adopted the arbitrary-and-capricious rule
as the appropriate standard for review .... ").
39. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
40. Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
41. JAMES F. JORDEN ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.04[C], at 4-50.
42. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1130.
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ally reviewed under the de novo standard.43 The de novo standard of re-
view affords less deference to the administrator's decision because it
allows the courts to "second guess" the decision.44 But if the plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretion to determine eligibility for bene-
fits or to construe the terms of the plan, then an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review is applied.45 Arbitrary and capricious is synonymous
with abuse of discretion.46 In the Tenth Circuit, the abuse of discretion
standard is generally known as the arbitrary and capricious standard.
47
IV. DEEMED DENIALS
This paper examines the Tenth Circuit's decision in Finley v. Hew-
lett-Packard, which applied a more deferential standard of review-
arbitrary and capricious-to an administrator's "deemed denial" of bene-
fits. As the court noted in Finley, the circuits are split on this issue.48
A. Tenth Circuit: Finley v. Hewlett-Packard
49
1. Background
Ms. Finley was an employee of Hewlett-Packard Corporation from
1969 to 1996.50 In 1996, she suffered from right thoracolumbar scolio-
sis. 51 Ms. Finley's employee benefit plan (the "Plan") was sponsored by
Hewlett-Packard and administered by Voluntary Plan Administrators,
43. See Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002).
44. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1094.
45. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115.
46. "All the circuits affirm that there are two applicable judicial standards of review in ERISA
benefit denial claims-the de novo standard and the more deferential standard-abuse of discretion."
Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1130. "The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits prefer the
abuse of discretion standard over the de novo standard." Id. at n.249.
47. Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996).
48. The Finley court noted the following circuit splits on this issue in footnote five of the
opinion:
Compare Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Emp. Ben. Org. Income Protection Plan, 349 F.3d
1098, 1107- 08 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that the administrator's failure to communicate
with plaintiff until 119 days into the 120-day review period triggers de novo review);
Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2002) (extending no deference to a
plan administrator's post hoc justification, issued only after commencement of litigation,
for a deemed denial of benefits); with McGarrah, 234 F.3d at 1030-31 (holding that an
ERISA plan fiduciary's failure to respond to beneficiary's request for administrative re-
view does not trigger heightened scrutiny absent showing of extreme procedural irregu-
larities); Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir.1993)
("In our view, the standard of review is no different whether the claim is actually denied
or is deemed denied."); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168, 1173 n.5
(10th Cir. 2004).
49. Finley, 379 F.3d at 1168.
50. Id. at 1170.
51. Id.
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Inc. ("VPA").52 VPA operates as an independent third-party administra-
tor and is compensated solely by a flat fee.53
On November 29, 1996, Ms. Finley left her job and shortly thereaf-
ter applied to VPA for short-term disability benefits.54 VPA denied these
benefits and paid only after Ms. Finley "administratively appealed with
the help of an attorney. 5 5
Later in July of 1997, Ms. Finley applied for long-term benefits un-
der the Plan.56 According to the Plan, a member is only eligible for long-
term benefits after their short-term benefits have expired if the member is
permanently "unable to perform any occupation for which he or she is or
may become qualified." 7 Thus, Ms. Finley was required to show by "ob-
jective medical evidence" that she was unable to perform any job for
which she was or could become qualified.58
After Ms. Finley was examined by her doctors, as well as those of
VPA, she sent the required reports to VPA in September 1997. 9 VPA
denied long-term benefits on March 11, 1998.60 VPA stated that Ms.
Finley was "capable of performing sedentary work for which she may
become qualified.",6 1 Ms. Finley appealed VPA's denial of long-term
benefits on May 12, 1998.62 Under ERISA's provisions in 1998, an ap-
peal from a denial of benefits must be resolved within sixty days. 63 Simi-
larly, the Plan provided that an appeal must be resolved within sixty days
unless an extension has been granted.64
On July 14, 1988, after a series of exchanges, VPA agreed to make
a decision within sixty days.65 On October 9, 1998, VPA denied the ap-
peal.66
2. Procedural Facts
Ms. Finley sued "under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking recov-
ery of her long-term benefits, and under 29 U.S.C. § 1133, seeking dam-
52. ld. at 1170-71.










63. Id. at 1171-72 (citing that later amendments to this provision did not take effect until
January 1, 2002 so the court applied the older regulation).
64. Id. ("Section 8(c) of the benefits document mimics this regulation, stating: 'In no event
shall the decision of the Claims Administrator be rendered more than one hundred twenty (120) days
after it receives the request for review."').
65. Id. at 1171.
66. Id.
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ages for VPA's alleged failure to provide full and fair review of her
claims. 67 The district court held that VPA's response to Ms. Finley's
administrative appeal was due on September 12, 1998-sixty days after
VPA's July 14 letter.68 VPA, however, denied the appeal on October 9-
twenty-seven days late.69 Thus, Ms. Finley's administrative appeal was
"deemed denied" under ERISA. The district court granted summary
judgment for the VPA using an arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. 70 Both parties appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment.71
3. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the plan using
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to examine the Plan ad-
ministrator's "deemed denied" decision.72 In Finley, the Tenth Circuit
applied the Firestone holding that a denial-of-benefits claim under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) requires a de novo standard unless the administrator of
the plan has discretionary authority to determine eligibility of benefits.
73
In this case, the court held that the Plan administrator had full discretion
to determine eligibility of benefits and granted more deference to the
administrator's decision.74 Further, the court stated that because the Plan
administrator had no financial or other incentive to deny claims and that
the benefits were paid out of the Plan's trust funds, there was no conflict
of interest triggering a less deferential de novo standard of review.75
The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs contention that the court
owes no deference to the administrator's decision because it was
"deemed denied., 76 The court held that Ms. Finley's administrative ap-
peal falls into an exception to the general use of de novo review for
"deemed denials" because she failed to "provide meaningful new evi-
dence or raise significant new issues . and the delay does not under-
mine confidence in the integrity" of the decision making process.77 The
court held that the plan administrator had "substantially complied" with
the deadline and the delay was "inconsequential" and "in the context of





72. Id. at 1170.
73. Id. at 1172 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989));
Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 1173.
75. Id. at 1175.
76. Id. at 1173.
77. ld. at 1174.
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an on-going, good-faith exchange. 78 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant.
79
B. Ninth Circuit: Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard 8°
1. Background
In Jebian, the plaintiff was a Hewlett-Packard engineer who suf-
fered from a multitude of orthopedic impairments and was given short-
term disability benefits by the plan administrator-VPA. 8' After the
plaintiff had exhausted his short-term disability benefits, he applied and
was denied long-term benefits by VPA.82 He appealed the denial of
benefits, and sued the plan administrator after it failed to reply within
ERISA's timeframe. 83 The district court reviewed VPA's denial of long-
term benefits under the abuse-of-discretion (arbitrary and capricious)
standard, and granted summary judgment for the plan administrator.
84
2. Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the appropriate standard of
review was de novo.85 The Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impres-
sion that the "[d]eemed denials are not exercises of discretion." 86 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that "deemed denials" are "undeserving of defer-
ence under Firestone, and a de novo standard of review applies. 87 Fur-
ther, the court held that the plan administrator's 119 days of "radio si-
lence" to the claimant's appeal triggered de novo review.18 The Ninth
Circuit did note, however, that using de novo review in certain "deemed
denial" claims may be "tempered" where there is "substantial compli-
ance."
89
78. Id. at 1173-74.
79. Id. at 1173.
80. Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098 (9th
Cir. 2003).
81. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1101.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1102.
84. Id. ("We conclude that the proper standard of review of VPA's decision in this case is de
novo, and remand for reconsideration of Jebian's claim accordingly.").
85. Id. at 1103 ("The primary question before us, of first impression in this circuit, is whether
a plan administrator's discretion, otherwise within the administrator's discretion, can be accorded
judicial deference when the purported final, discretionary decision is not made until after the claim is
... already automatically deemed denied on review. We conclude that where, according to plan and
regulatory language, a claim is 'deemed . . .denied' on review ... there is no opportunity for the
exercise of discretion and the denial is usually to be reviewed de novo.").
86. Id. at 1106; see also Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., 275 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
the administrator's failure to exercise discretion and communicate with the plaintiffs prior to litiga-
tion subjected them to de novo review).
87. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1106.
88. Id. at 1107.
89. Id.
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C. Fifth Circuit: Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore90
1. Background
In Moore, the plaintiff sought to recover accidental death benefits
under ERISA.9' The plaintiff was employed by Southern Farm Bureau
Life Insurance Company and had coverage for herself and her husband.92
Plaintiffs husband suffered a brain tumor and fatally crashed his vehi-
cle.93 The plaintiff attempted to recover benefits from Southern Farm
Life, the plan administrator.94 Southern Farm Life filed for a declaratory
judgment, asking the court to hold that the plaintiffs policy did not re-
quire it to pay under a policy exception.95 Southern Farm Life did not
communicate the denial of the plaintiffs claim to her before asking for
the declaratory judgment.96 The plaintiff counterclaimed for alleged
deemed denial of benefits.97 The district court applied de novo review
and found for the plaintiff.98 The administrator of the plan appealed.99
2. Decision
The Fifth Circuit held that "[i]n our view, the standard of review is
no different whether the claim is actually denied or is deemed denied."''1°
The court held that the district court erred in using the de novo standard
of review for factual determinations under ERISA and instead applied
the abuse of discretion standard.10 Thus, the court rejected plaintiffs
contention that the failure to provide a written denial within the time-
frames required under ERISA elevates the standard of review from abuse
of discretion to de novo. 10 2 However, the Fifth Circuit held that "under
Firestone, we review the plan administrator's interpretation of the policy
de novo.
' 03
90. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993).









100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. ("For factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of
review is the appropriate standard; that is, federal courts owe due deference to an administrator's
factual conclusions that reflect a reasonable and impartial judgment.").
102. Id. ("Failure to provide a written denial does not mean that the abuse of discretion stan-
dard announced in Pierre is not applicable.").
103. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Eighth Circuit: McGarrah v. Hartford Life Insurance Company' °4
1. Background
In McGarrah, the plaintiff sued the plan administrator under ERISA
for terminating his benefits.'05 The plaintiff was a truck driver for Wal-
mart. 1°' After slipping on ice and suffering a herniated cervical disk, he
applied for and received long-term disability benefits. 0 7 Two years later,
Hartford (the employee benefit plan administrator) discontinued benefits
after learning that the plaintiffs physical condition had significantly im-
proved. 0 8 The plaintiff appealed the denial but did not receive a response
from Hartford. 1°9 The plaintiff sued for the denied benefits under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)." 0 The district court-using the arbitrary and capricious
standard-granted summary judgment for Hartford.1 1'
2. Decision
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's use of the arbitrary
standard and the judgment for the defendant.' 12 The court held that "[i]n
general, the abuse-of-discretion standard applies, if, as in this case, the
plan expressly gives the administrator discretion to determine eligibility
for benefits and to construe the terms of the plan."'" 3 The court re-
sponded to the plaintiffs claim that "procedural irregularities" should
entitle him to a less deferential review of the administrator's decision by
conceding that Hartford's failure to respond is "troubling" and a "serious
procedural irregularity." 114 The Eighth Circuit, however, set forth a "rig-
orous standard" that a participant must meet to get de novo review: the
irregularity must "raise[s] serious doubts as to whether the result reached
was the product of an arbitrary decision or the plan administrator's whim
.. or where procedural irregularities are so egregious that the court has
a total lack of faith in the integrity of the decision making process
The Eighth Circuit held that the "mere presence of a procedural ir-
regularity is not enough to strip a plan administrator of the deferential
104. McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2000).




109. Id. at 1029.
110. Id. at 1027.
111. Id. at 1027-28.
112. Id. at 1028.
113. Id. at 1030 (citing Bruch, 489 U.S. at 115).
114. Id. at 1031.
115. Id.
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standard of review."'"16 The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant." 
7
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
In Gilbertson v. Allied Signal Inc., decided before Finley, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's use of arbitrary and capricious in a
"deemed denied" case! 18 In Gilbertson, the plaintiff appealed the admin-
istrator's denial of long-term benefits.' 9 Later, the administrator ex-
tended the time for providing additional medical information in consider-
ing the plaintiffs appeal. 120 But the administrator neither replied to the
appeal within ERISA's required timeframe nor contacted the plaintiff
again. 12 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's appeal was "deemed
denied.' ' 122 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's use of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard in granting summary judgment for the de-
fendant and remanded for a de novo review.
23
The Tenth Circuit noted in Finley that a court should use de novo
review in a "deemed denied" case: "[w]hen the administrator fails to
exercise his discretion within the required timeframe, the reviewing court
must apply Firestone's default de novo standard.' '124 However, the Tenth
Circuit distinguished Gilbertson, stating that the administrator "made no
decision to which a court may defer" requiring a de novo review.
125
The Tenth Circuit further attempted to qualify Gilbertson by stating
that its decision to apply de novo, instead of the arbitrary and capricious
standard, is not "a hair-trigger rule" resulting in less deference if the ad-
ministrator's decision is "rendered the day after the deadline." 126
In Finley, the Tenth Circuit held that there was a limited exception
(McGarrah exception) to the de novo standard if the "delay was a mere
procedural irregularity that did not undermine its confidence in the integ-
rity of the administrator's decision making process."' 127 The Tenth Circuit
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1030-31 ("In these circumstances, Hartford's failure to respond to McGarrah's
appeal, while wrong, does not undermine our confidence in the integrity of its decision-making
process.").
118. Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 631-32 (10th Cir. 2003).
119. Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 629.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 636.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 636-37.
124. Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168,
1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 631-32).
125. Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 631-32).
126. Id. at 1173 (quoting McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234 F.3d 1026, 1031 (8th Cir.
2000)).
127. Id. at 1174 (citing the district court's reliance on the Eight Circuit's decision in McGar-
rah, 234 F.3d at 1026, forwarding this exception to using de novo review in "deemed denial" cases).
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applied the arbitrary and capricious standard because the plaintiff failed
to "provide meaningful new evidence or raise significant new issues [on
administrative appeal]." 128 Also, the Tenth Circuit held that the delay did
"not undermine [the court's] confidence in the integrity of [the adminis-
trator's] decision-making process." 19
The Tenth Circuit reiterated in Finley that the goal of ERISA is to
"promote accurate, cooperative, and reasonably speedy decision-making
based upon a good faith exchange of information between the
administrator and the claimant."'130 Further, the court said that failure by
the plan administrator to respond under the required timeframes can still
be deemed "substantial compliance" if the delay is: "(1) inconsequential;
and (2) in the context of an on-going, good-faith exchange of information
between the administrator and the claimant."'
' 3 1
In Finley, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "substantial compliance
rule" of Gilbertson and held that VPA had substantially complied with
the deadline, albeit late. 32 However, the substantial compliance rule in
"deemed denial" cases fails to "protect the reasonable expectations of the
participants."'133 Thus, when an administrator fails to comply with
ERISA's deadlines and a claim is deemed denied, no deference should be
granted.
The Tenth Circuit in Finley appears determined to grant deference
to a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits. If we re-examine the
purpose and spirit of ERISA-to provide a constructive framework in
order to prevent employer abuses of participants' benefit plans-an ad-
ministrator's failure to respond to a participant or beneficiary's appeal
for denial of benefits is not an acceptable exercise of discretion. Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit held in Jebian that "[d]eemed denials are not
exercises of discretion."'' 34 Congress's intent to "protect employees' 135
should not be construed in "deemed denial" cases to allow administrators
of an employee benefit plan yet another tactic to stall decisions or frus-
trate the process. 136 A plan administrator's failure to respond to an appeal
within the prescribed ERISA timeframes indicates a lack of acting pru-
128. Id. (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 633).
129. Id. (quoting McGarrah, 234 F.3d at 1031).
130. Id. at 1173 (quoting Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 635).
131. Id. at 1174 (citing Gilbertson, 328 F.3d at 635).
132. Id. at 1173-75.
133. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpre-
tation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 995, 1050 (1995).
134. Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098,
1106 (9th Cir. 2003).
135. See 29 U.S.C § 1001(a) (2004).
136. Flint, supra note 133, at 1048 ("The policy that ERISA seeks to further is to protect the
reasonable expectations of the participants.").
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dently or in "good faith" and courts should not accord deference to the
administrator's decision.' 37
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit treats all denials the same: "[iln our
view, the standard of review is no different whether the claim is actually
denied or is deemed denied."'138 Although the Fifth Circuit prefers the
abuse of discretion for all factual determination reviews, a blanket appli-
cation affords the same deference to an administrator's decision whether
or not it complied with the timeframes provided for under ERISA.
Although the silence of ERISA on an appropriate standard of re-
view was intentional in order to develop federal common law, a standard
of review for "deemed denials" is necessary to provide participants,
beneficiaries, and employers consistent guidelines for compliance. 139
Further, a consistent approach will promote ERISA's goals of "fairness,
disclosure, and due process to participants" with similar claims.'
4° Oth-
erwise, as a scholar has noted, "the method of review chosen by the
courts will determine the fairness by which a plan administrator adminis-
ters an employee benefit plan.
141
Applying de novo review in "deemed denial" cases encourages ad-
ministrators to "protect the reasonable expectations of the partici-
pants.' 42 Plan administrators will follow ERISA's provisions more
closely and act more prudently if they lose the "defendant's shield"
14 of
arbitrary and capricious review in "deemed denial" cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
ERISA's silence has resulted in the current circuit split regarding
the appropriate standard of review of an administrator's "deemed de-
nied" decision. The Tenth Circuit grants more deference than other cir-
cuits to an administrator's decision by using an arbitrary and capricious
standard in "deemed denial" cases when the administrator has substan-
tially complied with ERISA's timeframes. But to comply with ERISA's
purpose and spirit to protect employees, however, courts should apply the
less deferential standard of de novo in "deemed denial" cases. Applying
137. Jebian, 349 F.3d at 1103.
138. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993).
139. See 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a
body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights
and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 56 (1987) (stating that a federal common law is sought for ERISA provision interpretation).
140. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 1175.
141. George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Seige, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 133, 133 (1989) (emphasis added).
142. Flint, supra note 133, at 1048.
143. Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants; Practical Assessment of a Ne-
glected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 724 (1994).
[Vol. 82:3
2005] ERISA 'S SILENCE
the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in "deemed denial"
cases provides plan administrators no incentives to comply with ERISA.
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